|
BGA Report -- Part 4 (BGA Report -- Part 1
Part 2 Part 3
Part 4)
Report of the Blue Ribbon Panel
Basic Facts Regarding the Crime
On Friday evening, January 8, 1993, shortly after closing,
the owners and five employees of the Palatine Brown’s Chicken
and Pasta franchise were murdered. The victims included Brown’s
owners Richard and Lynn Ehlenfeldt, Palatine High School students
Michael Castro and Rico Solis, and Palatine residents Guadalupe
Maldonado, Thomas Mennes, and Marcus Nellson. Between 9 and 10
p.m. on that Friday evening, the killer or killers entered the
restaurant and purchased a chicken meal. Thereafter, the restaurant
safe was opened, several hundred dollars were taken, and the seven
were shot and killed.
The bodies of the victims were left in the two restaurant coolers,
piled on top of one another, execution-style. The power in the
restaurant was turned off at 9:48 p.m. (as indicated by the electric
clock); the killer(s) left at an undetermined time, exiting a
crime scene that would not be discovered until 3 a.m. Saturday
morning.
In the first minutes after the crime was discovered, officers
from the Palatine Police Department and the Cook County Sheriff’s
Police (CCSP) were on the scene. Evidence technicians from the
Northern Illinois Police Crime Laboratory and the Palatine and
CCSP Departments were dispatched, as the local news media began
to gather in the Brown’s Chicken parking lot to report on
the worst mass murder in suburban Illinois history.
On Monday, January 11, after the only suspect in the murders
was released, a formal Investigative Task Force was formed, directed
by Palatine Police Chief Jerry Bratcher. By the end of that week,
the Task Force would include personnel from the Palatine Police
Department, the Cook County Sheriff’s Department, the State’s
Attorney’s Office, the Illinois State Police, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, the Chicago Police Department, and 10
suburban police departments. At its peak, the Task Force was
comprised of over 120 individuals.
As of November 1995 however, the crime remained unsolved, and
the Task Force had been scaled down to 7 full-time investigators.
Frank Portillo, Owner and Chief Executive Officer of Brown’s
Chicken and Pasta, asked the Better Government Association and
the Chicago Crime Commission to look at the Task Force’s
handling of the investigation.
Appointment of a Blue Ribbon Panel
The Chicago Crime Commission and the Better Government Association
announced on April 17, 1996, that they had formed an independent
panel to review and provide recommendations concerning the handling
of murder investigations like the 1993 Brown’s Chicken homicides.
The Panel members were selected for their expertise in law enforcement,
legal education and the public interest and is composed of former
high-level federal, state and city law enforcement investigators,
officials, prosecutors and academic experts (Appendix B).
In announcing the creation of the panel, it was emphatically
stated:
“Our purpose in convening this panel is not to solve the
crime, but to answer some basic questions about whether appropriate
resources were deployed in a manner consistent with the professional
law enforcement standards which the community has the right to
expect.”
(BGA/CCC Press Release, April 17, 1996)
The Palatine Task Force was assembled on an ad hoc basis; its
work attracted critical commentary in the media. Accordingly,
this Panel’s initial goal was to develop a set of recommendations
on how a successful multi-jurisdictional Task Force might be organized
to respond to high profile crime situations. It is the Panel’s
desire to generate feedback from the suburban law enforcement
community, typically inexperienced in homicide investigations
of this magnitude, as to which of the proposed task force models
seem appropriate to their needs and to help them implement the
model they select.
Method of Operation of the Panel
The Better Government Association’s Chief Investigator Michael
Lyons spent 18 months interviewing dozens of sources closely connected
to the Task Force in addition to other sources in law enforcement.
These sources include experienced and high-ranking law enforcement
officials, assistant state’s attorneys, and informed citizens
— individuals who possess information on the conduct and
activities of the Task Force. A variety of internal documents
and legal depositions was gathered that provide corroboration
for the source interviews. This information, summarizing the
BGA investigation, was presented to the Panel.
In addition, some panel members, in small groups, conducted interviews
with sources already contacted by the BGA. These interviews provided
additional information from which the Panel generated some of
its recommendations. A range of law enforcement experts also
addressed the Panel, offering among other things, their insights
on the Brown’s Chicken investigation and ideal future Task
Force responses.
Conclusions of the Blue Ribbon Panel
I. Although no doubt sincere in its desire to solve the crime,
the Palatine Police Force was inexperienced in major homicide
investigations. Yet, after the task force was assembled, Palatine
officers, rather than more experienced officers who then became
available, still remained in key positions of responsibility on
the Task Force. Overwhelmed by the magnitude of the case, they
failed effectively to:
a. secure the crime scene.
b. canvass the surrounding area.
c. coordinate investigative personnel — especially in utilizing
those who were often more experienced than Palatine officers in
homicide investigations.
d. integrate the variety of resources (e.g. various computer
database and analysis capabilities) that were available from the
wide range of law enforcement agencies comprising the task force.
e. open basic lines of communication between the Command and
rank and file within the Task Force.
II. This inexperience initially contributed to:
a. a delayed discovery of the crime scene.
b. three wasted days of investigative efforts pursuing one lead,
subsequently proven false, while ignoring all other investigative
avenues.
III. The State’s Attorney’s Office departed from its
traditional role, which is to allow the police to solve the crime,
and instead insinuated itself into a murder investigation and
ultimately emerged as a leader of the Task Force. This resulted
in having State’s Attorney’s investigative personnel
who were inexperienced in major homicide investigations placed
into a key tactical command position. This contributed to:
a. a failure to share critical investigative information among
Task Force Investigators.
b. preventing the surveillance of a prime suspect.
c. internal disputes which resulted in the inappropriate release
of a prime suspect.
d. feuding among experienced investigators from the various agencies
over the handling of a crucial lead.
e. a continuing lack of confidence in the leadership by many
Task Force members.
f. a disintegration of the Task Force.
IV. The above Command mistakes led quickly to a defensive posture
with the media and the public. This posture led to:
a. placing more emphasis on creating a positive PR spin rather
than forming an effective law enforcement team.
b. publicly asserting PR positions often contradicted by the
facts available to the Task Force.
V. The Village Trustees and the Mayor of Palatine should have
then, now and in the future provide oversight to the police department’s
conduct and performance to ensure they have sufficient means necessary
to conduct a major homicide investigation.
Panel Recommendations
Brutal, violent, and sensational crimes, like the murders in
Palatine, challenge us to rethink how well prepared we are to
deal with serious crime. In Cook County alone, outside the City
of Chicago, there are over 120 municipal Police Departments, ranging
in size from one police officer to 151. They offer a level of
protection that varies from less than one-half of a police officer
for every thousand citizens to 65 police officers for every thousand.
The average size of the suburban departments is 40 police
officers. Although most of the larger suburban departments may
be well suited for the constituencies they serve and for 99% of
the situations they encounter, it is not realistic to expect them
to maintain, nor should taxpayers be expected to support, large
and highly specialized units to deal with the extremely violent
crimes and complex investigations which may only occasionally
arise in their jurisdictions (this is the reasoning behind the
exclusive jurisdiction of the National Transportation Safety Board
and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in their respective areas).
Economy of scale requires a more cost efficient approach.
Since the Palatine murders, there have been other suburban homicides
which have severely challenged the resources of smaller jurisdictions
to respond, and unfortunately there will be more. The City of
Chicago, with 13,000 police officers and a national reputation
for homicide investigation, currently serves as a resource for
any suburban department that finds itself facing a complex murder
investigation. However, this is an informal and ad hoc arrangement.
“To be truly effective in responding to the level of violence
in the world today, law enforcement agencies must consider how
they can best tap the well trained and highly specialized resources
of police agencies willing to assist with the manpower commitment,
expertise, and coordination necessary to mount a rapid response
homicide investigation unit.
“Certainly the traditional safeguarding of turf is a
problem in many jurisdictions. Some Chiefs feel threatened by
the suggestion that they are unable to successfully investigate
a homicide without the assistance of outside experts. Unfortunately,
they may be protecting their egos at the victim’s expense
as the murder goes unsolved.”
These observations, quoted from the July, 1996, national publication,
Police Chief Magazine, could not have been more on point. The
key to a successful homicide investigation, especially a complex
and perplexing one, is the rapid response of trained and experienced
investigators with the skills and resources necessary to deal
with this type of crime.
Recommendation I. The appropriate elected officials of each
suburban municipality should promptly inventory and periodically
review in detail the investigative assets available to their police
departments to deal with major violent crimes.
The assets to be reviewed should include:
a. The training and experience of local police officers.
b. The number of officers available for detail to a major crime
investigation without compromising daily routine police functions.
c. The availability of accredited laboratory services for testing
and preserving evidence.
d. The policies and procedures in place for accessing the resources
of other jurisdictions and coordination with the State’s
Attorney’s office.
Recommendation II. Suburban law enforcement agencies should
immediately begin working to implement a multi-jurisdictional
Major Case Squad Model for criminal investigations before another
department is faced with a similar tragedy without adequate preparation.
Five basic approaches for dealing with this type of major criminal
investigation, in gradations of formality of organization and
structure, are listed in Appendix A. Of these, the Major Case
Squad option is recommended as the most realistic in terms of
possible immediate implementation. The panel also recognized
that Metropolitan Policing is a concept that should be explored
and evaluated as a possible long term solution.
In each of these models the issues that arise are the funding
required to provide adequate police services in response to major
complex crimes, the procedures that would have to be instituted,
the required level of experience and the necessary training, equipment
and technical resources that would be needed at the very beginning
of a major crime investigation. Both the New York State Commission
of Investigation and the St. Louis Major Case Squad emphasize
that the most important characteristic of the commanders of any
multi-jurisdictional major crime investigation is the relevant
background (experience and training) in such investigations.
Any structure is only as good as the personnel involved. And
whether there are minimum requirements established for training
and experience or simply guidelines, the most important factor
is the expertise - based on documented and quantifiable training
and experience - of the people in charge of the investigation.
Recommendation III. The Chicago Crime Commission should provide
resources and assistance to suburban municipalities in the development
and implementation of the Major Case Squad concept as soon as
possible, and work to facilitate the necessary intergovernmental
cooperation.
APPENDIX A
1. Ad Hoc Multi-Agency Task Forces.
This is the status-quo system in which individuals and equipment
from various jurisdictions are pieced together based on allegiances,
friendships traditions, associations, business and personal relationships,
and whatever assistance may be available at any given time. Sometimes
multi-jurisdictional or multi-agency groups such as this are suitable
and work, but they are unpredictable. No two are ever the same,
depending on who the local police chief feels is in a position
to help. The main problems with this approach are that the people
and technology are often incompatible, the delay in assembling
a group and organizing it can hinder the investigation from the
outset, and the roles of the assembled investigators are not based
on specific training and experience relevant to the crime that
needs to be solved.
2. Mutual Aid Agreements.
One step beyond the current ad hoc system is a procedure whereby
various jurisdictions agree in advance as to how to assemble a
major crime investigation unit, specifying the duties of its personnel
and protocols for the conduct of the investigation, including
the specific role of the prosecutor’s office. This type of
formal agreement was recommended by the State of New York Commission
of Investigation, which issued a report in January, 1995, concerning
the investigation of the death of Kristie Fischer. That case
highlighted many of the same problems experienced by the Palatine
investigation. The report noted “the patchwork quilt of
law enforcement agencies that provide various arrays of services
throughout the county.” (They were dealing with Westchester
County which had 43 police jurisdictions — many fewer than
the 120+ in Cook County.)
3. Metropolitan Enforcement Groups (MEGS).
MEG units are used in Cook County and elsewhere in Illinois
for multi- jurisdictional investigations of major narcotic cases.
Personnel are assigned full-time, with cross-jurisdictional credentials
and thus able to pursue the complex and intricate drug distribution
networks wherever the investigation may take them. This is clearly
a workable model for dealing with continuing criminal enterprises,
but does not appear to be appropriate for intermittent episodes
of violent homicides. This arrangement does, however, represent
a step forward in multi-jurisdictional cooperation.
4. Major Case Squads.
This option specifically identifies individuals with relevant
training who are drawn from a regional base and organized into
a specialized unit. There are two basic variations:
a. County-wide and county-run such as currently is the case
in Lake County, Illinois.
b. A cooperative venture managed by an independent board of
directors representing the participating law enforcement agencies.
This is the arrangement used by the Greater St. Louis Major Case
Squad.
This model offers the clear advantage that specific individuals
(who routinely work together and whose training and experience
are directly on point) are available as soon as possible at the
crime scene, without the initial haggling and confusion over
roles and responsibilities regarding the investigation. The participating
police officials are obligated to call the Squad under pre-determined
circumstances (all homicides, for example). Because of the sheer
size of Cook County, a regional approach could be utilized.
5. Metropolitan Policing.
This is the most highly organized model, where all policing
responsibilities are assumed by a large jurisdictional unit.
It naturally raises concerns among local jurisdictions about the
sanctity of local control and the loss of responsiveness of local
departments. In some cases, like Dade County Florida, the county
is the largest Police Department in the jurisdiction and has become
the de facto major crime expert. This is not the case in Cook
County, where the Sheriff’s Department Police, although larger
in number than any individual suburban department, pales in comparison
to the size of the City of Chicago’s Police Department.
Metropolitan Policing has been proposed many times, as early as
more than 30 years ago.
The question inevitably raised is which is the greater risk
to the local citizenry, the occasional ineffectiveness and failure
of local police functions or the ceding of police authority to
a larger governmental unit. Historically, true Metropolitan Policing
has been rejected by individual local governments as too great
a loss of power and sensitivity to local concerns, even though
it may provide an improvement in police services. However, despite
entrenched political opposition in the past, it does offer the
most cost-effective method of providing suburban residents with
sufficient specialized law enforcement resources whenever and
wherever they are needed.
nts as too great
a loss of power and sensitivity to local concerns, even though
it may provide an improvement in police services. However, despite
entrenched political opposition in the past, it does offer the
most cost-effective method of providing suburban residents with
sufficient specialized law enforcement resources whenever and
wherever they are needed.
BGA Report -- Part 1
Part 2 Part 3
Part 4) |