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BGA Report -- Part 3 ( BGA Report -- Part 1
Part 2 Part 3
Part 4)
Aviles’ Story
Zuley and Vic Valdez, of the Illinois State Police, debriefed
Aviles. Aviles said that he had a conversation with Cruz, a chieftain
of the PR Stones on January 13, 1993, in which he admitted involvement
in the Palatine murders. “There was a fight and shit had
to be done.” Aviles went on to explain that there had been
a fight and Cruz had “japped out and had to do them all.”
Cruz said that he was with “Gabriel” that Friday night
and that there “wasn’t much money” in the restaurant.
Aviles said Gabriel, another PR Stone, was still talking about
Palatine. He explained later that “Gabriel” was actually
Sanchez. Aviles had initially wanted to protect Sanchez because
he had offered Aviles’ girlfriend a place to live when she
first left home.
Meanwhile, a tip had come in from a witness who said he saw a
man standing inside Brown’s the night of the murders. As
he walked up to the door and pulled on it, the man told him that
the restaurant was closed. The witness completed an identi-kit,
which bore a striking resemblance to Sanchez. Zuley saw the identi-kit
result during the course of his conversations with Aviles. His
belief in the accuracy of Lead 80 increased. This witness later
identified a photo of Sanchez as that person.
However, this witness later admitted that he filed a false police
report. He said he was, “trying to protect someone.”
His identi-kit result was discredited, but only after Lead 80
was already dismissed.
Aviles admitted to committing a number of armed robberies with
Cruz in the months immediately preceding the murders. The gang
was putting together money for a drug buy, and they were moving
their efforts to the suburbs, where there was “more money
and less chance of getting caught.”
To corroborate Aviles’ statements, Zuley and Valdez, along
with Longos and Rodriguez of Gang Crimes, drove around with Aviles
and another witness, asking them to identify previous jobs, which
they did.
A String of Robberies
Aviles took the investigators to the Captain Video Store. On
December 6, 1992, the PR Stones robbed the Captain Video Store
at 4459 Lawrence Ave. Two offenders entered the store and brandished
a blue steel semi-automatic pistol. They herded two employees
into the store basement while one offender went behind the counter
to the register and removed $500 cash.
The PR Stones moved north. On December 29, 1992, Cruz robbed
an employee at the King David Bakery on Dempster and McCormick.
Cruz put a gun to the young employee’s head and stole his
paycheck and the cash he had on him. Aviles and Sanchez, along
with two other gang members, were waiting in the car while Cruz
robbed him.
On January 5, 1993, the woman owner of the Irish Wolfhound Pub
at 3734 W. Milwaukee was forced at gunpoint to open the restaurant’s
safe. The other employee was robbed by a second offender. Once
again, two offenders entered the pub and threatened employees
with a blue steel semi-automatic pistol. The PR Stones are believed
to have been involved.
January 6, 1993, two days before the Brown’s murders, the
PR Stones robbed the Edens Motel at the intersection of Cicero
and Peterson. One of the robbers, later identified as Aviles,
entered the motel lobby with a blue steel semi-automatic pistol
and struck the desk clerk in the face, demanding that he open
the register. Aviles was caught hiding in a dumpster after fleeing
the scene. He was incarcerated. The physical description offered
of one of the offenders in the Edens Motel robbery matched the
description given by the victims of the Captain Video Store robbery.
Aviles also offered information regarding the casing of a North
Side Burger King restaurant. He admitted to, “pumping”
his girlfriend’s friend, a Burger King employee, for information
on store policies. Aviles and his girlfriend asked the employee
about closing times, the number of people that worked given shifts,
and the location of the safe. Task Force documents reveal that
the employee and Burger King manager corroborated Aviles’
statements. They placed him and his girlfriend in the store, and
described the wad of money Aviles was carrying at the time. The
employee confirmed that she was “being pumped” for information.
The modus operandi of all of these robberies were strikingly
similar to Brown’s and the chronology of robberies, which
led progressively northward, led directly to Brown’s.
Corroboration of Lead 80
Chicago Gang Crimes current intelligence was saying that “Palatine
was a PR Stones thing.” Their intelligence also indicated
Cruz now wanted Aviles killed for ratting on him. Officers Longos
and Rodriguez of Gang Crimes knew the PR Stones exceptionally
well. “Our guys felt that Cruz was the guy.”
Chicago Gang Crimes firmly believed this during the time leading
up to the surveillance and arrest of Cruz. In interviews with
investigators, Aviles noted Cruz’ habits. His favorite weapon
was a .38 Smith and Wesson. Highly unusual for stick-up men, he
always carried spare ammo and liked to reload. Cruz liked to fire
the weapon, would reload right away and he always picked up the
shell casings. He always wore gloves. These were the circumstances
of the Brown’s massacre. The detectives were convinced.
Brent Fowler of the Skokie police was now a key lead 80 investigator.
Brought in because of the apparent connection between Palatine
and the King David Bakery robbery, Fowler began a push to set-up
surveillance of Cruz. Initially worried about the veracity of
Aviles’ information, Fowler and the other detectives were
satisfied after Aviles’ initial statements about the gang’s
other robberies proved exceptionally accurate.
Surveillance and Arrest
Fowler requested a special mobile surveillance van from Northbrook.
He also recruited other investigators and analysts from the state
team, through Vic Valdez, to assist. Mobile surveillance is complicated,
sophisticated and labor intensive. But the state police had exceptionally
useful civilian cars and agreed to help Gang Crimes because of
their belief that Cruz and Sanchez were involved in Palatine.
But Gang Crimes’ mobile surveillance of Cruz was called
off by Kavanaugh of the State’s Attorney’s office. Kavanaugh
maintained that the investigators lacked probable cause to initiate
the surveillance. O’Brien later admitted that surveillance
is in fact used to develop probable cause, not the other way around,
saying, “whoever gave them that advice was wrong.” This
is about as fundamental a criminal legal concept as there is.
Kavanaugh’s gross misinterpretation of fundamental concepts
such as probable cause may be connected to his tenure at the Internal
Affairs Division (IAD). There, policemen contend that probable
cause is necessary before initiating internal surveillance of
fellow law enforcement officers. Whatever the case, Kavanaugh
was not convinced and the investigators were angry.
Kavanaugh and O’Brien continued to discount Lead 80 by saying
that they simply couldn’t believe that “jerky gang bangers”
were committing suburban robberies, much less a crime of Palatine’s
magnitude.
Yet another obstacle had been erected by Task Force command.
Zuley and Fowler decided that “these people are nuts.”
If you want a surveillance, “prove these guys did a suburban
robbery,” was Kavanaugh’s challenge to Valdez, Zuley
and Fowler. Checking records, Fowler described to Kavanaugh the
Skokie bakery robbery. Also, Aviles’ father lived in Wheeling,
one of Palatine’s neighboring suburbs. When things got too
hot in the city after performing a string of robbery jobs, the
Stones would use the home of Aviles’ father as a hide-out.
Doubts about gang activity in the suburbs were diminishing.
“Prove Cruz did the suburban bakery robbery,” was
the next hurdle given to the investigators by Kavanaugh if they
wanted to conduct surveillance. Kavanaugh insisted that Cruz be
positively ID’d as the offender in spite of heavily corroborated
evidence that Cruz was indeed responsible. Kavanaugh was told
that it would be a mistake to positive ID an armed robber who
had become a prime suspect in a multiple murder case. If Cruz
was ID’d and not watched, and he committed more crimes, someone
would look foolish. But Kavanaugh did not relent.
Fowler then conducted a photo line-up so that the Skokie robbery
victim could ID his attacker. Without hesitation, the victim identified
Cruz and pointed out that Cruz had spoken to him in Puerto Rican
Spanish as he stole his paycheck. Aviles previously told investigators
about the stolen paycheck. His information kept checking out.
Fowler had now proven that Cruz had been involved in a suburban
robbery. The Task Force command—O’Brien, Kavanaugh
and Koziol—met a few days later and decided that surveillance
was no longer enough. A warrant for Cruz’ arrest would be
sought. They had a confirmed armed robber and murder suspect on
the street. But before procuring the warrant O’Brien insisted
upon meeting with the Skokie victim personally.
The Skokie robbery victim was taken to Rolling Meadows by Fowler.
O’Brien interviewed him, decided he was in fact reliable,
and authorized Fowler’s request for an arrest warrant. O’Brien
was satisfied. He had come full circle and was now vouching for
Aviles’ credibility with the court. Aviles had provided the
Task Force with key information that had led to the witness and
the solution of the King David Bakery robbery and ultimately to
the issuing of a warrant for Cruz’s arrest.
Arrangements were made for Gang Crimes to do the pick-up on January
25, 1993. Just having finished another briefing session with Aviles,
Valdez, Zuley and Fowler called Palatine Deputy Chief McGregor.
He told them that the sweep was canceled, nothing was happening,
and they could go home. Zuley then called Gang Crimes to inform
them that nothing was happening. But Gang Crimes countered that
they had been called by the Task Force and they were going to
meet in the 24th District that night to execute the arrest warrant
by picking up Cruz.
Gang Crimes, well-acquainted with Cruz, was going to carry out
the arrest with representatives of the State’s Attorney’s
office and Palatine present. Rodriguez had arranged to meet Cruz
at the McDonald’s on Clark and Olive streets. This was not
unusual—Rodriguez had known Cruz since Cruz was fourteen.
Rodriguez described him as a “stone-cold killer.”
The Split
Zuley and Fowler were furious. The Task Force had cut them out
of their lead.
Fowler went straight to the 24th District office on Clark Street
in Rogers Park. Zuley went home, fuming. Fowler insisted that
he, along with Zuley and Valdez, be present during the arrest.
It was a Skokie case and warrant, and Kavanaugh agreed that Fowler
could participate. Fowler called Zuley at home, asking him to
come to the 24th. When Zuley arrived, he went nose-to-nose with
Kavanaugh in front of the 20 to 30 people present, including state
police Glenn Leonard and Vic Valdez and representatives of Gang
Crimes. Zuley screamed, “this is bullshit, cutting us out
... after we built this lead, you tell us to go home while you
pick up the suspect ... you’re grandstanding this investigation!”
Kavanaugh was relatively silent.
A highly-experienced and high-ranking law enforcement officer
and senior member of the Task Force described the confrontation
between Zuley and Kavanaugh in the following way: “Kavanaugh
and Zuley were nose-to-nose shouting.” He actually moved
back because he feared that punches would be thrown. When asked
what the fight was about he answered, “control.” He
believed that Kavanaugh wanted to control the investigation very
tightly, which surprised him, considering Kavanaugh’s lack
of investigative experience.
The officer also described the role of the State’s Attorney’s
office and thought it odd that they were in command, as opposed
to experienced homicide detectives like Zuley. The State’s
Attorney usually expedites search warrant requests and provides
support to investigators. He couldn’t believe they were involved
with Palatine in a daily, supervisory manner. The officer added
that he believed there to be a pre-existing relationship between
Kavanaugh and Koziol, Bratcher’s “rising star.”
Kavanaugh and Koziol were involved together in every way and appeared
to be friends. The officer did not like Koziol—he thought
he was “aggressive and pushy beyond what was necessary.”
After the confrontation, Kavanaugh said privately to Zuley, “Don’t
you ever do that again.” But Fowler later challenged Kavanaugh
on the same grounds. He argued that Zuley and Valdez were integral
to the interrogation of Cruz and Sanchez because they had all
the information on their backgrounds and other criminal activity.
The Initial Interrogation
The group traveled to the Skokie station to conduct the interrogation.
Fowler began the questioning of Cruz. Zuley did a cursory interview
with Sanchez. Kavanaugh and Robertson, a State’s Attorney
investigator known as someone you “wouldn’t want to
cross,” went to Skokie as well. They were planning on interrogating
the suspects themselves, but Fowler and Zuley took over. The Skokie
chief forced Kavanaugh and Robertson to wait in the station house.
“Skokie warrant, Skokie house, Skokie rules,” he said.
Now it was Kavanaugh and Robertson who were cut out of the interrogation.
They left Skokie late that evening, furious.
Meanwhile, Fowler was talking to Cruz. At first, Cruz stated
that he had remained in the car during the King David Bakery job
while his accomplices robbed the employee. The next morning, however,
when Cruz’s questioning continued, he finally admitted that
he was the one to put a gun to the victim’s head and rob
him of his paycheck. This admission came only after almost six
hours of questioning. Fowler arranged a physical line-up for the
Skokie witness and the witness identified Cruz. Cruz was charged
with armed robbery and armed violence.
It was time to transfer Cruz and Sanchez to Palatine.
Interrogation at Palatine
All was quiet at Task Force Headquarters when Cruz and Sanchez
were brought in for further questioning. According to one detective,
“there was no sense of excitement or urgency in the air.
It didn’t feel as if the crime were about to be cracked.”
O’Brien and Chief Bratcher were not present when the interrogation
began around 4:30 p.m. on January 26, 1993. They had a dinner
to attend.
When the interrogation began, Valdez was questioning Sanchez.
He informed Sanchez that Cruz had already implicated him in the
Skokie robbery, but Sanchez maintained his innocence. Zuley joined
in the questioning and proceeded to describe the other robbery
jobs that Aviles and Cruz had discussed with the investigators.
Although noticeably upset and emotional, Sanchez continued to
deny involvement.
It became quickly apparent to the investigators that Sanchez
was terrified of Cruz; Sanchez feared for his life. He was emotional,
sobbing. He grew even more upset when the interrogation turned
to the subject of Palatine.
Meanwhile, investigators Fowler and Russell interrogated Cruz.
A decision was made to break for dinner, and the four lead investigators
left to eat and bring burgers back for the suspects. According
to one key investigator, a good way to “move suspects”
is to show them a little respect.
As they left the station, the investigators had already discussed
how to best use Aviles’ statements against Cruz. They had
decided to confront Cruz with the jailhouse telephone conversation.
They were also going to arrange for polygraph tests and physical
line-ups. The investigators felt they were in for a long night
of questioning.
As the four investigators, Zuley, Fowler, Valdez and Russell
went outside, one observer noticed that it didn’t seem as
if much progress was being made. Jay Levine of Channel 2 News
was doing a report outside headquarters, and the investigators
laughed at him as they got into the car. Levine was one of Bratcher’s
favorite reporters.
The investigators returned to the station after dinner. Zuley
made a call to Chief Milner of Elmhurst, an expert on interrogation
techniques. Zuley wanted his advice on how to best handle the
situation. While Zuley was talking with Milner, Koziol and Robertson
informed the other Lead 80 detectives that they were releasing
Cruz and Sanchez.
What had happened after the investigators left for dinner probably
changed the course of the investigation forever. The split down
the middle of the Task Force between the investigators and the
command became a chasm and it exists to this day.
When Zuley, Fowler, Valdez and Russell went to dinner, a senior
law enforcement official noticed something peculiar. Koziol and
Robertson from the State’s Attorney’s office entered
the interrogation room where Cruz was being held. The law enforcement
official believed that the lead investigators did not know their
suspects would be questioned while they were gone. He went on
to explain that it is not acceptable in any police organization
for other officers to go in and interview a suspect without the
expressed consent of the investigator.
How serious was this breach of police etiquette when Koziol intervened
to release Cruz?
LeRoy Martin, former superintendent of the Chicago PD and a man
with a wealth of knowledge in the investigation of violent crime,
addressed the BGA/Crime Commission Blue Ribbon Panel. He was asked
about the practice of interrupting an officer’s interrogation
and replied, “that would probably result in a fist fight
in most Chicago precincts.”
Another senior law enforcement official with over 30 years of
experience present at the scene put it this way: “You have
got to understand ... a police officer anywhere in the world would
have a huge problem with that. It is an unforgivable offense ...
it doesn’t matter if the guy would apologize or offer to
shine your shoes. You’d have a problem with them for the
rest of your career. Police simply don’t do that no matter
what the reason.” He went on to say, “then to let someone’s
suspect go after talking to them is beyond a fighting offense.”
This official was a member of the Task Force and assumed Koziol
knew what he was doing. After all, he was one of the bosses.
But after spending less than an hour between Cruz and Sanchez,
Koziol and Robertson had decided that he was not involved with
the Palatine killings.
Koziol told Valdez that he “had looked into his [Cruz’s]
eyes and believed that he didn’t do it.” Valdez asked
Koziol to clarify his statement, to be sure that he did indeed
want the suspects released. Koziol reiterated that Cruz and Sanchez
were not involved in the murders. A senior law enforcement official
notes, “most police that know about Lead 80 know about the
‘I looked in his eyes’ statement and they think it’s
just stupid.”
Zuley had by now finished his conversation with Chief Milner
and he had just learned of Koziol’s decision. He shouted,
“What did you do? You’ve only worked on two murders
in your life! You talked to him for 25 minutes and determined
he didn’t do the murders and it took Fowler six hours to
get him to confess to an armed robbery. How many gang-banging,
murdering, robber Puerto Ricans have you ever interviewed in Palatine?”
Zuley screamed at Koziol. Koziol responded, “That shouldn’t
matter. I’ve been to the Reid School of Interrogation.”
Zuley remembered what his Chicago superior had told him when
he had first been assigned to the Task Force. He had warned him
not to fight with anyone at Palatine, “remember, it’s
their murder case.”
Zuley had already caused problems in his week on the Task Force.
Individuals close to Zuley recalled one of his first interactions
with Chief Bratcher. Zuley had been complaining to Bratcher about
the incomplete canvass attempt. He criticized Koziol and Bratcher
looked surprised. Early in the investigation, a large group of
Task Force members went out to dinner. During dinner, Zuley was
overheard to say to the chief, “Boss, this is solveable.
It’s punks. It’s a shitty stick up team that fucked
up. This case is not seven murders, it’s one R/D number.
The number of victims doesn’t change anything.”
Zuley decided he didn’t want to interfere again. It was
Fowler who insisted that Cruz not be released. “I’m
not releasing him—I want him charged from Skokie.”
The Unraveling of Lead 80
Zuley believed that the command had not liked the lead from the
initial tip. They were easily intrigued by more sensational explanations.
A county detective related they were intrigued by the facts that
Ted Kennedy had called the Ehlendfeldt’s daughters to express
his sympathy over their loss. Were the killings political? Was
the Mafia involved? Had they financed the restaurant?
From the beginning hours of the investigation, there were several
officers who discussed the possibility of a robbery gang being
responsible for the murders. But Zuley felt that the command didn’t
look at the obvious. The command was simply too stunned by the
magnitude of the case.
Yet the FBI seemed supportive of the lead. One agent told Zuley
that while the FBI could not initiate an investigation, they would
be supportive of the detectives’ work and help in any capacity
that they could.
There was little the Lead 80 investigators could do after Koziol’s
decision was made. Cruz and Sanchez were released from Palatine
and Cruz was charged with the Skokie armed robbery and booked.
The next day was January 27, 1993. Longos of Gang Crimes and
Fowler had another brief conversation with Cruz in Skokie. In
an attempt to confuse Cruz, Longos explained that perhaps he had
been implicated because he was caught on film, or because detectives
might have his fingerprint from the bakery employee’s paycheck
and it matched one in Brown’s.
Cruz took the bait. He shouted out, “man, there was no camera
in that restaurant!”
Cruz had told Fowler that he wanted to talk to Zuley. Zuley arrived
at the Skokie station and went in to see Cruz. Fowler sat in on
the interview. They noted that Cruz cared about his wife and children,
expressed great concern for them and that he feared for them.
He was in tears and said he couldn’t sleep. Cruz told Zuley
and Fowler that he wasn’t involved, but that his roommates
were. “Look, man, I didn’t do it but man, they didn’t
have to shoot them all, man they just shot all of them, they shot
five of them in one place and two in the other—and just for
chump change ... there was a fight and they killed them all.”
Aviles had initially told investigators that there had been a
fight. Cruz’s statements again validated Aviles’ story
and corresponded to the physical evidence at the scene.
Cruz identified his roommates by their gang names. Gang Crimes
intelligence revealed that they were Eric Huber and Brian Deering,
white males that were members of the TJOs. Both men had recently
been released from the penitentiary. They had records for violent
criminal behavior. Huber and Brian Deering’s brother Patrick
were incarcerated for nine years for their participation in a
wild shoot-out with police on the North Side.
In an October 1984 drug deal gone awry, Huber, Deering and their
ringleader Gary Kellas, attempted to sell $22,600 worth of cocaine
to an undercover officer. The Chicago Police Department’s
Organized Crime Division had set-up a sting. After attempting
to take the money without turning over the cocaine, the gang members
took out Uzis and began firing at the individuals now identified
as police officers. A car chase ensued, the gunfire continued,
and the TJOs were arrested and tried.
It was this same group of violent criminals who Cruz was implicating
in the Brown’s massacre. But Cruz was due in court. The investigators
had to finish their questioning. Cruz would not talk about his
relationship with Aviles. They had to let him go.
But Lead 80 was not dead. Zuley and Fowler planned a SuperBowl
Sunday sweep to pick up the area TJOs, including Huber and the
Deering brothers, and “front them” against one another.
Gang members often talk.
Another Preemption
The suburban gang sweep involving Gang Crimes, Skokie, State
and Task Force members, was planned for Sunday, but that was evidently
not soon enough for Task Force command. Koziol and Robertson picked
up just Huber and Deering on Saturday, without the knowledge of
the lead investigators and without picking up their associates.
Zuley and Fowler had been overridden again, their experience in
murder and gang cases dismissed as inconsequential.
Afterward, Zuley and Fowler were asked if they wanted to talk
to both men. Before they entered the interrogation room, Koziol
described the content of his interviews with the suspects. He
said that they did not appear to be involved.
Zuley interviewed Huber with Bryan Opitz of Palatine. Opitz was
pretty quiet during the interview, as if he didn’t want to
interfere. In fact, Opitz admitted his lack of investigative preparation
and deferred to Zuley’s expertise.
The interview was short. Huber described his recent haircut and
discussed the Friday night of the murders. He said that he had
been driving around with Cruz in Cruz’s girlfriend’s
car. She had come down from Fon du Lac, Wisconsin in her 1985
silver Ford Thunderbird with four round headlights. Reports taken
from eyewitnesses who were around Brown’s between 9 p.m.
and 10 p.m. confirm that a silver car with four headlights was
seen parked behind the restaurant. But Cruz’s girlfriend
didn’t remember if she was in Chicago that night. Her story
changed. She originally said she picked-up Cruz before dark and
arrived in Fon Du Lac around midnight. She later said she wasn’t
sure.
Fowler learned little additional information from Brian Deering.
Huber and Deering were consequently released, Lead 80 was declared
dead, and the investigating officers were assigned to new leads.
Zuley and Fowler were both assigned to investigative teams led
by officers of a much lower rank. Shortly thereafter, Zuley, and
later Fowler, left the Task Force.
According to Chief Bratcher, Zuley was dismissed from the Task
Force for leaking to the press. Zuley maintains he left the Task
Force of his own volition. But Kavanaugh would seek greater revenge
against the detective who had publicly embarrassed him. He would
go to IAD.
Lead 80, however, was not completely dismissed. Two separate
follow-up investigations, conducted by Medrys of Cook County and
Peters of Barrington, along with the FBI, were ordered. But the
trail was cold, the initial investigators were not consulted,
and key witnesses were not called. But years later, Bratcher could
say: “This lead is dead. It’s been beat to death. It
has no legs, it can’t stand on it’s own.”
Perspective
Zuley, Valdez and Fowler, along with the other lead 80 investigators,
were angry. They admit their frustration with Task Force command.
Their opinions of the events are obviously colored by their emotions.
But there were other officers present who were not directly involved
in the interrogations. They observed the events and had this to
say about why the feeling was that the murders were the result
of a botched robbery attempt:
“They had all kinds of strange theories, but if you came
to kill a guy, you don’t kill six people with him ... you
wait and you get him in the parking lot without any witnesses.”
“As far as Lead 80, I know Dick Zuley and murder is his
thing. I’ve talked to a lot of guys and some like Zuley and
some hate him. But none of them question his skill at solving
murders.”
“In my mind, Lead 80 was the best we had. I remember we
were going to follow Cruz. We had everything set up, and the word
came down that there would be no surveillance. I don’t know
why Kavanaugh ordered that ... Remember that your [the BGA] report
will be read by a lot of chiefs and police officers and it is
an example of how the wrong people were in charge.”
Lead 80 Response
“The Leak”
At one point, Channel 7’s Chuck Goudie appeared to put out
inaccurate information he had gathered regarding the investigation
of Lead 80. Zuley, who knew Goudie from contact in Chicago, offered
to call Goudie to straighten out the facts. He was roundly told
to keep out of it.
From the beginning, key members of the command had chosen favorites
among the press corps to leak information to. Jay Levine was consistently
stroked by the Task Force and was also liked by Bratcher—they
had other favorites too. Goudie was not one of the chosen. Goudie
had taken a very hard line toward the Task Force and was therefore
widely detested by the command. One witness close to the Task
Force told us, “they hated Goudie and posted his picture
up on the wall next to the mug shots of wanted criminals.”
Zuley’s attempts to provide Goudie with correct information
were heavily criticized by management members of the Task Force,
and Chief Bratcher maintains that Zuley was in fact fired from
the Task Force for leaking to the press. Information on lead 80
did not reach the media, however, until September of 1993. Zuley
had left the Task Force in February of that year.
The Lead 80 document that was leaked was a copy of a draft report.
This report had been accessible to many people from many different
agencies. Nothing Zuley had worked on during his time on the Task
Force was reported by the media during the first nine months after
the murders. Zuley insists that he was not responsible for the
leak. And no one involved with Lead 80 on the task force could
supply any evidence that Zuley had indeed leaked to the press.
But at one Illinois Police Chiefs’ Conference, Captain Pope
of Schaumburg bragged of having caught Zuley calling the media.
Pope was a close friend of Bratcher, and he forwarded this information
to the Palatine chief.
Bratcher, attempting humor, later said, “I didn’t really
fire him. I just had him sent back to Chicago and terminated his
work with us ... I had the Task Force requirements lowered by
one.”
Zuley was publicly chastised by Andy Knott. Knott, a former Tribune
reporter, made tactical investigative decisions from a position
of apparent authority based on his closeness to O’Malley.
Knott was thought by investigators to be nothing more than an
inexperienced PR man. He had only sat in on a few investigative
meetings and his actions against Zuley were thus deemed disproportionately
harsh.
The Response
What was the reaction of other members of the Task Force to the
news about Zuley’s alleged improper actions?
Bratcher’s initial response to Goudie’s Channel 7 news
segment on Lead 80 was to downplay the importance of the lead.
“It’s not an official document. The real Lead 80 is
a book this [inches] thick. Our reports are on official stationery.”
When asked about Zuley’s possible motive for authoring the
“unofficial” report, Bratcher replied, “I think
he wrote it to give to the press, to give it to Chuck Goudie.”
Bratcher maintains that he did not receive a copy of the Lead
80 document until a member of the press gave it to him. Zuley
insists that he forwarded all documents to the Task Force. If
he had not, his Chicago superiors would have pushed him to hand
over all information reports in order to complete his task force
assignment. But obviously a report would have been required from
the time spent on interviews with Cruz.
Bratcher issued a press release from the Task Force to counter
the Lead 80 information reported to the public which stated the
following:
The Palatine Investigative Task Force and FBI investigators
conducted a thorough follow-up investigation into a lead connecting
Chicago robbers with the Palatine mass murder case. As with all
significant avenues of investigation pursued by our task force,
this investigation has been carefully supervised, monitored and
assessed.
This investigation started with tips provided by questionable
sources. Reynaldo Aviles, a convicted murderer and armed robber
facing mandatory life in prison, gave conflicting statements about
alleged conversations which were materially inconsistent. When
an attempt was made to overhear subsequent conversations, Aviles
prevented it. The other related tip was provided by Robert A.
McQueeny, 20, of Elgin. On April 6, 1993, McQueeny pleaded guilty
to providing false information to police, a misdemeanor, and was
sentenced to twelve months non-reporting probation and a period
of community service.
While the large investment of investigative time resulted in
the clearance of other robbery cases in Skokie, it did not develop
a productive link with the Palatine case. I am satisfied with
the course of this investigation.
Bratcher was discounting Lead 80 on the basis of unreliable
witnesses providing false information. Aviles was incarcerated
on charges of armed robbery and was awaiting a May 26, 1993 court
date.
Aviles never made it to court. He was found dead in his cell
on May 15, 1993. An apparent suicide note to his girlfriend was
found in his cell. Part of the note read: “I hope they will
leave you alone Jose Cruz and his gang.” The official autopsy
report concluded that Aviles had died of theophylline intoxication.
Several abrasions, bruises, and hemorrhages were found on his
body, however, showing evidence of a struggle.
The detectives who had interviewed Aviles maintain that the
information he provided to the Task Force was correct and reliable.
It was corroborated by other sources and actual reported robberies.
According to one investigator, “Aviles looked like gold.”
Why was the Task Force so anxious to discount Aviles’ previous
statements, especially when they had at one time been deemed credible
enough by O’Brien to justify an arrest warrant for Cruz?
In fact, if Aviles was providing “conflicting statements”
to the Task Force, why was Bratcher taking credit for clearing
a Skokie armed robbery case? Didn’t the Skokie case corroborate
Aviles’ information?
The response to Lead 80’s appearance in the news media was
thus twofold. First, Zuley was attacked and insulted for his alleged
actions. Second, and more importantly, the Task Force sought to
discredit the information contained in the lead. In the summer
of 1995, the Task Force would go so far as to hire media analyst
Rick Rosenthal, a former Channel 9 anchorman, to “draft a
response to lead 80.”
Current Task Force Coordinator Jim Bell had this to say on the
Zuley issue: “It is not uncommon to have maverick operators
who run amuck and go to the press.”
Kavanaugh’s Revenge
Kavanaugh now had the ammunition he needed to get even with Zuley.
Kavanaugh, who had made his reputation as “Mr. Clean,”
catching cops in his position at IAD, was going to retaliate against
Fowler, Valdez and especially Zuley for their confrontational
conduct in the investigation of Lead 80.
He attempted to file disciplinary charges against all three detectives.
Fowler’s supervisor Jerry Adams stood behind Fowler and told
the State’s Attorney’s office to forget the beef.
Valdez’s superiors in the Illinois State Police refused
to entertain Kavanaugh’s equest.
But the Chicago PD’s Internal Affairs Department took the
charges against Zuley seriously.
An IAD sergeant called Skokie and asked Fowler and his supervisor
Adams to come to Chicago to give statements on the Zuley matter.
Fowler and Adams decided that if the Chicago PD wanted to ask
the questions, the IAD sergeant could come to them. The sergeant
came a few days later and asked about the veracity of the Lead
80 report. He did not seem concerned with how the report was leaked.
Fowler told the sergeant that, “the report is more honest
than I would be.” He went on to say that although he did
not author the report, that job was delegated to Zuley because
he was the faster typist, he was an active participant in the
investigation and maintained that the document was 100% accurate.
After the interview, IAD decided to go ahead with the charges
against Zuley for filing a false report, stating that Fowler had
never seen the Lead 80 report and that it contained several inconsistencies.
Fowler was so angered by this that he wrote a letter to IAD confirming
Lead 80 and his support for Detective Zuley.
Role of the State’s Attorney’s Office in the “Beef”
Kavanaugh did not stop his vendetta at IAD. He approached the
Public Integrity Unit of the State’s Attorney’s office
in the fall of 1993, suggesting that the charges against Zuley
should be disclosed to Judge Strayhorn, the judge in the Dantrell
Davis Cabrini Green sniper case. Kavanaugh argued that these charges
could be relevant to Zuley’s credibility as a lead detective
testifying in the Davis case. This case of the Cabrini Green sniper
was one of the most important, high visibility cases in Chicago
and it was solved by Zuley. It appeared incredible that Kavanaugh
would go this far, endangering a case of this magnitude to get
even with Zuley.
It appeared to one State’s Attorney the BGA spoke with that
someone was trying to damage Zuley’s career. He thought that
Zuley was a good detective. He suggested that at a given time
25% of all detectives are under investigation by internal affairs.
The attorney felt that someone had “a hard-on” for Zuley
because these internal affairs were never brought up to judges
or defense attorneys. He said he had never seen anything like
it before. The State’s Attorney contended that if a detective’s
credibility was successfully questioned based upon an internal
affairs investigation, that detective would “have to find
another line of work.”
Another State’s Attorney said, “I cannot imagine that
even O’Malley would go after a detective like Zuley because
he didn’t like the way a report had been written.”
One of O’Malley’s top assistants was aware that Kavanaugh
had filed a beef against Zuley. He revealed that that knowledge
was widespread in the State’s Attorney’s office. He
said that, “although disagreements among investigators are
not uncommon, it is horrendous for a State’s Attorney to
file a beef against a working homicide investigator since we’re
going to be dependent on the testimony of guys like Zuley in the
future.”
Another State’s Attorney was given an opportunity to read
part of Lead 80. He thought it looked good. Checking with Kavanaugh,
he was told that the report was inaccurate and had been written
without the knowledge of the other reporting detectives, Fowler
and Valdez. But this State’s Attorney felt that Kavanaugh
had gone off “half-cocked” in his efforts to get other
cops and that Zuley was good, “as good as they come.”
He argued that throughout the Palatine investigation, Kavanaugh
wanted to play “police” for O’Malley because he
saw himself as an overseer of the Task Force. But when Zuley hit
on a good lead, the credit would be taken away from Kavanaugh.
O’Brien’s Response
And what of Pat O’Brien, Task Force legal advisor, who had
never liked lead 80 from the start?
O’Brien explained that Zuley was not fired from the Task
Force but “detailed back to Chicago” and that he was
“a cop that took many short cuts and few notes.” O’Brien
went on to discredit Lead 80 by saying, “Deering and Huber
were questioned extensively and lead 80 led nowhere, although
it was damn interesting.” O’Brien now feels, “it
still could have been Cruz, but there’s just not enough evidence
to convict.”
O’Brien explained that the prints of the Lead 80 suspects
were not in the restaurant and argued that Cruz knew only certain
general facts about the murders. He differentiated these facts
from what a killer would know. O’Brien attributed Cruz’s
emotional state during questioning to the gang member’s drug
addiction. He says it is common for a withdrawing addict to become
emotional after long periods of questioning.
O’Brien admitted that Zuley did not leak Lead 80. He felt
that there was too much time that had lapsed between Zuley’s
involvement on the Task Force and the media reports.
Results of the “Beef”
Zuley was exonerated on the original Lead 80 complaint of writing
an unauthorized report but received a one-day suspension on a
second complaint.
The second complaint stemmed from Zuley’s refusal to drop
the investigation of Lead 80. Months after leaving the Task Force,
Zuley interviewed a source who owned the store next to Manny Castro’s
T-shirt shop on Montrose Avenue. The source told Zuley that Manny’s
son, murder victim Michael Castro, had worked several times in
his father’s shop.
Gang Crime investigators learned that Castro had been arrested
in May 1992 for a failure to exhibit a firearm registration certificate.
Castro was selling guns to gang members, including the PR Stones,
and Cruz had volunteered an accurate physical description of Manny
Castro in the interview with Zuley and Fowler. Had Cruz known
Manny Castro’s son who was murdered at Brown’s?
The PR Stones were now linked to one of the murder victims. Zuley
and the others felt it necessary to push this lead, even though
they knew it was against procedure. He had been told by his supervisor
to stay away from the Palatine matter. He was, after all, no longer
on the Task Force.
Therefore, Zuley ultimately took a one-day suspension. He had
been given the option of signing an admission and giving up eight
hours time but he wouldn’t sign and took the day.
Current intelligence continues to implicate Jose Cruz and his
gang in the Brown’s Chicken massacre. Chicago Gang Crimes
continues to receive leads, tips and other intelligence almost
weekly saying Brown’s was “a PR Stones thing.”
But this information is no longer forwarded to Task Force officials.
The “beef” against Zuley, Fowler and Valdez set a precedent.
Task Force command would not tolerate dissension in their ranks.
Gang Crimes, when asked about situation, replies “you know
what happened to Zuley.” The Task Force had effectively cut
off the best source of current intelligence in Illinois.
The Anniversary Press Conference
On January 9, 1996, the Palatine Task Force held a press conference
to release new information regarding the investigation and to
commemorate the anniversary of the murders.
Jim Bell revealed four pieces of evidence deemed critical by
the Task Force, in an effort to “trigger the recollection
of someone who may know the person responsible for this crime.”
These items were: the type of shoe worn by the killer, the type
of gun used to kill the victims, the type of vehicle seen in the
vicinity of the restaurant during crucial times, and the approximate
time of the murders.
To this day, the Task Force insists that the large shoe print
found at the scene provides overwhelming evidence that the killer
was a very large man. This, despite the fact that news media tapes
made at the time when the bodies were removed show a very large
man in shoes, which were uncovered, helping to remove the bodies.
Similarly, the Task Force appears convinced that a white vehicle,
in the size and shape of a late 1980s Camaro, was the car of the
offender(s), despite several witnesses who describe a silver 1970s
Cougar or Thunderbird model with four round headlights at the
scene.
And the Task Force had hired a media relations consultant, Rick
Rosenthal to help persuade the public that these facts, and not
those contained in lead 80, were the key bits of evidence that
would bring the killer(s) to justice.
Rosenthal, President of RAR Communications, Inc., was paid the
sum of $1200 by the Task Force for 12 hours of service. His tasks
were to attend three Task Force conferences, draft a lead 80 response,
and monitor the actual news conference.
What was the “Lead 80 response” drafted by Rosenthal?
It was an attempt to attack those reporters that had reported
on the lead in their broadcasts. The brunt of most of Bratcher’s
critique during the press conference fell on Dave Savini of Channel
5 News. Savini had aired several segments regarding lead 80 and
Bratcher worked hard to discredit the Unit 5 investigation.
To do so, Bratcher, in a script prepared by Rosenthal, attacked
several aspects of the lead. He stated that the nine-page Lead
80 document in the possession of the media was not the real lead
document, but an unofficial report authored by an investigator
who had only worked on the Task Force for two-and-a-half weeks.
Bratcher’s inconsistency argument with regard to Lead 80
portrayed the lead as based on a car with Wisconsin plates and
a composite sketch. Bratcher pointed out that both pieces of information
were given by witnesses who later admitted to filing false reports.
Bratcher also discredited Aviles’ testimony again, emphasizing
his criminal record and inconsistent statements.
But wasn’t there much more to lead 80 than these few points?
What about the string of robberies with the same M.O. as Brown’s?
What about the Castro connection? Even the testimony of key Lead
80 suspects corroborated the information given by Aviles. But
there was a 1985 silver Ford Thunderbird with four headlights
and Wisconsin plates owned by Cruz’s girlfriend. Aviles noted
they had access to it. Huber said they were riding in it that
night. Task Force detectives found the car at Cruz’s girlfriend’s.
She says she was in Chicago that night and independent witnesses
said they had seen such a car at Brown’s.
Bratcher said that the Task Force liked Lead 80 in the beginning,
but it had been “beat to death.” A follow-up investigation
was conducted by another team of investigators in an effort to
leave no stone unturned. One team of investigators, Medrys of
Cook County and Peters of Barrington, would privately complain
at parties about members of the Task Force while publicly telling
the BGA, “I was privileged to work with them.”
The press conference, a forum for the rebuttal of Lead 80, ended
with Bratcher’s admission that Cruz was still a suspect.
Law and Order
Rick Rosenthal’s work in support of the Palatine Task Force
was not through. He authored an article in Law and Order magazine
in July 1996. Law and Order has very limited circulation—distributed
primarily to police chiefs, sheriffs and other local law enforcement
agencies. The purpose of the magazine is to provide upper-level
law enforcement management with “how to” articles in
running more efficient agencies.
Rosenthal’s piece, entitled Media Brutality: A case history
of how one department was attacked, boasts about the merits of
the wondrous Palatine Task Force. “This multi-agency task
force has investigated more than 4,000 leads. There are still
seven skilled investigators working the case full time ... Together,
the seven task force officers have 119 years of combined investigative
experience.”
Rosenthal goes on to attack the work of Channel 5’s Dave
Savini, finishing the job Bratcher began in the January press
conference of that same year. He describes Savini’s reports
as being at odds with the details of the case, which he became
aware of while working as a paid consultant for the Task Force.
“Aviles was not a ‘key informant’ and what he
told police simply was not true.”
“Also, the supposed ‘lead’ about Wisconsin plates
was one of 15 to 20 bogus leads phoned in by a man in a neighboring
community. He admitted he made up the lead about Wisconsin plates
and all his other leads.”
Once again, the same two pieces of information are discredited—Wisconsin
plates and Aviles’ statements. What about the other information
that corroborates Lead 80? What about the information provided
by Aviles that was solid enough to lead to the successful solution
of a Skokie armed robbery?
How much of Rosenthal’s piece can be considered an objective
look at the facts when he was a paid consultant, hired to promote
positive press about an admittedly botched investigation?
Bratcher had done it again. His paid consultant was engaged in
an active PR offensive: attacking the critics, destroying their
credibility, and putting out inaccurate information.
Response to the BGA/Crime Commission Probe
The support for Bratcher within suburban police circles has been
duly noted. Thus, it was no surprise when the Blue Ribbon Panel
was attacked for looking into the inner workings of the Palatine
Task Force. After all, it was an ongoing murder investigation.
Critics fired back at the BGA and Crime Commission probe, and
Bratcher himself told BGA investigators that he would not allow
his Task Force to be put up before a Tribunal. He stated that
the Panel’s look at the facts were wrongfully inspired by
an angry Frank Portillo. Bratcher felt that Portillo’s involvement
in a civil lawsuit brought forth by one of the victims’ families
had colored his perceptions of Task Force conduct.
A Resolution was issued by the Illinois Association of Chiefs
of Police. It cited the following:
• The Palatine Police Department is an agency of the Village
of Palatine
• The Village President and Board of Trustees are the elected
officials of the Village of Palatine accountable to the voters
of the Village
• The Better Government Association and the Chicago Crime
Commission are accountable to no one
• Because the Better Government Association and Chicago Crime
Commission have no legal or procedural standing to investigate
ongoing criminal matters they should immediately end this ill-advised
and wasteful investigation and allow this professional, multi-jurisdictional
task force to concentrate on its task of solving this crime.
This Resolution was adopted by various agencies, including
the Lake County Chiefs of Police Association, the DuPage County
Chiefs of Police Association, and the North Suburban Association
of Chiefs of Police. Other letters of support for Bratcher and
his Task Force were sent to the BGA.
Suburban forces were clearly behind Bratcher and his troops.
But the BGA investigation has illustrated the myriad of personal
relationships Bratcher has formed with the Trustees and the Mayor
of Palatine. Bratcher’s work is to be accountable to the
Village Trustees, yet he is soliciting for their private business.
The State’s Attorney’s office should be a check on the
actions of suburban police, yet Bratcher is a contributor to O’Malley’s
political campaigns. The Palatine Police Department officers need
to be accountable to the citizens they work to protect, but many
of them were hired as favors to Bratcher’s friends, fellow
chiefs with sons that desired a position on Bratcher’s force.
The citizens of Palatine must hold their appointed officials
accountable. It is imperative that they have full information
to do so. The BGA/Crime Commission probe is an attempt to educate
village citizens about the conduct of their officials. It is also
an effort to build support for the creation of a permanent Task
Force, staffed with experienced investigators and efficient command.
An agency that can be called to action should a tragedy occur.
According to several law enforcement officials who worked on
the case, the Palatine Task Force was an example of “how
not to run a Task Force.” The BGA is proposing how one should
be run.BGA Report -- Part 1
Part 2 Part 3
Part 4)
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