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Laborers for JUSTICE presents the House Judiciary Committee report on  
ADMINISTRATION'S EFFORTS AGAINST THE
INFLUENCE OF ORGANIZED CRIME IN THE 
LABORERS'
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH AMERICA

January 2, 1997

I. Executive Summary
The forces of organized crime, particularly La Cosa Nostra, have inflicted immeasurable harm on every American, from the price of goods in a store to the presence of drugs on the streets. The mob routinely targets labor unions and brings untold damage on rank-and-file workers by, among other things, stealing their jobs for well-placed friends, forcing them to pay unnecessary fees, and stealing from their pension and welfare trust funds.


The mob-busters at the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Department of Labor (DOL), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) decided in 1991, during the Bush Administration, to begin an all-out attack against the influence of organized crime within the Laborers' International Union of North America (LIUNA), a union with a membership that exceeds 700,000 individuals. In preparation for its attack, DOJ, with the assistance of DOL and the FBI, compiled over one million pages of evidence. This documentation stood as the backbone for the 212-page civil racketeering complaint against LIUNA and a number of its officers, including the union's General President, Arthur A. Coia.


In the complaint, Mr. Coia is identified as an individual who "has associated with and been controlled and influenced by, organized crime figures," associated "with members of the New England La Cosa Nostra for a substantial period of time," and for three years with his father received kickbacks that were shared with Raymond Patriarca, head of the New England Crime Family.


Meanwhile, Mr. Coia, shortly after becoming the General President of LIUNA in March 1993, also became a professional, social and personal friend of the President and First Lady of the United States. Despite repeated notice to the White House by DOJ, DOL, and the FBI, including an FBI memorandum to the White House Counsel's office which stated, "Coia is a criminal associate of the New England Patriarca organized crime family," the relationship between Mr. Coia, the President and First Lady continued to grow.


The Federal Government's decades-long fight against mob corruption in labor unions took a historic turn in early 1995. In 19 previous cases, the Department of Justice filed and won civil anti-racketeering (RICO) complaints in federal court. Independent monitors were appointed to rid the unions of organized crime control.


But in February of 1995, the Department switched to a new mob-busting technique -- self-policing. In the case against LIUNA, DOJ reached a settlement with the union and its president which allowed a team chosen by LIUNA to undertake the task of cleaning out mobsters from the union. A retired senior FBI official was named as inspector general, a former organized crime prosecutor and LIUNA lawyer was hired to be the prosecutor, and a former U.S. attorney was retained to be the judge. To date, many LIUNA members associated with the mob have been expelled from the union. In addition, LIUNA signed a consent decree which allows DOJ to file the RICO complaint at any point and have an independent monitor appointed.


While the settlement has produced positive results, troubling questions remain. First and foremost, Arthur Coia, LIUNA's politically well-connected president, is still in charge, despite being characterized by the head of DOJ's Organized Crime and Racketeering Section as a "mob puppet." In late 1994, after receiving the 212-page RICO complaint filled with allegations of wrongdoing leveled against him, Mr. Coia faced the ordeal of battling to save his job against a court-appointed monitor. Now he appears stronger than ever. Mr. Coia went from being characterized as a "mob puppet" in 1994 to President Clinton's head table at a multi-million dollar, black-tie fundraising dinner sponsored by the Democratic National Committee earlier this year.


Second, Mr. Coia's lawyers argue that DOJ has promised not to "pull the plug" on the internal clean-up process unless the union acts in bad faith. They may attempt to litigate for breach of contract if DOJ files the consent decree.


Third, President Clinton maintained a strong personal relationship with Arthur Coia even as the Justice Department zeroed in on the union president. White House officials ignored repeated notifications by law enforcement officials of Mr. Coia's connection to organized crime. These coexistent facts -- namely 1) that Mr. Coia is one of the biggest financial supporters of the Administration and 2) that he has escaped from the clutches of the Justice Department -- present a disturbing appearance of conflicting interests. This appearance, at the very least, severely undermines the public's confidence in the integrity of the justice system.

II. Introduction
 


Ten years ago, the President's Commission on Organized Crime (PCOC) identified organized crime as a plague on society that had to be surgically and meticulously excised from legitimate institutions. It also identified what came to be known as the "Bad Four," the four most corrupt unions in America: the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT), the Longshoremen, the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Workers, and the Laborers' International Union of North America.


Since then, the Federal Government has spent tens of millions of tax dollars to rid these and other unions of mob control. Federal prosecutors chose the civil remedies of the federal anti-racketeering statute (RICO) as the legal mechanism to accomplish this mission because it was crafted for the specific purpose of excising organized crime from legitimate institutions. In 19 civil RICO cases over the past decade, the Department of Justice has won 19 times.


And then came LIUNA and Arthur Coia. After years of work and the preparation of a 212-page civil RICO complaint supported by millions of pages of documents, the Justice Department made a historic law enforcement concession. It reached a settlement with LIUNA which turned the mob-busting mission over to the union itself.


Such a change in direction deserves congressional scrutiny. Given the severe harm inflicted on America by organized crime, the general public, including law-abiding union members in particular, deserves to know whether such a shift in policy is consistent with the interests of public safety. Moreover, maintaining public confidence in the integrity of the criminal justice system is vital to public order. Yet, the circumstances surrounding the LIUNA settlement have severely threatened public confidence.


In its 1986 report, the PCOC criticized then President Reagan for associating with and accepting political support from Teamsters' President Jackie Presser while the Department of Justice was investigating racketeering activities within the IBT. (1) The Commission noted that personal relationships between political officials and union officials connected to organized crime can undermine public confidence in the criminal justice system. The Commission observed:


Even when there are no actual attempts to tamper with the prosecutorial process by using political power, certain political alliances and well-timed political contributions can create an appearance of impropriety.... The Commission...is convinced that the impact of such contacts can lead to an erosion of public confidence and dampen the desire to end racketeering. (2)


This is clearly the same issue at stake in the saga of the Federal Government's enforcement of anti-racketeering laws against the Laborers' International Union of North America. Two points are indisputable: 1) in 1994, the Department of Justice was closing in on LIUNA and Mr. Coia after years of investigation; and 2) at the very same time, Mr. Coia had established himself as a major political force within the Democratic party and built a personal relationship with the President and the First Lady. The extensive media attention paid to this matter is evidence enough of the troubling connection between these facts.


On July 23 and 24, 1996, the Subcommittee on Crime of the Committee on the Judiciary conducted a two-day hearing entitled, "The Administration's Efforts Against the Influence of Organized Crime in the Laborers' International Union of North America (LIUNA)." During the course of the two-day hearing, the Subcommittee heard from a total of eleven witnesses. These witnesses included high ranking DOJ officials, organized crime experts, and the former business manager of LIUNA Local 210 who was an eyewitness of organized crime control within the union. Prior to the hearing, the Subcommittee interviewed more than fifty individuals and reviewed hundreds of documents. Mr. Coia did not testify because his attorney refused to allow the bipartisan subcommittee staff to interview Mr. Coia prior to the hearing. It is standard procedure in oversight hearings that witnesses be interviewed before testifying publicly. Indeed, all eleven hearing witnesses agreed to be and were interviewed before testifying.


The Crime Subcommittee's investigation focused on the connection between the Justice Department's actions and Mr. Coia's privileged position. While the facts gathered to date do not reveal a direct connection, serious concerns exist about the propriety of the White House's extensive dealings with someone who was simultaneously battling federal prosecutors.


The PCOC's warnings regarding the erosion of public confidence apply squarely to the LIUNA case. Millions of tax dollars were spent in pursuit of organized crime influences within LIUNA. Instead of seeking an independent court-appointed monitor to clean-up the union, the Justice Department gave this responsibility to the union and reserved the option of going to court if the self-policing approach was unsatisfactory. The Administration should have expected that such a change in direction would give rise to careful scrutiny.


Many will argue that the Department's decision has given Mr. Coia not just a new lease on life within LIUNA but, ironically, a unique opportunity to strengthen his hold on the union. Rivals have been removed through the clean- up efforts that have occurred and Mr. Coia's continued leadership presents the image of a reformer rather than the man once described by a senior Justice official as a "mob puppet."


Of course, the Justice Department and LIUNA officials strongly disagree. They assert that Mr. Coia is precariously situated at the present time because he is subject to continuous investigation by the LIUNA enforcement team. The Department will "pull the plug" on the enforcement team and take the union to court if Mr. Coia fails to comply with various demands.


Only time will tell if the taxpayers have been well served. It is regrettable, however, that while the nation waits, a cloud of suspicion, emanating from the apparently conflicting actions of the Administration, hangs over the entire matter.

III. Background
 

A. Organized Crime in America
 


For too long, organized crime has had a choke hold on society. It is a problem affecting every man, woman and child in the United States. In 1994, Louis J. Freeh, Director of the FBI, testified before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary as follows:


In the 1986 report called 'The Impact: Organized Crime Today,' the President's Commission on Organized Crime...estimate(d) the cost of organized crime on the economy, in terms of sustained higher prices and the continued underpayment of taxes to the federal government. The Commission concluded that the estimated economy-wide impact of organized crime, excluding drug trafficking organizations, was as follows:


output was reduced by $18.2 billion in 1986 dollars,


employment was reduced by 414,000 jobs;


Consumer prices were higher by 0.3 percent; and


Per capita personal income was lower by $77.22, measured in 1986 dollars.


Director Freeh further noted that "although figures abound with regard to the billions of dollars in federal, state, and local seizures of drugs, illegal drug proceeds (cash and other assets), etc. the fundamental harm to society is incalculable." (3)


The destructive nature of organized crime was similarly described at the Subcommittee's two-day hearing. Outlining the harmful impact of organized crime from his own personal experience, James Moody, the recently retired Deputy Assistant Director of the Organized Crime, Drug and Criminal Intelligence Branch of the FBI's Criminal Investigations Division, reported to the Subcommittee that there are currently about 2000 La Cosa Nostra (LCN) members in the United States. He went on to report that each member has about ten associates, meaning that about 22,000 people throughout the United States are actively engaged in loan-sharking, prostitution, pornography, extortion, drug trafficking, fraud, gambling, bribery, racketeering and, of course, murder.

B. Organized Crime and Labor Unions
 


Mr. Moody and other witnesses confirmed that the customary targets of organized crime are labor unions. According to the FBI, the close relationship which has historically existed between organized crime and labor is based on several factors Specifically, unions enable organizations like the LCN to:


convert financial resources, such as members' dues, union assets, or worker benefit funds to the mob's own use (There are over $115 billion in some 4,500 union benefit funds in the U.S., and a large local may have as much as $200 million in its retirement fund);


use union dues to exact payoffs from businesses in the form of sweetheart contracts or strike insurance;


influence an entire market, through various bribes and payoffs with union money, as part of a general market corruption scheme; and


gain access to and protection from the political and governmental process. Corrupt, LCN-influenced union authorities dictate their wishes to political figures, tempting them with substantial campaign contributions and union voting power. (4)


Edward McDonald, chief of the federal Organized Crime Strike Force in Brooklyn, once characterized the correlation between organized crime and labor unions as follows:


A corrupt union is a profit center. It offers almost unlimited opportunities for extortion through the use of "ghosts" (fictitious workers and "no-shows" -- employees who do not come to work) and the threat of slowdowns. Mobcontrolled unions and labor-leasing companies supply security guards for nuclear power plants, garbage collectors for most New York City office buildings, and truck drivers for Shell Oil, Coca-Cola, and International Paper, among many others. A union can be used instead of a gun or a baseball bat. (5)


In its final report to President Reagan in 1986, the PCOC identified the four largest unions that were infiltrated by organized crime. These four unions, which became known as the "Big Four," are the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, the Longshoremen, the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Union, and LIUNA.


In connection with the PCOC's findings, Clark Hall, who held the position of an acting unit chief and supervisory agent at the FBI, stated at the Subcommittee's hearing the following with regard to unions and organized crime:


The higher levels of the Big Four have been so pervasively corrupted in the past...that, indeed each of those presidents of each of those Big Four international unions were hand-picked by La Cosa Nostra. There is no question whatsoever.


In fact, the corruptive influence of organized crime in LIUNA has been so extensive that, according to Mr. Moody, a successful prosecution of an individual union officer has resulted in the union replacing such officer with another mob figure, a frustrating fact for dedicated law enforcement officials.

C. Organized Crime, LIUNA and Arthur Coia
 


LIUNA was established in 1903, and has a membership that exceeds 700,000 individuals. It is comprised of 60 district councils and more than 5000 local district offices, and, according to the Department of Justice, has long been a tool of corrupt union officials acting in concert with members of organized crime families.


Since March of 1993, Arthur A. Coia has served as LIUNA's General President Mr. Coia won the position of General President after the death of Angelo Fosco, a well known associate of organized crime. Mr. Coia joined LIUNA, with his father's help, in 1957, and held numerous positions within LIUNA prior to becoming the General President. Over the past 40 years, Mr. Coia has served as the Vice President of Local 271, the Assistant Regional Manager of New England, the Business Manager of the Rhode Island District Council and the General Secretary-Treasurer of the International Union. His father was also an associate of the mob according to the Justice Department.


During the Subcommittee's investigation, LIUNA went to great lengths, including full page newspaper ads, to assert that Mr. Coia is leading the union through a process of honest reform. The information gathered by the Subcommittee provides ample justification for any objective observer to remain skeptical. The Subcommittee received a significant amount of information indicating that Mr. Coia was influenced and controlled by organized crime. Much of this information was provided by credible law enforcement officials, including officials in the Justice Department and the FBI.


In 1994, the Justice Department, with the assistance of the Department of Labor and the FBI, prepared a 212-page civil racketeering complaint which it intended to file against LIUNA. In the complaint, DOJ asserts that the action was brought against LIUNA and others for the following reasons:


...to rid the union of domination and influence by members and associates of organized crime. LIUNA has been infiltrated at all levels by corrupt individuals and organized crime figures who have exploited their control and influence over the union for personal gain and to the detriment of the union and its members. LIUNA union officials and employees at all levels, including the general presidency, have been chosen, subject to the approval of, and have been controlled by, various members and associates of organized crime. (6)


That same complaint identifies individuals who were both members of LIUNA and of LCN With regard to Mr. Coia, the complaint includes the following allegations:


Mr. Coia has "associated with, and been controlled and influenced by, organized crime figures;" (7)


Mr. Coia was associating with members of the New England La Cosa Nostra for a substantial period of time. Mr. Coia was a defendant in a case involving a scam whereby they would loot the health and welfare benefit funds in 1980. The case was dismissed because the statute of limitations had run; (8)


Mr. Coia and his father received kickbacks for three years from Joseph Hauser and Farmer's National Life Insurance Co. with the intent to influence their actions concerning the Rhode Island Laborers' District Counsel Health and Welfare Fund and the Rhode Island Laborers' Heavy and Highway Health and Welfare Benefit Fund for the purchase of group life insurance. They shared their kickbacks with Raymond Patriarca, the head of the New England Crime Family; (9) and


Mr. Coia and others attempted to induce upstate locals to surrender control of their education and training funds. Mr. Coia and others were conspiring to obtain property under false pretenses. (10)


Along with the complaint, the testimony of long-term civil servants from the Department of Justice and the FBI, the same people whose credibility LIUNA now relies upon in defense of its settlement with the government, raised serious allegations against Arthur Coia. Michael Ross, a supervisory agent at the FBI, advised the White House in an October, 1994, memorandum that "Coia is a criminal associate of the New England Patriarca organized crime family." (11) Explaining his characterization of Mr. Coia in the memorandum to the Subcommittee, Mr. Ross stated that Mr. Coia "is a person we feel has, through their past associations, shown a nexus and an affiliation with the LCN, and that's why we classified him as an LCN associate." When asked if he still stands by this characterization, Mr. Ross said that he did.


A similar characterization was offered by Mr. Moody. He stated that in his opinion Mr. Coia could not have become president of LIUNA without LCN approval. Finally, Paul Coffey, the head of the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section (OCRS) at DOJ and the lead prosecutor in the LIUNA case, said in a 1994 memorandum that Mr. Coia was a "mob puppet." (12) Indeed, federal law enforcement officials felt so strongly about Mr. Coia's mob connections that the draft complaint's demand for relief included a request that various named defendants, including Arthur Coia, be enjoined:


...from participating in, or having any future dealings of any nature whatsoever with any officer, agent, representative or employee of LIUNA or any other labor organization about any matter which related directly or indirectly, to the affairs of LIUNA or any other labor organization, and from owning or operating any business which employee members of LIUNA or any of its subordinate bodies in the Northern District of Illinois or elsewhere. (13)


In addition to the extensive allegations against Mr. Coia in the complaint, which was supported by thousands of documents, and the testimony of law enforcement officials, the Subcommittee also received testimony from a former LIUNA member and business manager of LIUNA Local 210. Ronald Fino testified at length during the hearing regarding the mob, its influence upon LIUNA members, and Mr. Coia's relationship with organized crime.


Mr. Fino, the son of a mob associate and a highly regarded DOJ informant, painted a grim picture of the negative impact that organized crime has upon members of organized labor. He discussed the "new look" of mob associates and his personal relationship and experiences with Mr. Coia. Mr. Fino noted, "Constituents, relatives, associates, and cronies of the mob would be and are always first in line when plush working assignments were and are handed out." As for organized crime's control of union leadership, Mr. Fino stated the following:


control and policy-making and the appointments throughout the infrastructure of the Laborers' International Union lay with the Cosa Nostra. You could not become a general president nor an international officer of LIUNA without mob approval. This doesn't mean that each and every official is aware of the heavy hand that dictates that official's each and every move.


With regard to the "new look" of the mob, Mr. Fino said the following:


Many creative members and associates of the Cosa Nostra are no longer adorned in the fedoras, and you will find that they are well-educated and take full advantage of that education and the moneys that they have accumulated. Today you will find that the mob is as reliant on the public relations firms as it is with its high-powered attorneys and accountants. Projecting an image of goodness and popping up at charitable fund-raising functions, combined with a voice for social justice, the racketeer builds a formidable defense against prosecution by the Justice Department and prosecution.


Mr. Fino described for the Subcommittee, under oath, his first-hand, personal and frequent contact with Mr. Coia. Estimating that he saw Mr. Coia 25-30 times annually, Mr. Fino talked of dinners, golf games and other business and social functions that he attended with Mr. Coia during the 1980s.


One conversation between Mr. Fino and Mr. Coia occurred at a time when Mr. Fino was considering running for the position of international vice-president. Because of this interest, Mr. Fino decided to speak to his friend and influential member of LIUNA's General Executive Board, Arthur Coia. Mr. Fino recounted discussing with Mr. Coia the need for mob approval of Mr. Fino's appointment to the Board. In particular, Mr. Fino said that he and Mr. Coia discussed Joseph Todaro, Sr., the boss of the Buffalo LCN family, and John Riggi, the boss of the DeCalvacante faction of the Genovese family. At the conclusion of that conversation, Mr. Coia told Mr. Fino that he was to listen to whatever mob member Joe Todaro told him, relaying the fact that "you know as well as I do where those decisions are going to be made."

IV. The Administration's Enforcement Efforts Against LIUNA and Mr. Coia
 

A. The Complaint
 


To rid unions of mob influence over the past decade, DOJ has filed civil anti-racketeering complaints in federal court. These cases are brought under the "Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act," also known as RICO (18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq.). The purpose of this statute is to eliminate the infiltration of organized crime and racketeering from legitimate organizations operating in interstate commerce.


There are five elements necessary to establish a RICO violation under 18 U.S.C. 1962. These elements are the following:


any person;


who conspires to or invests in, acquires or maintains an interest in, or conducts or participates in the affairs of;


an enterprise;


which engages in, or whose activities affect interstate or foreign commerce;


through the collection of an unlawful debt, or patterned commission of various state and federal crimes.


It was pursuant to this statute that the Justice Department, with the assistance of the Department of Labor and the FBI, drafted a 212-page complaint that named as defendants, LIUNA and, among others, Arthur Coia, its General President. This complaint, according to Mr. Coffey, took about three years to complete and was based upon more than a million pages of documentation. In 19 similar complaints filed by DOJ over the past decade, DOJ has never lost.


The Department intended to file the complaint in the Northern District of Illinois. But on November 4, 1994, the Department provided a draft copy of the complaint to the union and its General President.

B. The Settlement and the Consent Decree
 


Shortly after receiving the draft complaint on November 4, Robert Luskin was hired by LIUNA to represent the union in its dealings with the Justice Department. Mr. Luskin was and still is a partner in the law firm of Comey, Boyd & Luskin, and formerly held the position of Special Counsel to the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section at DOJ.


After recognizing that there was a potential conflict of interest between Mr. Coia, among others, and LIUNA, Mr. Luskin recommended that private counsel be retained by certain named defendants. In response to this recommendation, Mr. Coia hired Brendan Sullivan, Jr., and Howard Gutman, both of the D.C. law firm of Williams & Connolly.


Between November 1994 and February 1995, LIUNA and Mr. Coia, represented by their counsels, and DOJ engaged in negotiations in pursuit of a settlement of the case. Despite the extensive documentation of the allegations in the complaint and the Department's perfect track record in RICO cases, Mr. Coffey and his colleagues persisted in the quest for a negotiated resolution. Mr. Coffey testified that he received no pressure from anyone within the Administration to continue to negotiate. Rather, he asserts that his willingness to negotiate rested in the potential weaknesses of the government's case, which could have spelled trouble if DOJ went to court, and the continual concessions being offered by LIUNA and Mr. Coia to avoid the filing of the RICO complaint.


At the end of this three month period, a novel settlement agreement was executed. The core of the agreement required LIUNA to sign a consent decree, which DOJ could file in court along with the complaint and which includes LIUNA's acquiescence to the appointment of an independent monitor. The agreement also requires LIUNA to maintain a self-sustaining, self-policing internal structure to rid itself of mob influence, under the watchful eye of DOJ, DOL and the FBI. Although never spoken, the settlement did not require the removal of Mr. Coia, despite the allegations of wrongdoing against him in the draft complaint. (14)


The self-policing structure established by LIUNA consists of an Inspector General who investigates allegations of wrongdoing, a General Executive Board (GEB) Attorney who serves as prosecutor, a Hearings Officer who serves as judge, and an appellate officer. The Inspector General is a retired senior FBI official. Mr. Luskin, who negotiated the settlement on behalf of LIUNA, continues to serve in the position as GEB Attorney, and the Hearing Officer is a former U.S. Attorney. Each of these individuals was chosen by the union and approved by DOJ.


The consent decree executed as part of the settlement agreement permits the Justice Department to impose, through the court, an independent monitor if the Department is not satisfied with the internal actions of LIUNA in ridding itself of mob influence and control. This option was described by Mr. Coffey at the Subcommittee's hearing as a "hammer" because the Justice Department is poised to strike whenever it concludes that LIUNA's reform efforts are inadequate.


However, during the Subcommittee's investigation, another perspective on the significance of the consent decree and the ability of the Department to swing the hammer was identified. According to Mr. Gutman, Mr. Coia's personal attorney, Mr. Coffey once stated to him that no one issue would ever be the basis for filing the consent decree (ie., swinging the hammer). This was interpreted by LIUNA and Mr. Coia's attorneys to mean that no one disagreement between LIUNA and DOJ would cause the government to impose the consent decree and force a court-appointed monitor take control of the union.


Sometime after this statement was made, DOJ and LIUNA disagreed vehemently with regard to the progress being made by the union in the area of election reform. LIUNA did not want to agree to the election of officers by all union members - one person, one vote. This disagreement occurred after LIUNA had implemented other reforms, employed a staff to conduct internal investigative activities, and adopted new ethics and disciplinary procedures.


According to Mr. Gutman, when Mr. Coffey threatened to file the consent decree in court, thereby taking over the union, he and LIUNA determined that the Department was not acting in good faith. Moreover, filing the consent decree would be inconsistent with Mr. Coffey's earlier statement about the significance of any one issue of disagreement. As a result, Mr. Gutman told Subcommittee investigators that he prepared the legal documents necessary to enjoin the government from imposing the consent decree. In particular, Mr. Gutman told Subcommittee investigators that he prepared a breach of contract complaint asserting detrimental reliance on the Department's good faith.


Ultimately, LIUNA and DOJ settled their differences on the election issue. Nevertheless, the experience reveals a potentially serious problem for the United States in this new approach to combating organized crime's control of labor unions.


Another troubling feature of the settlement agreement is that the Inspector General and GEB Attorney have the responsibility of investigating wrongdoing by Mr. Coia. While the Subcommittee was consistently informed by current and former law enforcement officials that the Inspector General and GEB Attorney are held in high regard for their professionalism and integrity, there nevertheless exists an apparent conflict of interest. LIUNA has gone to great expense in publicizing its selfpolicing efforts and the reform-minded leadership of Mr. Coia. The vigor of the internal watchdogs' pursuit of Mr. Coia must remain as a concern, particularly when those who pay their salaries are committed to the improvement of Mr. Coia's image.

V. The White House and Mr. Coia
 


Mr. Coia was granted the position of General President of LIUNA on March 11, 1993 Shortly thereafter, a strong professional and personal relationship steadily developed among President Clinton, the First Lady and Mr. Coia. Yet this relationship grew in the midst of an escalating federal organized crime investigation of Mr. Coia and LIUNA.


A striking example of the overlapping nature of Mr. Coia's relationship with the President and the civil RICO case against him is found in the events of November 4, 1994. On the same day that the Justice Department sent the RICO complaint to Mr. Coia, the President sent him his own handwritten correspondence:


Dear Arthur -- I just heard you've become a grandfather -- Congratulations!


Thanks for the gorgeous driver -- It's a work of art. Best, Bill (15)


Most disturbing, this relationship flourished at a time when the White House received repeated warnings and notifications by law enforcement officials of Mr. Coia's alleged ties to organized crime.

A. Warnings to the White House Concerning Mr. Coia
 

1. Early Warnings
 


Throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, it was common knowledge within law enforcement and organized labor circles that LIUNA had been targeted by federal organized crime investigators. As stated above, the Justice Department, following on the heels of the PCOC, had set its sights on LIUNA as far back as 1986. Former FBI Director William Sessions publicly declared the Bureau's intentions to root out mob influence from the major labor unions. Moreover, numerous news reports chronicled the connections between organized crime and LIUNA. For example, on October 21, 1993, the Chicago Tribune reported that DOJ was preparing legal action to purge LIUNA of mob influence. That same article identified a number of individuals who were affiliated with LIUNA as well as organized crime. (16)

2. The "Mob Puppet" Memorandum
 


Shortly before January 11, 1994, an employee of the Office of the Inspector General at DOL contacted Paul Coffey. He had been advised that the First Lady was considering whether to accept an invitation to speak at LIUNA's annual Tri-Fund Conference to be held in Florida the following month. After receiving this information, Mr. Coffey prepared a memorandum addressed to his immediate supervisor, John Keeney, the Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division at DOJ.


In this memorandum, Mr. Coffey notes that in February 1994, OCRS intended to recommend that a civil racketeering case be filed against LIUNA, including its General President, Arthur Coia. Mr. Coffey states, "It might be prudent to recommend that she (the First Lady) avoid any direct contact with Coia, if possible, inasmuch as we plan to portray him as a mob puppet." (17)


This memorandum was not provided to the White House because it was DOJ's understanding that Mrs. Clinton's staff had already been alerted by DOL that some of the conference attendees would be defendants in an upcoming DOJ anti-racketeering case. The First Lady subsequently declined Mr. Coia's invitation to speak at the 1994 Tri-Fund Conference, however she did appear at the 1995 conference with Mr. Coia (which is discussed below).

3. The FBI Background Check and Related Warnings to the White House
 


On September 15, 1994, the White House Counsel's Office contacted the FBI and requested that a name check be conducted on Mr. Coia. (18) The catalyst for the name check request was that Mr. Coia was being considered by the White House for a position on the prestigious President's Council on Competitiveness.


In early October, Mr. Coffey was advised by the FBI of the White House's request. This resulted in Mr. Coffey drafting another memorandum. This memorandum addresses the possible appointment of Mr. Coia to the President's Council on Competitiveness, and in it Mr. Coffey states. "The Criminal Division has long had information from cooperating witnesses, that Coia was associated with and controlled by the New England family of LCN." (19)


This memorandum was addressed to Attorney General Janet Reno and Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick, from Jo Ann Harris, the former Assistant Attorney General in charge of DOJ's Criminal Division. Surprisingly, this memorandum was never provided to Attorney General Reno or Ms. Gorelick, but was provided to another member of DOJ staff, David Margolis, Associate Deputy Attorney General. On or about October 6, 1994, Mr. Margolis contacted the White House Counsel's Office by telephone and expressed DOJ's concern with Mr. Coia's appointment in light of the on-going and intensive investigation into Mr. Coia's alleged mob connections. In fact, based upon information provided by the White House, Mr. Margolis, over a period of months, contacted the White House Counsel's office from time-to-time to ensure that Mr. Coia did not receive the appointment to the President's Commission on Competitiveness because of his alleged mob ties.


On October 7, 1994, the FBI responded to the White House Counsel's September 15, 1994, inquiry. This response states, in pertinent part, "Coia is a criminal associate of the New England Patriarca organized crime family." (20)


Former White House Counsel Abner Mikva, who was in office for just one month prior to the White House's receipt of the FBI's response, told the Subcommittee that he does not know what happened to this communication after it was received by the White House.

4. The Second Tri-Fund Conference
 


Based upon interviews with Judge Mikva and Deputy Chief of Staff Harold Ickes, the White House on yet another occasion became aware of concerns surrounding Mr. Coia. Mr. Ickes contacted Judge Mikva regarding the First Lady's anticipated appearance at LIUNA's 1995 Tri-Fund Conference. In response to Mr. Ickes' inquiry, Judge Mikva spoke to Ms. Gorelick. According to Judge Mikva, Ms. Gorelick noted that DOJ had several concerns about Mr. Coia which he subsequently passed on to Mr. Ickes. It has been reported that Judge Mikva advised Mr. Ickes that the First Lady should avoid one-on-one contacts with Mr. Coia.


Mr. Ickes did not recall advising the First Lady of any of the concerns expressed by the Deputy Attorney General with regard to Mrs. Clinton's anticipated appearance with Mr. Coia at the Tri-Fund Conference in Florida. It should be noted, however, that press accounts indicate that Mr. Ickes advised the First Lady of the concerns surrounding Mr. Coia and his alleged ties to organized crime. (21)


Whether Mr. Ickes advised the First Lady of the concerns expressed to him by White House Counsel Mikva regarding her appearance at the Tri-Fund Conference is not clear. What is clear, however, is that the First Lady's speech writer appears to have been briefed. At the top of the page of her preparation notes for Mrs. Clinton's Tri-Fund remarks are the words, "They are mob." (22)

B. Mr. Coia's Relationship with the President, First Lady and
 

the Democratic Party
 


IfDOJ and DOL warnings to the White House were intended to discourage conduct which would appear to conflict with the Federal Government's anti-racketeering efforts, then they certainly failed to achieve their purpose. The Subcommittee's review of documents provided by the Administration has turned up over 120 transactions within a three-year period of time between the White House and Mr. Coia. (23) In addition, the Democratic National Committee accepted financial contributions from Mr. Coia during this period of time amounting to at least $280,000.


The contacts between the White House and Mr. Coia range in nature from rather innocuous official correspondence to personal gifts, including an autographed basketball, golf balls, a golf hat, a golf shirt, a golf club from the President to Mr. Coia, and a custom made golf club from Mr. Coia to the President. Also included in the list are numerous personal notes between the President and Mr. Coia, and White House invitations relating to breakfasts, dinners, special events, and flights aboard Air Force One.


One example of how law enforcement warnings went unheeded can be found in the events of October, 1994. In the first week of that month, as noted above, a senior Justice Department official had informed White House officials of the connection between Mr. Coia and organized crime, and the FBI had sent a memorandum to the White House Counsel's office informing it that Mr. Coia was "a criminal associate of the New England Patriarca organized crime family." Nevertheless, on October 21, 1994, President Clinton wrote to Mr Coia the following:


Dear Arthur: Thanks for the great golf shirt and the copy of your article in Northeast Golfer. I am also sorry that we did not have the chance to play golf together this season. You might have helped me break 80. Your thoughtfulness and continued support mean a lot to me. Please give my best to Joanne. Sincerely, Bill Clinton (24)


Mr. Coia's relationship with the Democratic National Committee (DNC) presents the same story of conflicting appearances and impropriety. This is demonstrated vividly by reviewing several exchanges of correspondence.


After the White House was advised of the serious concerns held by DOJ, DOL, and the FBI regarding Mr. Coia's relationship with organized crime, the DNC continued to demonstrate a close and friendly relationship with Mr. Coia. For example, Donald Fowler, Chairman of the DNC, sent to Mr. Coia a tie bar with the Presidential seal on it. Included was a hand-written note in which Mr. Fowler thanked Mr. Coia for his help and his "friendship." (25) Shortly thereafter, Mr. Fowler again sent a hand-written note to Mr. Coia thanking him for a pen that was given to him by Mr. Coia as a gift. (26) Sometime later, Mr. Fowler again contacted Mr. Coia through another hand-written note. In that note, the Chairman of the DNC thanked Mr. Coia for a tie and for a contribution that Mr. Coia had made. In particular Mr. Fowler said:


Thank you for the tie. I appreciate it, and appreciate your friendship even more. Our conversation on Sunday was good. Thank you for your contribution. We will keep in mind the items that we discussed: President Clinton attending your convention, your role in the '96 Convention, follow up with other union presidents, etc. We will stay in touch. Dan. (27)


On November 19, 1995, Mr. Fowler wrote to Mr. Ickes at the White House. In that handwritten note, Mr. Fowler advises Mr. Ickes, "Arthur Coia, President of Laborers' International Union, would like a speaking role at the '96 convention. He has been a very good supporter of the President and the Democrat party. Dan" (28)

VI. Conclusion
 


There are those who are quick to dismiss the Subcommittee's review of the Administration's conduct in the LIUNA matter as election-year politics and pay back for the Washington union boss' campaign against Republicans in Congress. Such views may be politically convenient, but they ignore a central truth: the impartial administration of justice is ill-served when targets of investigations by the executive branch regularly and publicly associate with the most senior officials within the same branch of government.


Why is it that Justice Department career officials were concerned about White House associations with Mr. Coia? The answer is obvious. They were deeply troubled by the appearance of such associations because of their effect on the public's confidence in the impartial administration of justice. The considerable experience of these officials had taught them that a storm of controversy could erupt if federal law enforcement was perceived to be serving political interests.


And indeed, that is exactly what happened. After DOJ and LIUNA reached a settlement in the case, suspicions soon emerged that Mr. Coia's extraordinary political connections had paid off. These suspicions cast a shadow of impropriety over hard-working public servants at DOJ -- the very result these prosecutors had tried to avoid with their warnings to the White House.


Much has been said about Arthur Coia's associations with organized crime. Mr Coia fervently denies such claims. Mr. Coffey at DOJ insists that the allegations in the complaint are valid but "the jury is still out" on whether Mr. Coia is still associated with the mob. Yet putting aside concerns about the outcome of ongoing criminal investigations or the ultimate success of LIUNA's self-policing efforts, White House officials acted irresponsibly in not being sensitive to the appearance of a conflict of interest.


Moreover, this appearance of a conflict continues to this day. According to testimony at the Subcommittee's hearing, Mr. Coia is still under investigation by both the Justice Department and the LIUNA enforcement team. If DOJ files the consent decree or if criminal charges are brought against Mr. Coia, then the case against LIUNA and Mr. Coia, the President's friend, will become much more visible to the American public. How then can it be appropriate for the President and Mr. Coia to be such high profile political allies? And does this high profile political alliance make it more difficult for the Department to file the consent decree?


To date, the Subcommittee has not received any indication from any political official in the Administration that there is a concern about the appearance of impropriety outlined in this report. Until that happens and, more importantly, until steps are taken to eliminate this serious problem, the interests of justice will continue to suffer.

                              DISSENTING VIEWS OF
 

                            Hon. Charles E. Schumer
 

                              Hon. Robert C. Scott
 

                                Hon. Zoe Lofgren
 

                            Hon. Sheila Jackson Lee
 

                              Hon. Melvin L. Watt
 

                             Hon. John Conyers, Jr.
 

I. INTRODUCTION
 


These hearings, as described by the hearing title, were concerned with the Clinton "Administration's efforts against the influence of organized crime in the Laborers." According to every one of the Majority's witnesses, the Clinton Administration's efforts were a success, particularly the ongoing efforts to rid the Laborers' International Union, N.A. ("Laborers") of mob influence following the unprecedented settlement agreement the Department of Justice ("Justice") signed with the Laborers in February 1995. (29) Even the Majority's Report concedes the settlement has "produced positive results." (30)


This congressional investigation began in March 1996 when the Majority claimed that the Clinton Administration improperly influenced career prosecutors at Justice to settle the civil racketeering law suit involving the Laborers. (31) Yet, the Majority's Report now admits there is no direct evidence of "improper influence." (32)


The investigation began with the unfounded charge of "improper influence." (33) Indeed, there are a series of memos and reports by the Republican Leadership repeating these charges against the Administration.


The Majority announced the investigation in a presidential election year soon after the unions committed themselves to an informational campaign against some Republican congressional candidates. (34) At this time, the Judiciary Chair said, "If Organized Labor launches a $35 million campaign against you, you're not going to lay down and play dead." (35)


In an attempt to find some evidence to back up the unfounded charges, the Majority circulated a memo directing Republican congressional staff to collect derogatory information on the Clinton Administration and the unions. (36) Despite their efforts, they found no evidence to support their charge of "improper influence."


The Majority's expressed preference for a government takeover of the Laborers in this case was the rationale for opposing the civil RICO settlement that, in the Majority's words, "turned the mob-busting mission over to the union itself;" but the Speaker and Judiciary Chair earlier opposed any government takeovers of unions as "inherently destructive." (37)


When the Majority called an insider witness. Ron Fino, to testify, they said he was "as knowledgeable a witness about the Laborers as there is." (38) But the Majority preferred to limit what Fino had to say to matters involving the Clinton Administration and did not want to hear or credit what Fino alleged about questionable associates of Republican Vice Presidential Candidate Jack Kemp.


And when the Majority Report found no direct evidence of wrongdoing by the Administration, it turned to the specter of "appearances" to justify its "investigation." (39) The Majority's discussion of "appearances" was not particularly rigorous. It consisted of general observations on "associations," never precisely defined, that involved the President and, seemingly, any individual under investigation. The Majority's position careened perilously close to guilt by association. The Majority invoked as its ethical standard the findings of a Crime Commission Report that was critical of "the propriety" of conduct in Reagan's Administration, and the Majority quoted a passage from that report out of context, to criticize the Clinton Administration's handling of the Laborers' case. The Majority overlooked the distinction, however, that was critical to that Commission's recommendation. Whereas the Reagan Administration did nothing to prosecute the Teamsters, the Clinton Administration took action against the Laborers. By the Majority's overbroad "associational" standard against anyone "under investigation," as former White House Counsel Abner Mikva (Counsel Mikva) observed, the President shouldn't even have meetings with the Speaker of the House while he is under investigation.


To paraphrase Counsel Mikva, the evidence is clear: nothing the President did, and nothing that anybody in the official family did, could in any way be construed by anybody in Justice as pressure to do, or not do something. (40) By this standard, not only did the Clinton Administration not in fact influence anyone, the Clinton Administration did not do anything that could even be construed as influencing anyone.


We have also set forth below in a separate section some background of what happened in earlier Administrations to set the stage for what happened in this Administration and why settlement discussions made sense, how they proceeded, and a brief review of the results already achieved. (41)

II. THE INVESTIGATION
 

A. THE MOTIVATION FOR THIS CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION WAS
 

UNNECESSARILY PARTISAN
 

1. The Majority Never Had Any Evidence To Support The Unfounded Charge of


"Improper Influence" That Began This Investigation
 


At the end of the day, the Majority conceded in its Report that there was no evidence of the charge, "improper influence," that began the investigation. " T he facts the Majority gathered to date do not reveal a direct connection, (42) the Report said.


However, as early as March 28, 1996, and without regard for the reputations of the career prosecutors involved, the Chair of the House Republican Conference said that " President Clinton 's appointees" improperly influenced career prosecutors at the Department of Justice to settle a civil racketeering law suit against the Laborers. (43) And he repeated this unfounded charge afterwards. (44)


In an effort to find some evidence, the Majority circulated a memo to Republican House Staff insisting they search after any information they could find on waste, fraud, abuse and influence involving the Clinton Administration and the unions. (45)


When the congressional "investigation" got under way, the Majority Staff interviewed present and past White House counsel, the White House Deputy Chief of Staff, all the key career prosecutors involved in the Laborers' investigation, key F.B.I. supervisory agents, and counsel for the Laborers and for the Laborers' President. The Majority's staff requested documents that finally totaled 20,000 pages from the White House, Justice, various agencies, and the Laborers themselves. The fifty or more interviews conducted by the Majority Staff and the 20,000 pages collected by the Majority produced no proof that any person, directly or indirectly, improperly influenced anyone. What the Majority found instead was proof there had been no influence.


Ms. Jo Ann Harris, formerly the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division, is the only Clinton appointee who could possibly have "influenced" any career prosecutors. It was after a meeting in her office that the disputed settlement with the Laborers occurred. (46)


Ms. Harris testified that she was not in a position to "influence" any career prosecutors as she was the one who "followed" their recommendation and Ms. Harris further reassured the members that no person at the White House, nor at Justice, nor anyone from anyplace else had even tried to influenced her. (47)


The former F.B.I. Deputy Assistant Director for the Criminal Investigations Division, James E. Moody, responsible for racketeering investigations, dismissed the charge of "improper influence" as frivolous since he'd been present during the settlement negotiations, and knew Justice's principal negotiator for twenty years, trusted him and trusted the independence of all the other public servants involved in the negotiations. (48) Moody testified the enforcement agreement was "different but it was not a sweetheart deal." (49) If he believed for a moment it was a "sweetheart deal," Moody said he would have blown the whistle on the enforcement agreement. (50) Despite this testimony, the Majority claimed in its Report that "a shadow of impropriety" hung over these distinguished career prosecutors. (51)

2. The "Investigation" Got Underway in a Presidential Election Year
 


The timing of the investigation during a presidential election year suggests of partisan motive. No member of the Majority objected to the enforcement agreement with the Laborers when it was announced in February 1995. But shortly after the AFL-CIO and the Laborers announced a well-funded informational campaign to oppose Republican congressional candidates, the Republican National Committee Chair complained about the unions' informational campaign. (52) and, about the same time, the Chairman of the House Republican Conference made the factually unsupported charges we discussed in the last section, that " President Clinton 's appointees" improperly influenced career prosecutors at Justice.

3. The Majority Was Not "Going To Lay Down And Play Dead"
 


Asked in a television interview to confirm or deny whether the congressional investigation was retaliatory, the Judiciary Chair said, "They the unions might have a point ." (53) Nor did the Chair hesitate to explain why: "If Organized Labor launches a $35 million campaign against you, you're not going to lay down and play dead." (54)

4. The Majority's Objection To The Laborers' Policing Themselves Was
 

Undermined By The Republican Leadership's Past Opposition To The
 

Government Taking Over Any Union as "Inherently Destructive"
 


The Majority objected that the settlement "turned the mob-busting mission over to the union itself," and apparently preferred that the government do the job instead. This is in remarkable contrast to an earlier position. The Speaker and Judiciary Chair had opposed any government takeover of a union as "inherently destructive":


W e are very troubled by reports that the Department of Justice has chosen a broad and unprecedented enforcement strategy that must, of necessity, undermine the ability of a union to perform its statutory functions as the collective bargaining representative of its members. Labor unions in this society serve as a counter-balance to the institutions of government and corporations and afford workers a vehicle for exercising a voice in the determination of national policy as well as their wages and working conditions. To function properly, unions must be independent of government or corporate control in order to reflect and represent the interests of their members. The imposition of trustees to administer an international union by the government is, on its face, inherently destructive of the ability of workers to represent and speak for themselves through their unions. The exercise of such authority by the government to essentially remove one of the major participants in the democratic process, establishes a precedent which strikes at the very foundation of our democracy. (55)

5. The Majority Accepted Ron Fino's Testimony Concerning the Clinton
 

Administration But Ignored His Accusations Concerning Jack Kemp
 


The Majority's principal witness, Mr. Ron Fino, testified about Coia's alleged associations with organized crime, but knew nothing about Mr. Coia's leadership since Fino had left the Laborers before Coia became the International's President. Fino's allegations about Coia were otherwise uncorroborated by any other witness, document, wire or recording device. Since about the late 1980's, Mr. Fino's workaday life has been spent, and all his income apparently derived from what he had to say about "wise guys." When the FBI cut off Mr. Fino's stipend, he sold a story to that supermarket tabloid, the Globe, alleging O.J. Simpson "had drug links to the mob," according to the headline emblazoned across the tabloid's front cover.


The Majority lionized Fino. Rep. Fred Heineman called Fino "a gutsy guy." (56) Rep. Ed. Bryant praised Fino for "hav ing consistently provided what I believe to be accurate information to the F.B.I. in regard to the union and mob activities." (57) The Crime Subcommittee Chair told Fino he was "probably about as forceful and as ... knowledgeable a witness about Laborers' International Union and Racketeering as there is -- period -- anywhere." (58)


When it was rumored that the Republican Leadership planned additional hearings, Minority Staff contacted Fino. In those conversations, Fino alleged that former Rep. Jack Kemp associated with mob associates. (59)


On September 18, 1996, Rep. John Conyers (D-MI), Ranking Minority Member of the Judiciary Committee, wrote the Chair to ask "out of a sense of evenhandedness and fair play" for approval for Fino to travel to Washington, D.C. so Fino might be deposed by Judiciary Committee Staff. (60) Rep. Conyers explained that "the fact that such serious allegations are being made by a witness the Majority obviously consider ed so credible ... indicates to me that further inquiry into this matter is required." (61)


On September 23, 1996, Time Magazine reported Fino's allegations against Kemp. (62) There followed several more news reports and, on September 25, 1996, when ABC Network TV asked Vice-Presidential Jack Kemp about Fino's allegations, Kemp said he "welcome d anybody who would lay out any fact that would accuse me Kemp of any active crime or being tied to the mob." Rep. Conyers said he "couldn't agree more" but the Judiciary Chair did not grant Rep. Conyers' request.


The Majority preferred to limit what Fino had to say to matters involving the Clinton Administration and did not wish to hear what Fino alleged about associates of then Republican Vice Presidential Candidate Jack Kemp.

B. THERE IS NO APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY CONCERNING THE
 

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT BETWEEN JUSTICE AND THE LABORERS
 


Having failed to demonstrate there was evidence of any improper influence in reaching the settlement in the Laborers' case, the Majority insists instead its concern is the "appearance" of impropriety. But the Majority's suggested standard for "propriety" is overbroad and the related discussion about "propriety" is replete with undocumented assertions, factual inconsistencies, and false and misleading statements.

1. THE MAJORITY'S STANDARD IS OVERBROAD
 


First, consider the Majority's standard prohibiting any "association" that involves the President and, seemingly, any individual "under investigation." For the statement of this proposition, the Majority relies on a recommendation found in the Crime Commission Report (63) critical of the Reagan Administration's handling of the Teamsters Union. (64) The Majority's Report relies on the Commission's observation about "appearances" in the Reagan Administration to criticize the Clinton Administration's prosecution of the Laborers' case. But the Majority overlooks the distinction that was critical to the Commission: whereas the Reagan Administration did nothing to prosecute the Teamsters, the Clinton Administration acted against the Laborers. (65)


In essence, the question the Majority posed in its Report was why the President and the First Lady associated with the Laborers' President, Arthur Coia. The Majority apparently does not consider Mr. Coia's representative capacity as the leader of 750,000 working men and women or his support of the President's policies as either good or sufficient cause for this association.


The Majority apparently is of the view that it is inappropriate for President Clinton -- and presumably for any President -- to meet with any official or person while that official or person is "under investigation." Consider, by was of example, that Republican President George Bush met with the Laborers' President Angelo Fosco while he was under investigation. (66) The F.B.I. stated Fosco was an associate of and under the direct influence of the Chicago Crime Family founded by the infamous Al Capone. According to the Majority's apparent prohibition. President Bush's meeting with Fosco would be ill-advised and unethical and possibly illegal.


Similarly, Former Senator Robert Dole met with Teamster President Jackie Presser while Presser was under federal investigation when there was no question that Presser was "mobbed up." (67) Should Senator Dole have avoided contact with the Teamsters? Alternatively, as suggested by former Counsel Mikva," does the Majority mean that President Clinton may not "associate" with Speaker Gingrich simply because the Speaker is "under investigation"?


As Counsel Mikva suggested, "appearances" are important as " t his Government operates on trust and wants people to believe in the Government which is why we do all the things we do." (68) But, while perception and appearances are "incredibly important," Counsel Mikva explained that a President could not restrict his meetings or "associations" to "altar boys and Sunday school choir s during his public career." (69) Counsel Mikva commented that the problem with "perceptions" based on "appearances" is that you can't "control the problem that some people for example, looking at that picture of Mr. Bush with Jackie Presser might say, 'Aha, he President Bush was in the Teamsters' pocket." (70) Mikva concluded, since we "can't control some third party's perception w e try to minimize it if we can." (71) Mikva then narrowed the question, testifying that the "ethical propriety" that this Subcommittee was legitimately concerned with, was "that nothing the President did and nothing that anybody in his official family did ... could in any way be construed by anybody in Justice as trying to put pressure on them at Justice to lay off." (72)

2. THE MAJORITY'S ASSERTIONS ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS
 


Second, the Majority Report distorts the hearing record and asserts: (1) the President knew something he did not, (2) Justice went "easy" on the Laborers' President, Arthur Coia, (3) Coia was more involved with organized crime than Justice contends, and (4) union self-policing has never been previously considered.

a. The President did not receive a "law enforcement warning"
 

concerning Arthur Coia
 


The Majority charged there was a "law enforcement warning" about a criminal investigation of Arthur Coia and it "went unheeded" in October 1994. (73)


The Majority contends a senior Justice Department official "informed White House officials of the alleged connection between Mr. Coia and organized crime" and "sent a memorandum to the White House Counsel's Office" with this same investigative information and "nevertheless" President Clinton sent Mr. Coia a thank you note for the golf shirt and a magazine article Coia had forwarded to the President." (74)


In fact, the "warning" was not "unheeded" in the sense that the information requested by and provided to the White House was used for its intended purpose, a name check. Mr. Coia was under consideration for an unpaid position on the President's Council on Competitiveness. A name check was requested of the F.B. I. by one of those few people concerned with that review process. The paper work was directed to a clerk or intern in the White House Counsel's office. (75) Mr. Coia, for whatever reason, was not appointed. (76)


Moreover, the name check report came with a cautionary proviso, not to circulate it. (77) White House Counsel testified he did not see the report and did not inform the President of its content. (78) As a result, when the President penned his thank you note to Mr. Coia, thanking him for a shirt and a magazine, the President was completely unaware of the contents of the name check." (79)

b. The Justice Department Did Not Go "Easy" On Coia
 


The Majority concludes, as a result of the settlement, Laborers' President Coia "has escaped from the clutches of the Justice Department." (80)


A review of the records indicates that this is not the case. First, Coia is subject to intense scrutiny. As a result of the consent agreement, Mr. Coia waived his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. FBI Racketeering Chief Moody testified he couldn't recall any Union President ever agreeing to do that. (81) This waiver is significant in that Coia is currently the subject of both an internal disciplinary investigation by the Laborers Inspector General, Doug Gow, and by Justice. Former FBI Chief Moody said he'd known Doug Gow for "twenty some years," from when Gow was number three in charge of the FBI and swore " Gow will go right after you," and after Mr. Coia, if he has the evidence. (82) John Keeney, the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division at Justice, said that Coia had earned no right to delay any investigation, nor any immunity from prosecution. (83)


Second, Coia must free the union from the mob. Racketeering Section Chief Coffey said Coia had to get rid of the mob and if "he can't do it, doesn't want to do it, he's slow to do it, he's playing both sides of the street ... then sitting in the wings waiting for him is a court and a bunch of officers, court-appointed officers and the Government sitting there with all its powers." (84) Put most succinctly, Coffey said, "the mob goes or these officers including Coia go; it's one or the other." (85)

c. Coia's "Associations" with Organized Crime Have Not Been Established
 


The Majority also repeatedly refers to Coia as a "mob puppet" based on a report written by Coffey in 1994. (86) The Majority failed, however, to note that by the time of the hearings in 1996. Mr. Coffey's view had changed. When asked at the hearing whether Coffey had called Coia a "mob puppet," Coffey responded, "I think that's what I said but ... the jury's out on whether he is today." (87)


Coffey explained that "the interesting thing about Coia is that he's the first guy to come to the Government and he says, 'It ain't true that I'm a mob puppet ' ... and 'I can prove it's not true' ..." by ridding the union of organized crime influence. (88) As for the contention that FBI Chief Moody said that's how Coia became President of the Laborers, with mob support, (89) Moody testified that "in the past" that's how the leadership was selected (90) but the mob's influence had "greatly lessened within the last 10 to 12 years." (91) Coffey explained, "At the time Coia got his job as the Laborers' President , the wheels were coming off the mob's hold of the Laborers ." (92)


The Majority also charges that Mr. Coia "associated 'with members of the New England La Cosa Nostra for a substantial period of time." (93) The draft complaint merely alleges Coia has been "associating with members of the New England LCN ..." (emphasis supplied). This is a distinction with a difference. Special Agent Mike Ross explains that "associating" meant as little as " hanging out" whereas an "associate" or "associated" meant "influenced and perhaps with historic or familial ties." (94) And on the question of whether Coia was a mob "associate," Moody testified that there was not "sufficient evidence" to say Coia was an associate of organized crime. (95) Coffey testified. "So far, the evidence does not suggest that he's now an associate." (96)


Finally, the Majority charges that "for three years with his father Coia received kickbacks that were shared with Raymond Patriarca, head of the New England Crime Family," (97) and says it again later in the Report. (98) The statement is unfair since the charges involved events in and around 1973 that were not proven in court and were eventually dismissed in 1984. The draft civil RICO complaint makes this abundantly clear. (99) But the Majority did not make it clear in its Report.

d. Congress and Others Have Previously Advocated Union Self-policing
 


The Majority claims that self-policing by the target union is a new mob-busting technique requiring special scrutiny that was somehow proposed as a "sweetheart" deal by the Clinton Administration. (100) Yet, as noted elsewhere in these dissenting views, prior to the Laborers' settlement, the Speaker and Judiciary Chair previously supported unions cleaning their own house and vigorously opposed the destruction inherent when the government acted instead. (101) The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations also reviewed this matter with some care in 1990 and recommended, where possible, that unions be left in place and went on to cite examples where this had occurred. (102) Moody explained that it was because the Teamsters case served as a precedent and the ongoing threat of RICO that the Laborers instituted the necessary changes themselves. (103)

III. BACKGROUND AND SETTLEMENT
 


To fully understand the import and utility of the Laborers' settlement it is useful to consider the overall context and evolution of our nation's battle against organized and the particular facts of Justice's case against the Laborers.

A. The Fight Against "The Enemy Within"
 


Senators Kefauver and McClellan thoroughly investigated organized crime's corrupting influence on the labor movement. 1,525 witnesses testified at Senate hearings conducted over a three year period. (104) The historic clash between then Committee Chief Counsel Robert F. Kennedy and Teamster Leader Jimmy Hoffa, televised nationwide, symbolized the combatants' respective roles, Kennedy's struggle to uncover and destroy mob influence, and Hoffa's resistance.


Kennedy persisted, however, and, after becoming Attorney General, successfully prosecuted Hoffa and other corrupt leaders in an unprecedented effort to rid the unions of "the enemy within." (105) Unfortunately, the convictions Kennedy obtained, the prison sentences imposed, and the gains made in the 60's, were relatively short-lived.


By 1986, President Reagan's Commission on Organized Crime ("the Commission") focussed on the mob's "market place corruption" -- "the control and exploitation of labor unions by organized criminals." (106) The Commission concluded that the mob influence by the Teamsters was as intrusive and pervasive as ever and extended to three other Internationals including the Laborers. (107)


Former Chief Circuit Judge Irving R. Kaufman, the Chair of the Commission, urged "the adoption of a national strategy to remove organized crime from the marketplace... ." (108) He insisted that President Reagan prosecute the Teamsters, as well as the Laborers, Longshoremen, and the Hotel Workers, but the Reagan Administration limited its efforts largely to the Teamsters. (109)


In fact these troubles derived from the Commission's insistence that the Administration use civil RICO to take over the unions. (110) Since its enactment in 1970, prosecutors considered the RICO statute a powerful weapon to combat organized crime. (111) But the statute had not been widely used in the civil context before the Commission's recommendation and its use against unions posed unforeseen problems.

B. Limitations and Failures of Civil RICO
 


After the Commission proposed using civil RICO, and Justice was preparing to comply, its use was roundly criticized by Congress, by no less than the current Speaker and the Chair of the Judiciary, in a forceful letter of denunciation addressed to then Attorney General Meese on December 10, 1987. (112)


The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (P.S.I.) was critical of the varying powers and responsibilities exercised by a court-appointed trustee in a civil RICO case. (113) The PSI was concerned about possible government abuse, (114) and therefore recommended that the union leadership be left in place, (115) citing precedent to do so (long before the Laborers). (116) PSI further cautioned the government, based on the past failures of RICO, that it was not necessarily the best device to oust union leadership under mob influence. (117) The Commission's recommendations were therefore subject to significant criticism and close congressional scrutiny. (118)


In the Teamsters' civil RICO case, notwithstanding wiretaps, surveillance, and its array of proven informants, the parties fought for years, spending millions of dollars, before the federal district court appointed a court monitor to run the Teamsters. That civil RICO prosecution was expensive, time- consuming, inefficient, and, in one notorious example, resulted in the substitution of one set of "mobbed-up" union officials by another.


Neither the Reagan or Bush Administrations pursued the Laborers in any significant way other than to collect and organize the information it had relating to the Laborers (about a million documents). But as the years ran by following upon the Commission's Report, the underlying charges against the Laborers grew stale, the most significant targets of the investigation died or were replaced, and the evidence Justice had against those remaining was uncorroborated by any wiretap evidence or surveillance witnesses. The Majority refers to the Laborers' documents, without mentioning how problematic the information was, as "the backbone" of the civil RICO complaint that was drafted during the Clinton Administration. (119) Notwithstanding the difficulties caused by the delays following the Commission recommendations in 1986, and in spite of the evidential shortfall, the Clinton Administration finally took action where the earlier Administrations had failed to act.

C. Clinton Administration Efforts to Fight the Mob
 


When the Justice Department finally completed a draft civil RICO complaint against the Laborers, they forwarded the draft to the Laborers' counsel, rather than filing it with the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, preferring to negotiate if they could before beginning what promised to be costly litigation. There was good reason for both sides to talk.


Eight years had passed since the Commission had complained about mob influence in the Laborers. (120) The government had F.B.I. surveillance of Laborers' President Angelo Fosco meeting with the mob. (121) But they had failed to successfully prosecute Fosco once before (122) and in 1993 Fosco died and was replaced as General President by Arthur Coia, Jr. A number of mobsters and union leaders died since the President's Commission though they were named in the complaint as co-conspirators. (123)


Justice knew its evidence was stale. They had to consider the likelihood they might have difficulty seeking an injunction based on events more than ten years old. (124)


Another problem was that the government was unwilling to disclose some of its most recent evidence. The Department blacked out paragraphs and even pages of its draft complaint. (125) Justice apparently hoped a settlement would make disclosure unnecessary.


Further, while the government had evidence implicating some of the Locals and the District Councils, the U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois and his Civil Division Chief had "lingering concerns" about the strength of the evidence against the International, the object of the draft civil RICO complaint. (126)


The Department and the F.B.I. also understood that they had stronger evidence against some individuals than others. The F.B.I. felt confident about evidence that Laborers' Vice President John Serpico from Chicago was "mobbed up" (127) and was "influenced by the Chicago LCN family" (emphasis supplied). (128) However, the F.B.I. concluded they could only allege Coia had been " associating with" organized crime figures. They could not contend that the mob influenced him in his decisions or actions. (129)


Both sides appreciated the risks of litigation. The Laborers were particularly concerned about the disastrous effects this civil RICO suit would have on their ability to negotiate contracts for their members. Justice was further constrained by an executive order prohibiting litigation unless there was first an attempt to settle the matter. President Bush's Council on Competitiveness (130) prompted Executive Order 12778, (131) specifically Section 1(a), that said in the strongest possible terms that:


"No governmental litigation counsel shall file a complaint initiating civil litigation without first making a reasonable effort a to notify all disputants about the nature of the dispute and b to attempt to achieve a settlement. . . . ." (emphasis and brackets supplied).


Robert Luskin, formerly the Special Counsel to the Department's Organized Crime and Racketeering Section appeared for the Laborers to discuss settlement. Soon after Washington attorneys Brendan Sullivan and Howard Gutman appeared for Laborers' President Coia. They discussed settlement with Paul Coffey, the Department's Chief of the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section. The Laborers, while asserting that the evidence against them was poor, still offered to address alleged mob influence. They asked Coffey if he would consider alternatives to court-appointed officers and allow the Laborers to police themselves. (132)


On December 14, 1994, Coffey forwarded a proposed consent decree. It was objectionable to the Laborers because it called for court supervision. It contained a partial acknowledgment to the Laborers' offer, however, to clean themselves up by providing for an in-house attorney "who has the GEB's (133) Board's mandate to take whatever action is necessary to accomplish the removal of organized crime and all other criminal elements from all levels of the union." (134) The Department's draft decree also provided for the removal from the Board of Vice President Serpico. Vice President Caivano and Bob Connerton, the Board's General Counsel, but not for the removal of President Coia. (135) The Laborers objected to removing officers without any due process.


The Laborers' counsel then prepared a counter proposal in response with elaborate procedures to reassure the Department of their good faith.


Coffey rejected the proposal. He had the fixed view that there had to be a signed consent decree. When the Laborers asked for a review within the Department, by John Keeney, the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division. Keeney supported Coffey's decision. So the Laborers sought review to Jo Ann Harris, the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division.


In advance of meeting with Jo Ann Harris, the Laborers convened a full Board meeting on January 18, 1995 to make significant changes to help convince Justice, and presumably the federal district court of their good faith.


The Board approved an internal disciplinary code that replaced the authority of the President and the Board in disciplinary matters with an entirely independent review process. The procedure passed by a vote of 10-2.


The Code expressly barred any member or officer from "knowingly associating" with any member or associate of organized crime or "knowingly permitting" any member or associate of organized crime from influencing union affairs or obstructing or interfering with any investigation.


The Board created four new independent positions within the union (1) an Inspector General to investigate allegations of wrongdoing, (2) a Board Attorney to prosecute the charges, (3) a Hearings Officer to hear these charges, and (4) an Appellate Officer to review the Hearing Officer's rulings. In addition, the Board immediately suspended Vice-Presidents Serpico and Caivano pending the filing of charges by the newly appointed Board Attorney, Luskin. General Counsel Connerton also resigned.


The Laborers and Coia's counsel met at Harris' office shortly afterwards on January 19, 1995. By all accounts, there were twenty or more investigative agents and lawyers present from the F.B.I., the Department of Labor, the U.S. Attorney's Office from the Northern District of Illinois, and, of course, from Main Justice. The Laborers reported their accomplishments in the few days since their last meeting with Keeney and Coffey and asked once again for 90 days to show they could perform the job themselves.


But the Department wanted insurance against failure. The Department obtained its insurance when the Laborers' counsel agreed to sign a consent decree provided the Department agree not to file the decree unless and until the Laborers actually failed in their efforts to remove the mob. This insurance policy was reduced to writing on February 13, 1995, that provided for:


"a period of internal reform, lasting at least ninety (90)days, aimed at further investigating and disciplining individuals within any entity of LIUNA the Laborers for wrongful association with, or corruption by, members of organized crime, as well as instituting other reforms." (136)


The Department agreed to "provide any assistance allowed by law to LIUNA." (137)


After the ninety days it was up to "the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division Jo Ann Harris to determin e , in her sole discretion, that the imposition of a consent decree was necessary or desirable." (138) The Laborers have since described the oversight agreement they signed as "a gun pointed at their head" for the Department can pull the trigger at any time the Laborers fail.


The four months spent to make this enforcement agreement appear to have been time well spent. Since February 1995, the Laborers have removed 36 individuals from Office or membership, 21 of whom were allegedly mob- affiliated. Board Attorney Luskin negotiated settlements with or brought charges against another 13 individuals, 7 of whom were alleged to be mob-affiliated. The Laborers recently filed disciplinary charges against 28 targets in their investigation of Buffalo Local 210. This was among the Laborers' most significant accomplishments. Deputy Assistant F.B.I. Director Moody testified at the congressional hearings that Buffalo Local 210 "was the most blatant example of La Cosa Nostra control of a local union in the United States" and that the F.B.I. had had "trouble making criminal cases against that local." (139) The Laborers also imposed Trusteeships for Locals 1278, 853, 210, 602, the Baltimore District Council, and Local 73. They consolidated the Mason Tenders District Council in New York, an act that assured the removal of the allegedly corrupt officers of ten locals and their substitution by provisional officers vetted by the F.B.I.


Lastly, the Laborers concluded the direct election of their President and Secretary-Treasurer, and a referendum to find out whether the members want to elect the remaining International officers as well.

IV. CONCLUSION
 


We commend this Administration's successful efforts to rid the Laborers International of Organized Crime. While much remains to be done, a lot has already been accomplished. No Administration should ever interfere in an ongoing investigation. We are satisfied, however, that there was no improper interference here. While the Majority's motivation has been suspect in this presidential election year, we sincerely hope that we may now work together to study this enforcement agreement as a model for prospective civil RICO settlements and consider legislative and statutory reforms that may help working men and women.


______________________________


Charles E. Schumer


______________________________


Robert C. Scott


______________________________


Zoe ILLEGIBLE WORD


______________________________


Sheila Jackson Lee


______________________________


Melvin L. Watt


______________________________


John Conyers, Jr.


Editor's note.--For complete information concerning Exhibit No. 1 please refer to subcommittee hearings entitled, "Administration's Efforts Against the Influence of Organized Crime in the Laborers' International Union of North America," Serial No. 116, July 24 and 25, 1996, beginning with page 355.

                                 EXHIBIT NO. 1
 

                          UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
 

                         NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
 

                                EASTERN DIVISION
 
-------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,            )           
                                     )           
                         Plaintiff,  )           
                                     )           
                V.                   )     NO.   
                                     )           
LABORERS' INTERNATIONAL UNION OF     )           
NORTH AMERICA, AFL-CIO,              )           
                                     )    DRAFT  
JOSEPH AIUPPA,                       )           
ARTHUR J. BERNE,                     )           
LOUIS CASCIANO,                      )           
JAMES B. CASTALDO,                   )           
JOHN CATANZARO,                      )           
RAYMOND FLYNN,                       )           
JAMES J. GALLO,                      )           
JOHN GIARDIELLO,                     )           
MICHAEL LABARBARA, JR.,              )           
GENNARO LANGELLA,                    )           
ANTHONY D. LIBERATORE,               )           
CHESTER J. LIBERATORE,               )           
LOUIS ANTHONY MANNA, also known as   )           
"Bobby Manna,"                       )  COMPLAINT
JAMES MESSERA,                       )           
ROCCO J. NAPOLI,                     )           
CARMINE PERSICO,                     )           
ALFRED PILOTTO,                      )           
JOHN RIGGI,                          )           
JOSEPH P. ROSATO,                    )           
DANIEL G. SANSANESE, JR.,            )           
JOSEPH A. TODARO, SR.,               )           
JOSEPH A. TODARO, JR.,               )           
SALVATORE TRICARIO,                  )           
MATTHEW MICHAEL TRUPIANO, JR.,       )           
PETER VARIO, also known as "Jocko,"  )           
PETER A. VARIO, also known as        )           
"Butch,"                             )           
                                     )           
THE GENERAL EXECUTIVE BOARD OF       )           
THE LABORERS' INTERNATIONAL          )           
UNION OF NORTH AMERICA, AFL-CIO,     )           
                                     )           
ARTHUR ARMAND COIA,                  )           
General President,                   )           
ROLLIN P. "BUD" VINALL,              )           
General Secretary-Treasurer,         )           
MASON M. "MAX" WARREN,               )           
First Vice-President,                )           
-------------------------------------------------

                                                                          D-0003
 
--------------------------
--------------------------
First Vice-President,    )
JOHN SERPICO,            )
Second Vice-President,   )
VERE O. HAYNES,          )
Third Vice-President,    )
SAMUEL J. CAIVANO,       )
Fourth Vice-President,   )
ENRICO MANCINELLI,       )
Fifth Vice-President,    )
CHUCK BARNES,            )
Sixth Vice-President,    )
JACK WILKINSON,          )
Seventh Vice-President,  )
GEORGE R. GUDGER         )
Eighth Vice-President    )
MICHAEL QUEVEDO, JR.     )
Ninth Vice-President,    )
ARMAND E. SABITONI       )
Tenth Vice-President     )
ROBERT J. CONNERTON,     )
General Counsel          )
--------------------------

                                                                          D-0004
 


not participate in any conference regarding the filling of the proposed complaint.


Sincerely,


Paul E. Coffey


Chief, Organized Crime and


Racketeering Section


Enclosure

                                                                          D-0005
 

                                     INDEX
 
------------------------------------------------
                                            PAGE
------------------------------------------------
I.    INTRODUCTION........................     1
      1-3                                       
II.   JURISDICTION........................     2
      4                                         
III.  VENUE...............................     2
      5-6                                       
IV.   LA COSA NOSTRA......................     2
      Introduction........................     3
      7                                         
      Judicial Authority for the Existence      
      of the LCN..........................     4
      8                                         
      The LCN Commission..................     4
      9                                         
      LCN Families........................     5
      10                                        
V.    THE PARTIES.........................     8
      The Plaintiff.......................     8
      11                                        
      The Union Defendant.................     8
      12                                        
      Individual Defendants...............    12
      13                                        
------------------------------------------------

                                                                          D-0006
 
--------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------
       Defendant LIUNA International              
       Officials..............................  32
       14                                         
VI.    CO-CONSPIRATORS NOT NAMED AS DEFENDANTS  37
       15                                         
VII.   THE ENTERPRISE.........................  47
       16                                         
VIII.  COUNT ONE, VIOLATION OF TITLE 18,          
       UNITED STATES CODE SECTION 1962 (b)....  48
       Acquiring and Maintaining Control          
       of LIUNA...............................  48
       17                                         
       The Enterprise.........................  49
       18                                         
       Methods and Means......................  49
       19                                         
       a. Selection of Officers to Control        
       LIUNA..................................  49
       19 a.                                      
       (1) Selection of the General               
       President..............................  49
       19 a. (1)                                  
       (2) Selection of Regional,                 
       District Council and                       
       Local Officials........................  51
       19 a. (2)                                  
       b. Acts of Violence to Control             
       LIUNA..................................  59
       19 b.                                      
--------------------------------------------------

                                                                          D-0007
 
-------------------------------------
-------------------------------------
  c. Appointment and Retention of    
  Corrupt LIUNA Officials to         
  Control LIUNA..................  61
  19 c.                              
  d. Use of Election and Other       
  Internal Procedures to Control     
  LIUNA..........................  70
  19 d.                              
  (1) Constitutionally Prescribed    
  Procedures.....................  71
  19 d.(1)                           
  (a) Office of The General          
  President......................  71
  19 d.(1)(a)                        
  (b) Method of Nominating           
  Candidates for                     
  International Officer              
  Positions......................  71
  19 d.(1)(b)                        
  (c) Filling of Vacancies           
  on the General                     
  Executive Board................  72
  19 d.(1)(c)                        
  (2) Control of Elections         74
  19 d.(2)                           
  (3) Manipulation of the Hiring     
  Hall Used to Gain                  
  Employment for Rank and            
  File Members of LIUNA..........  75
  19 d.(3)                           
  (4) Use of Trusteeships to         
  Prevent Opposition to              
  Entrenched Leadership              
  Within LIUNA...................  79
  19 d.(4)                           
-------------------------------------


D-0008
------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------
     (a) Local 853..........................  79
     19 d.(4)(a)                                
     (b) Local 13...........................  80
     19 d.(4)(b)                                
     (c) Local 66...........................  82
     19 d.(4)(c)                                
     (d) Local 46...........................  83
     19 d.(4)(d)                                
     (e) Local 7............................  84
     19 d.(4)(e)                                
     (5) Formation of District                  
     Councils to Prevent                        
     Opposition to Entrenched                   
     Leadership Within LIUNA................  85
     19 d.(5)                                   
     e. Cronyism and Nepotism in LIUNA......  87
     19 e.                                      
IX.  COUNT TWO, CONSPIRACY TO VIOLATE TITLE     
     18, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 1962(b)  96
     Conspiracy to Acquire and Maintain         
     Control of LIUNA.......................  96
     20                                         
     The Enterprise and Manner and Means....  97
     21-22                                      
X.   COUNT THREE, VIOLATION OF TITLE 18,        
     UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 1962(c)....  97
     Conducting the Affairs of the              
     Enterprise Through a Pattern of            
     Racketeering Activity..................  97
     23                                         
------------------------------------------------

                                                                          D-0009
 
-------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------
      The Enterprise and Manner and Means.........   98
      24                                               
XI.   COUNT FOUR, CONSPIRACY TO VIOLATE, TITLE 18,     
      UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 1962 (c)........   98
      Conspiracy to Conduct the Affairs                
      of the Enterprise Through a Pattern              
      of Rackethering Activity....................   98
      25                                               
      The Enterprise and Manner and Means.........   99
      26-27                                            
XII.  THE PATTERN OF RACKETEERING ACTIVITY........   99
      A. Racketeering Act Related to the Extortion     
      of the LIUNA Membership, Racketeering            
      Act No. 1...................................  100
      28                                               
      B. Racketeering Acts Related to Corruption       
      of the Chicago Laborers' District Council,       
      the Southeast Florida Laborers' District         
      Council, the Massachusetts Laborers'             
      District Council and the Rhode Island            
      Laborers' District Council, Racketeering         
      Acts Nos. 2 through 10......................  102
      29-38                                            
      C. Racketeering Act Related to the Control       
      of LIUNA Local Unions in St. Louis,              
      Missouri, Racketeering Act No. 12...........  112
      39                                               
      D. Racketeering Acts Related to Colombo          
      Family Control of the Cement and Concrete        
      Workers District Council, New York City          
      Racketeering Acts Nos. 12 through 19........  114
      40-42                                            
-------------------------------------------------------

                                                                          D-0010
 
--------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------
E. Racketeering Acts Involving the LCN            
Commission's Use of the LIUNA Cement and          
Concrete Workers District Council to              
Corruptly Extort and Control Cement Work          
in New York City, Racketeering Acts Nos.          
20 Through 37................................  118
43-45                                             
F. Racketeering Acts Related to Corruption        
of LIUNA Local Union 21 by the Genovese           
Family in Northern New Jersey,                    
Racketeering Acts Nos. 38 through 60.........  123
46-49                                             
G. Racketeering Acts Related to De Cavalcante     
LCN Family Control of LIUNA Local Unions          
in Northern New Jersey, Racketeering Acts         
Nos. 54 through 63...........................  126
50-53                                             
H. Racketeering Acts Related to Luchese           
Family Control of LIUNA Local Union No.           
66, Long Island, New York, Racketeering Acts      
Nos. 64 through 91...........................  130
54-63                                             
I. Racketeering Acts Related to the               
Corruption and Control of LIUNA Local 210,        
by the Buffalo LCN Family, Racketeering           
Acts Nos. 92 through 97B.....................  136
64-67                                             
J. Racketeering Acts Involving the Corruption     
and Control of the Mason Tenders District         
Council of Greater New York, Racketeering         
Acts Nos. 98 through 103.....................  141
68-72                                             
K. Racketeering Acts Related to Control of        
LIUNA Locals 310 and 860, Cleveland, Ohio,        
Racketeering Acts Nos. 104 through 109.......  146
73-76                                             
--------------------------------------------------

                                                                          D-0011
 
-----------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------
       L. Racketeering Act Relating to Control of          
       Training Funds of Upstate New York LIUNA Locals     
       Racketeering Acts No. 110A-110L................  150
       77-79                                               
XIII.  SUMMARY OF THE RACKETEERING ACTS CHARGED            
       AGAINST EACH DEFENDANT.........................  166
       80                                                  
XIV.   THE FAILURE OF LIUNA OFFICIALS TO SATISFY           
       THEIR ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS......................  168
       Ethical Obligations of LIUNA Officials.........  168
       81                                                  
       Ethical Obligations Imposed by Liuna                
       Constitutions..................................  169
       81 a.                                               
       Ethical Standards of the American                   
       Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial          
       Organizations..................................  171
       81 b.                                               
       Ethical Obligations Imposed by Law.............  171
       81 c.                                               
       Widespread Publicity of Corruption                  
       Within LIUNA...................................  172
       82                                                  
       The Report of the President's                       
       Commission on Organized Crime..................  173
       82 a.                                               
       The Interim Report of the New                       
       York State Organized Crime Task                     
       Force on Corruption and                             
       Racketeering in the New York                        
       City Construction Industry.....................  177
       82 b.                                               
-----------------------------------------------------------

                                                                          D-0013
 
---------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------
       The Mother Jones Article...............  180
       82 c.                                       
       Specific Instances of Failure to take       
       Adequate Action to Eliminate Corruption  182
       83                                          
XV.    THE AURA OF CRIMINALITY EXISTING            
       WITHIN LIUNA...........................  187
       Other Convictions of LIUNA Officials...  187
       84                                          
       a. New York-New Jersey.................  187
       b. Illinois-Indiana....................  192
       c. Missouri-Arkansas...................  195
       d. Connecticut.........................  197
       e. Florida.............................  197
       f. Ohio................................  198
       g. Nevada/California...................  199
       h. Louisiana...........................  200
XVI.   CURRENT STATUS OF LIUNA................  202
       85-88                                       
XVII.  DEMAND FOR RELIEF......................  204
---------------------------------------------------

                                                                          D-0014
 

DRAFT
 

                                   COMPLAINT
 


The United States of America, plaintiff herein, by and through, James B. Burns, United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, for its complaint herein, alleges as follows:

                                       I
 

                                  INTRODUCTION
 


1. This action is brought against the Laborers' International Union of North America, AFL-CIO (hereafter alternatively, "LIUNA," or "the union,") and others to rid the union of domination and influence by members and associates of organized crime. LIUNA has been infiltrated at all levels by corrupt individuals and organized crime figures who have exploited their control and influence over the union for personal gain and to the detriment of the union.


2. LIUNA union officers and employees at all levels, including the general presidency, have been chosen, subject to the approval of, and have been controlled by, various members and associates of organized crime. Four consecutive General Presidents of LIUNA, Joseph V. Moreschi (1926-1968), Peter Fosco (1968-1975), Angelo Fosco (1975-1993) and ARTHUR ARMAND COIA (1993-present), have associated with, and been controlled and influenced by, organized crime figures. Consequently, the rights of the members of the union to control the affairs of the union have been systematically abused. Those union members who opposed this corrupt state of affairs, either at the local, district council, regional or international levels, have been intimidated into silence by violence, threats of violence, economic coercion, and by the known ties of corrupt local, district, regional, and international officials of the union with organized crime.

                                                                          D-0015
 


3. The United States brings this suit for injunctive relief pursuant to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations statute (hereafter "RICO"), Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1961 through 1968, to put an end to this systemic, long-standing, and ongoing corruption of the union and to restore control of its affairs to the members of the union.

                                       II
 

                                  JURISDICTION
 


4. Jurisdiction in this action is predicated upon Title 18, United States Code, Section 1964(b) and Title 28, United States Code, Sections 1331, 1345, and 2201.

                                      III
 

                                     VENUE
 


5. Venue for this action is predicated upon Title 18, United States Code, Section 1965 and Title 28, United States Code, Section 1391(b).


6. The United States invokes the expanded service of process provisions of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1965(b).

                                                                          D-0016
 


labor bribery in exchange for labor peace and the use of non-union labor while he was business manager of Local 46, as alleged in Racketeering Acts Nos. 98 through 100 below. On June 9, 1989, Peter Vario was sentenced to serve three and one half years in prison and ordered to pay a fine of $70,000.00 and forfeiture of $4,433.00. (See attached Exhibit 30) Vario's conviction was affirmed in United States v. Cervone, 907 F.2d 332 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, Bernesser v. United States, 498 U.S. 1028 (1991). Peter A. Vario has been released from prison and is currently on parole.


14. Defendant LIUNA International Officials: The persons whose names appear below are the defendant members of the General Executive Board and the General Counsel of LIUNA, whose offices are established by the LIUNA Constitution. These defendants are not, unless indicated otherwise in subparagraphs a. through m. below, named as defendants in their individual capacities but are named only in their official capacities for the purpose of properly effectuating the relief requested in this complaint, pursuant to Rule 19(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The defendant LIUNA International Officials are as follows:


a. ARTHUR ARMAND COIA has been the General President of LIUNA since February 1993 when he was elected to that position by the Board following the death of his co-conspirator, Angelo Fosco. Previously, he served as the General Secretary-Treasurer of LIUNA, having been elected by the Board to that office in 1989 to replace his father and co-conspirator Arthur Ettore Coia. From 1979 to approximately February 1993, Arthur Armand Coia was the regional manager of the New England Regional Office of LIUNA and the business manager of the Rhode Island District Council of LIUNA. Arthur Armand Coia has been associating with members of the New England LCN family for a substantial period of time. Arthur Armand Coia was a defendant in the case of United States v. Arthur A. Coia, et al., No. 81-417-CR-JLK, in the United States District Southern District of Florida, which is referred to in Racketeering Acts Nos. 6 and 7 below. The case against him was dismissed on the motion of the government prior to his trial because his co-defendants in that case, including his father, Arthur E. Coia, who were tried separately, were granted a directed verdict of acquittal on the ground that the indictment in that case had not been returned within the applicable period of limitations. Arthur Armand Coia is named as a defendant, herein, in both his official and his individual capacities. In 1993, Arthur Armand Coia received a salary of $188,020.64 as General President of LIUNA.

                                                                          D-0046
 


b. ROLLIN P. "Bud" VINALL, the General Secretary-Treasurer, is from LIUNA Local 1202, Dallas-Fort Worth, Texas and is the regional manager of the Fort Worth, Texas Regional Office. Vinall was elected to the position of General Secretary-Treasurer in October 1994 by the Board following the death of James J. Norwood who had held the position since February 1993. Vinall was first elected to the Board by the Board in 1976 to replace Angelo Fosco who had been elevated to the position of General President in 1975. In 1993, Rollin P. Vinall received a salary of $128,903.18 as


D-0047


a. At all times material to this Racketeering Act, defendant ARTHUR ARMAND COIA and co-conspirator Arthur Ettore Coia were officers, agents and employees of LIUNA, an employee organization within the meaning of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1954 (a) (3), some of whose members were covered by the Massachusetts Laborers' Health and Welfare Fund, which was, until December 31, 1974, an "employee welfare benefit plan" subject to the provisions of the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, Title 29, United States Code, Sections 301 - 309, and thereafter was an "employee welfare benefit plan" within the meaning of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Title 29, United States Code, Sections 1001 et. seq.


b. From in or about 1973, the exact date being unknown, up to and including 1976, the defendant ARTHUR ARMAND COIA and co-conspirator Arthur Ettore Coia at Providence, Rhode Island and elsewhere, including the Eastern Division of the Northern District of Illinois, did knowingly receive, agree to receive, and solicit a fee, kickback, commission, and thing of value, that is, money in an amount in excess of $25,000, from Joseph Hauser and Farmer's National Life Insurance Company, because of and with the intent to be influenced with respect to their actions, decisions and other duties relating to questions and matters concerning the Massachusetts Laborers' Health and Welfare Fund, that is, the purchase of group life insurance from the Farmer's National Life Insurance Company under a reinsurance agreement with the Old Security Life Insurance company of Kansas City, Missouri, and they did share the things of value they received with co-conspirator Raymond Patriarca, all in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1954 and 2.


D-0122

34. Racketeering Act No. 7
 


a. The allegations of paragraph 33. a. above are incorporated by reference and realleged as if fully set forth herein.


b. Some of the members of the employee organization mentioned in paragraph 33.a. above were covered by the Rhode Island Laborers' District Council Health and Welfare Fund and the Rhode Island Laborers' Heavy and Highway Health and Welfare Fund, both of which, until December 31, 1974, were welfare plans subject to the provisions of the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, Title 29, United States Code, Sections 301 - 309, and thereafter were "employee welfare benefit plan s " within the meaning of the Employees Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Title 29, United States Code, Sections 1001 et. seq.


c. From in or about 1973, the exact date being unknown to the plaintiff, to in or about 1976, defendant ARTHUR ARMAND COIA and co-conspirator Arthur Ettore Coia at Providence, Rhode Island and elsewhere, including the Eastern Division of the Northern District of Illinois, did knowingly receive, agree to receive, and solicit a fee, kickback, commission and thing of value, that is, money in an unknown amount greater than $25,000, from Joseph Hauser and Farmer's National Life Insurance Company, because of and with intent to be influenced with respect to their actions, decisions,

                                                                          D-0123
 


control of Laborers' Union Local 186 Educational and Training Fund, the Laborers' Local Union No. 214 of Oswego, New York and Vicinity Training and Education Fund, the Laborers' Local 322 Training and Education Fund, the Rochester Laborers' Apprentice and Training Fund, which is affiliated with LIUNA Local 435, (hereafter "the local funds") and the Upstate New York Laborers' Education and Training Fund, which is sponsored by the local funds (hereafter, the "Upstate Fund"), each of which was established through collective bargaining with employers and pursuant to Title 29, United States Code, Section 186 (c) (6), to individuals who were members and associates of the Buffalo LCN family. The said property includes, but is not limited to, the following: 1) the moneys and assets of the local funds and the Upstate Fund; 2) the right of the members of the upstate locals to loyal and faithful representation by union officers, agents, shop stewards and other representatives as guaranteed by Title 29, United States Code, Section 501 (a); and 3) the right of the members of the upstate locals as participants in employee benefit plans in which money was paid by employers of members of the upstate locals to trust funds established and maintained by the upstate locals for the purpose of defraying the costs of training programs pursuant to Title 29, United States Code, Section 186 (c) (6), to have the said employee benefit plans administered for the sole and exclusive benefit of the participants by the fiduciaries of such employee benefit plans, as guaranteed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended, Title 29, United States Code, Sections 1101 through 1114.

                                                                          D-0166
 


d. The aforementioned defendants and co-conspirators employed the wrongful use of actual and threatened force, violence, and fear including fear of economic harm, by various means, including, but not limited to, the allegations set forth in Paragraph 19 above, which is herein incorporated by reference and realleged as if fully set forth herein, to induce the members of the upstate locals to consent to the surrender of the property described above.

79. Sub-predicate Racketeering Acts 110B-110L
 


a. The following paragraph b. is realleged as a part of each of sub-predicate Racketeering Acts Nos. 110B through 110L.


b. From in or about 1986 to on or about July 31, 1994, in Rochester, New York and elsewhere, defendants ARTHUR A. COIA, SAMUEL J. CAIVANO, JOSEPH A. TODARO, SR., JOSEPH A. TODARO, JR., and DANIEL G. SANSANESE, JR., and co-conspirators Arthur E. Coia and Angelo Fosco and others whose names are both known and unknown devised and intended to devise a scheme and artifice to defraud and to obtain money and property under false and fraudulent pretenses, representations and promises, that is, to defraud the members of the upstate locals of the property described in Paragraph 78 c. above, well knowing at the time that the pretenses, representations and promises would be and were false when made. For the purpose of executing said scheme, the defendants and the co-conspirators would do the following:

                                                                          D-0167
 


(1) the defendants would attempt to establish regional training centers located in Buffalo, New York and Albany, New York which would be financed by contributions from employers of members of various LIUNA local unions located in upstate New York pursuant to the provisions of Title 29, United States Code, Section 186 (c) (6) and which would, in part, replace a training center located in Oswego, New York which had been established by the local funds and the Upstate Fund and which had been financed by contributions from employers of members of the upstate locals pursuant to the provisions of Title 29, United States Code, Section 186 (c) (6);


(2) the operations of the regional training centers located in Buffalo, New York and Albany, New York would be controlled by LIUNA officials who were members and associates of, or controlled by, the Buffalo LCN family;


(3) the defendants and their co-conspirators would attempt to establish the regional training centers located in Buffalo, New York and Albany, New York to reward contractors and service providers favored by the Buffalo LCN family, to provide employment to members and associates of the Buffalo LCN family without regard to the professional qualifications of these individuals and to pay for unnecessary or extravagant travel and entertainment expenses to the defendant LIUNA officials and others;

                                                                          D-0168
 


(4) the defendants and their co-conspirators and others who held positions as officials and employees in LIUNA would attempt to unlawfully use procedures established by the various LIUNA constitutions, including the imposition of trusteeships, the revocation of local union charters and the creation of district councils, to coerce and induce the upstate locals to surrender control of local union training trust funds to members and associates of the Buffalo LCN family;


(5) the defendants and their co-conspirators would attempt to deprive the members of the upstate locals of the control, through their elected local union representatives, of trust funds established for the sole and exclusive benefit of LIUNA members for training programs pursuant to the provisions of Title 29, United States Code, Sections 186 (c) (6) and 1101 through 1114;


(6) the defendants and their co-conspirators would and did misrepresent, conceal and hide and cause to be misrepresented, concealed and hidden, the purpose of and acts done in furtherance of the scheme to defraud.


c. Sub-Predicate Racketeering Act 110B: On or about December 11, 1989, for the purpose of executing and attempting to execute the aforesaid scheme and artifice to defraud and to obtain money and property by means of false and fraudulent pretenses, and representations and promises, and attempting to do so, defendants ARTHUR A. COIA, SAMUEL J. CAIVANO, JOSEPH A. TODARO, SR., JOSEPH A. TODARO, JR., and DANIEL G. SANSANESE, JR., and co-conspirators Arthur E. Coia and Angelo Fosco did knowingly cause to be placed in an authorized depository for mail matter, to be sent and delivered by the United States Postal Service according to the direction thereon, envelopes addressed to:

                                                                          D-0169
 


LIUNA Local 186


25 Elm Street


Plattsburgh, New York 12901


LIUNA Local Union 214


23 Mitchell Street


Oswego, New York 13126


LIUNA Local 322


P. O. Box 361


Massena, New York 13662 and


LIUNA Local 435


20 Fourth Street


Rochester, New York 14609


each of which contained a letter from then LIUNA General President Angelo Fosco directing these four LIUNA local union members of the Upstate New York Laborers' Education and Training Fund to affiliate their jointly administered training trust funds, established pursuant to negotiations with employers of members of those LIUNA local unions, with the regional training trust funds to be established in either Albany, New York or Buffalo, New York.


In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sectiona 1341, 1346 and 2.

                                                                          D-0170
 


e. Provide that the expenses of the court liaison officer(s) be paid out of the funds of LIUNA.


2. That this Honorable Court issue a permanent injunction prohibiting defendants JOSEPH AIUPPA, ARTHUR J. BERNE, LOUIS CASCIANO, JAMES B. CASTALDO, JOHN CATANZARO, SAMUEL J. CAIVANO, ARTHUR ARMAND COIA, RAYMOND FLYNN, JAMES J. GALLO, JOHN GIARDIELLO, MICHAEL LABARBARA, JR., GENNARO LANGELLA, ANTHONY D. LIBERATORE, CHESTER J. LIBERATORE, LOUIS ANTHONY MANNA, also known as "Bobby Manna," JAMES MESSERA, ROCCO J. NAPOLI, CARMINE PERSICO, ALFRED PILOTTO, JOHN RIGGI, JOSEPH P. ROSATO, DANIEL G. SANSANESE, JR., JOSEPH A. TODARO, SR., JOSEPH A. TODARO, JR., SALVATORE TIRCARIO; MATTHEW MICHAEL TRUPIANO, JR., PETER VARIO, also known as "Jocko," and PETER A. VARIO, also known as "Butch" and all other persons in active concert or participation with them in the affairs of the LCN from participating in or having any future dealings of any nature whatsoever with any officer, agent, representative or employee of LIUNA or any other labor organization about any matter which relates, directly or indirectly, to the affairs of LIUNA or such other labor organization, and from owning or operating any business which employs members of LIUNA or any of its subordinate bodies in the Northern District of Illinois or elsewhere.


3. That this Honorable Court issue a permanent injunction prohibiting defendants ROLLIN P. "BUD" VINALL, MASON M. "MAX" WARREN, JOHN SERPICO, VERE O. HAYNES, ENRICO MANCINELLI, CHUCK BARNES, JACK WILKINSON, GEORGE R. GUDGER, MICHAEL QUEVEDO, JR., ARMAND E. SABITONI, and ROBERT J. CONNERTON and their successors as

                                                                          D-0222
 

                                 EXHIBIT NO. 2
 


Federal Bureau of Investigation


Washington, D.C. 20535


October 7, 1994

                                 ARTHUR A. COIA
 


Captioned individual, also known as Arthur Armand Coia, who you advised was born March 21, 1943, in Providence, Rhode Island, and holds Social Security Number 037-26-3032, was one of the subjects of a criminal investigation by the FBI from 1977 to 1984 involving Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations and Conspiracy. Attached are 13 pages from an FBI report dated August 14, 1981, and a memorandum which contain the results.


Coia is a criminal associate of the New England Patriarca organized crime family.


In addition, Coia is a subject in an ongoing civil investigation by the FBI. No additional information can be provided at the present time.


It is important to note that Mr. Coia has no knowledge of this information. Caution should be exercised in discussing information relating to this matter as any disclosure of the investigation could jeopardize the investigation.


The records of the Criminal Justice Information Services Division reveal FBI Arrest Record Number 103863X3 for Arthur Armand Cola, also known as Arthur Armand Coia, born March 21, 1943, in Providence, Rhode Island, which may be identifiable with captioned individual, copy attached.


1 - Mr. Ross, Room 3076


1 - Mr. Bourke, Room 4371


1 - Mr. Thornton


1 - Miss Thompson


1 - Mrs. George


ILLEGIBLE WORD


See Note On Page 2


The central files at FBI Headquarters and appropriate computer data bases contain no additional pertinent information identifiable with the captioned individual based upon background information furnished in connection with this name check request.


Enclosures (3)


NOTE: Per request from Abner J. Mikva, Counsel to the President, at the White House (PA). Coordinated with SSA Michael Ross, LCN-IOC Unit, OC/DO Section 2, Criminal Investigative Division.

                                 EXHIBIT NO. 3
 


U.S. Department of Justice


Criminal Division


Organized Crime and Racketeering Section


PEC:sfh


1001 G Street NW, Suite 300


Washington, D.C. 20038-7598


January 11, 1994


MEMORANDUM


TO: John C. Keeney


Deputy Assistant Attorney General


Criminal Division


FROM: Paul E. Coffey, Chief


Organized Crime and


Racketeering Section


Criminal Division


SUBJECT: TRI-FUND CONFERENCE; THE FIRST LADY


The Laborers' International Union of North America (LIUNA) is sponsoring something called the Tri-Fund Conference in Orlando, Florida, during the week of January 31, ILLEGIBLE WORD . According to our information, Secretary of Labor Robert E. Reich will probably address the conference on January 31 via satellite hookup. The First lady, Hillary Clinton, is also planning to address the conference via satellite on February 2 or 3. OCRS doesn't know anything about the Tri-Fund conference nor what Mrs. Clinton or Secretary Reich plan to say.


Next month OCRS and the United States Attorney's Office in Chicago will recommend a civil RICO against LIUNA and some 27 defendants, including LIUNA General President Arthur Armand Coia. The complaint will allege that LIUNA has been dominated by the LCN for at least two decades. It is our understanding that Mrs. Clinton's staff has already been alerted by the Labor Department that LIUNA and some of the conference attendees will be defendants in the upcoming suit. It might be a good idea to double-check on that. On the merits, I don't see any reason to advise against her address, especially if it's by satellite. It might be prudent to recommend that she avoid any direct contact with Coia, if possible, inasmuch as we plan to portray him as a mob puppet.
------------------------------------------------
COFFEY 343 WCTR  WHITE 364 WCTR  MARINE 352 WCTR
------------------------------------------------

                                 EXHIBIT NO. 4
 

                                   AGREEMENT
 


This Agreement is entered into, this 13th day of February 1995, between the Laborers' International Union of North America (hereinafter referred to as "LIUNA") and the United States of America, by and through the Assistant Attorney General Jo Ann Harris and the United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, James B. Burns.


WHEREAS, LIUNA and the United States have been pursuing various courses of action designed to ensure that all locals and other entities within LIUNA are rid of any corrupting influence of any member of organized crime;


WHEREAS, both LIUNA and the United States seek the complete elimination of any such corrupting influence on any entity within LIUNA;


NOW, THEREFORE, LIUNA and the United States agree as follows:


1. LIUNA shall be allowed to undertake a period of internal reform, lasting at least ninety (90) days, aimed at further investigating and disciplining individuals within any entity of LIUNA for wrongful association with, or corruption by, members of organized crime, as well as instituting other reforms. During this period, the United States may provide any assistance allowed by law to LIUNA.


2. If, after this period of at least ninety (90) days from the date hereof (but prior to the expiration of this Letter Agreement), the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division determines, in her sole discretion, that the imposition of a consent decree is necessary or desirable, after having given LIUNA an opportunity to have a meeting to be heard, the parties agree to the filing of the attached complaint and entry and implementation of the attached consent decree.


3. This Agreement shall expire on February 11, 1998. CONSENTED AND AGREED TO:


DATE:______________________________
---------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------
THE GENERAL EXECUTIVE BOARD OF   THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
THE LABORERS' INTERNATIONAL                                    
UNION OF NORTH AMERICA, AFL-CIO                                
______________________________   ______________________________
Arthur A. Coia,                  Jo Ann Harris                 
General President                Assistant Attorney General    
______________________________   ______________________________
Rollin P. "Bud" Vinall           James B. Burns                
General Secretary-Treasurer      United States Attorney        
                                 Northern District of Illinois
______________________________   ______________________________
Mason M. "Max" Warren            Paul E. Coffey, Chief         
First Vice-President             Organized Crime and           
                                 Racketeering Section          
                                 Criminal Division             
                                 U.S. Department of Justice    
______________________________                                 
John Serpico                                                   
Second Vice-President                                          
______________________________                                 
Vere O. Haynes                                                 
Third Vice-President                                           
---------------------------------------------------------------


______________________________


Samuel J. Caivano


Fourth Vice-President


______________________________


Enrico Mancinelli


Fifth Vice-President


______________________________


Chuck Barnes


Sixth Vice-President


______________________________


Jack Wilkinson


Seventh Vice-President


______________________________


George R. Gudger


Eighth Vice-President


______________________________


ILLEGIBLE WORD Quevedo, Jr.


Ninth Vice-President


______________________________


Armand E. Sabitoni


Tenth Vice-President


______________________________


Robert D. Luskin


Attorney for the General Executive


Board of LIUNA


______________________________


Brendan V. Sullivan, Jr.


Attorney for Arthur A. Coia

                          UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
 

                         NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
 

                                EASTERN DIVISION
 
----------------------------
----------------------------
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  )
                           )
       Plaintiff,          )
                           )
           v.              )
                           )
LABORERS' INTERNATIONAL    )
UNION OF NORTH AMERICA,    )
AFL-CIO,                   )
                           )
       Defendant.          )
----------------------------

                                 CONSENT DECREE
 


This matter coming before the Court by agreement of the parties, the United States of America (hereinafter "the United States"), plaintiff, and the defendant, Laborers' International Union of North America, AFL-CIO. (hereinafter "LIUNA"), acting through and by decision of the General Executive Board, (hereinafter "the GEB"), and the Court being fully informed in the premises, FINDS as follows:


A. The organized crime syndicate known as La Cosa Nostra (hereinafter "the LCN") has at various times had a corrupting influence on the affairs of various locals and other entities within LIUNA;


B. By bringing certain criminal prosecutions and related proceedings, the United States has had success in reducing the extent of LCN corruption in various entities within LIUNA, but has not eliminated all of the corrupting influence in entities within LIUNA;


C. By the imposition of certain trusteeships, internal union discipline, the adoption of an Ethics Code and a new system of disciplinary procedures, and other techniques, the current GEB has taken steps to reduce the LCN corruption in certain entities within LIUNA, but has not eliminated all of such corrupting influence in entities within LIUNA;


D. The United States and LIUNA agree that there should be no corruption by the LCN of any entity anywhere within LIUNA, and thus, that further cooperative efforts, subject to judicial supervision and with judicial assistance, are necessary and appropriate.


E. The parties thus have agreed to the filing of a complaint, seeking equitable relief pursuant to the civil remedies provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. 1964, and to the contemporaneous filing of this Consent Decree;


F. The United States and LIUNA agree that one of the purposes of this Consent Decree is to ensure that the affairs of LIUNA should be maintained and conducted in a democratic fashion, with integrity, for the sole benefit of its members and without unlawful outside influence;


G. This Consent Decree has been entered into on behalf of the rank-and-file members of LIUNA; and


H. The United States and LIUNA, by and through its GEB, have consented to the entry of this order.


Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:

                              Purpose and Summary
 


1. The findings set forth in paragraphs A through H above are incorporated by reference in this paragraph and are agreed to by the undersigned parties. Both the United States and LIUNA are strongly committed to eradicating organized crime and criminal elements from all levels of the union. To fulfill its commitment to eradicate organized crime and criminal elements from all levels of the union, LIUNA has adopted a variety of procedural, structural, and substantive reforms designed to accomplish that goal and agrees to the adoption of additional reforms. These include constitutional, election and work referral reforms.


2. In addition, the GEB has retained an attorney, (hereinafter "the GEB attorney"), who has the GEB's mandate to take whatever action is necessary to accomplish the removal of organized crime and all other criminal elements from all levels of the union.


3. To achieve the mandate of this Consent Decree, this decree also establishes: (i) an Independent Monitor, who, among other things, is to supervise the removal of organized crime and all other criminal elements from all levels of the union; (ii) an Investigations Officer, who shall have independent authority to initiate and pursue investigations under this Consent Decree; and (iii) an Elections Officer who is to supervise the conduct of direct rank-and-file elections for officers of the International Union. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to limit the power and authority of the LIUNA officers from taking appropriate action not inconsistent with the purposes and objectives of this decree.

                               Court Jurisdiction
 


4. LIUNA, by and through the GEB, acknowledges that this Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and personal jurisdiction over the parties to this Consent Decree. This Consent Decree is a valid exercise of the Court's jurisdiction and remedial authority.


5. This Court shall retain exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action and over the parties to this Consent Decree to supervise implementation of this Consent Decree and shall have exclusive jurisdiction to decide any and all issues arising under the Consent Decree, and any and all disputes growing out of the interpretation or application of this Consent Decree until further order of this Court. The Independent Monitor, the Investigations Officer, the Elections Officer, or any party to this Consent Decree may apply to the Court for any order necessary or appropriate to implement this Consent Decree, including orders preventing non-parties from interfering with the implementation of the Consent Decree. The GEB, the Independent Monitor and the United States shall have the right to intervene in the event of any and all disputes growing out of the interpretation or application of this Consent Decree..

                                  Definitions
 


6. Any reference in this Consent Decree to the term "Independent Monitor" shall be construed to be a reference to the Independent Monitor whose powers and duties are defined in paragraphs ILLEGIBLE WORD to 35 below.


7. Any reference in this Consent Decree to the term "Investigations Officer" shall be construed to be a reference to the Investigations Officer whose powers and duties are defined in paragraphs 36 to 43 below.


8. Any reference in this Consent Decree to the term "Elections Officer" shall be construed to be a reference to the Elections Officer whose powers and duties are defined in paragraphs 44 to 47 below.


9. Any reference in this Consent Decree to the term "employee pension benefit plan" shall be construed to be a reference to any "employee pension benefit plan," and includes, but is not limited to, such plans as are defined in 29 U.S.C. 1002 (2) and any pension plans covering governmental employees.


10. Any reference in this Consent Decree to the term "employee welfare benefit plan" or "welfare plan" shall be construed to be a reference to any employee welfare benefit plan, including, but not limited to, such plans as are defined in 29 U.S.C. 1002 (1) or any welfare plan covering governmental employees.


11. The term "attorneys for the United States" as used in this Consent Decree means the United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois or any assigned Assistant United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois and the Chief of the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, (hereinafter "OCRS") or any assigned Trial Attorney of that office, or any other attorney assigned by the United States Attorney General. Any requirement in this Consent Decree to submit reports or other documents to the attorneys for the United States shall be construed to require submission of such reports and documents to the United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois and the Chief of OCRS.


12. Any reference to the term "LIUNA and its affiliated entities" in this Consent Decree shall be a reference to the International Union and its Regional Offices, District Councils, Local Unions and other subordinate entities and its affiliated employee pension benefit plans, employee welfare benefit plans, and its other affiliated funds, including but not limited to, political action committees (hereinafter referred to as "PACs") and Laborers-Employers Cooperative Education Trust funds (hereinafter referred to as "LECET funds").


13. As used in this Consent Decree, the term "knowingly associating" shall mean that: (a) an enjoined party knew or should have known that the person with whom he or she was associating is a barred person; and (b) the association was more than fleeting or casual. A "barred person" is (1) any member or associate of any La Cosa Nostra crime family or any other criminal group, or (2) any person prohibited from participating in union affairs. Nothing in this paragraph shall preclude: (i) an enjoined party from meeting or communicating with a barred person who is an employer to discuss the negotiation, execution or management of a collective bargaining agreement, or a labor dispute, when the enjoined party represents, seeks to represent, or would admit to membership the employees of that employer; (ii) an enjoined party from meeting or communicating with a barred person who is a representative of a labor organization to discuss union matters; (iii) an enjoined party from meeting or communicating with an officer, employee or member of LIUNA and its affiliated entities; and (iv) an enjoined party from meeting or communicating with a relative by blood or marriage solely for social purposes. As used in this paragraph, the term "relative" shall mean a lineal descendent, stepchild, ancestor, sibling or spouse or child of a lineal descendent, stepchild, ancestor, or sibling.

                                  Union Action
 


14. Permanent Injunctions: LIUNA agrees that all current and future officers, agents, representatives, employees and members of LIUNA and its affiliated entities are permanently enjoined:


(a) from committing any act of racketeering as defined in ILLEGIBLE WORD U.S.C. 1961 (1);


(b) from knowingly associating with any member or associate of the LCN or other criminal group or with any barred person;


(c) from knowingly permitting any member or associate of the LCN or other criminal group or barred person to exercise any control or influence, directly or indirectly, in any way or degree, in the conduct of the affairs of LIUNA and its affiliated entities. Nothing in this paragraph shall limit an enjoined person's ability to associate or transact union business with employers, LIUNA members, and labor representatives as provided for in paragraph 13(i)-(iii) above;


(d) from obstructing or otherwise interfering, directly or indirectly, in any way or degree, with the work of anyone who is appointed by the terms of this decree or from interfering with the efforts of any officer, attorney, or employee of LIUNA and its affiliated entities in effectuating the terms of this decree, or in attempting to prevent the LCN or other criminal elements from exercising influence on the conduct of the affairs of LIUNA and its affiliated entities.


15. Job Referral Rules: LIUNA believes that its members should be treated fairly in the distribution of work and that members should not be intimidated from exercising their democratic rights through manipulation of the hiring hall process. Therefore, LIUNA agrees that within thirty days after the entry of this Consent Decree, LIUNA and all of its subordinate entities shall adopt the job referral rules and procedures attached hereto as Exhibit A and incorporated herein (hereinafter referred to as "the Job Referral Rules"). These entities shall comply with the Job Referral Rules in all respects.


16. The GEB Attorney and the Independent Monitor shall supervise the implementation and operation of the Job Referral Rules. Upon determining that there has been a violation of those rules, the GEB Attorney or the Independent Monitor may issue any direction to any officer, agent, representative, employee or member of LIUNA or any of its subordinate entities, as may be appropriate to remedy the violation. The Job Referral Rules may be amended or modified by agreement of the GEB Attorney and the Independent Monitor


17. Other Internal Reforms: LIUNA recognizes that members must be free from intimidation in order to exercise their rights under the provisions of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, as amended, 29 U.S.C. 401-531 (hereinafter referred to as "the LMRDA"). The free exercise of these rights is important in eliminating the influence of organized crime. Therefore, LIUNA agrees to the election reforms set forth in paragraphs 45 to 48 below, and the constitutional changes enumerated in paragraphs 49 through 50 below.


18. GEB Attorney: The GEB Attorney has been given the power by the GEB to initiate and conduct investigations to remove organized crime and all other criminal elements as a source of influence in the affairs of LIUNA. All of the investigative powers described in the LIUNA International Union Constitution, Uniform Local Union Constitution and Uniform District Council Constitution (hereinafter referred to collectively as "the LIUNA constitutions") are delegated to the GEB Attorney for the purposes of complying with this Consent Decree. The GEB Attorney may initiate charges and present evidence at hearings before the Independent Monitor as detailed in paragraph 30 below. The GEB Attorney may bring charges against any officer, agent, representative, employee or member of LIUNA and its affiliated entities, including the General President, the General Secretary-Treasurer, and the members of the General Executive Board, for any matter constituting a felony violation of the laws of the United States; or any violation of any state or federal law relating to the conduct of the affairs of a labor organization or employee benefit plan. Charges may also be brought for a violation of the injunctions adopted in paragraph 14 of this Consent Decree, any provision of the LIUNA constitutions, or working rules, including the Job Referral Rules.


19. LIUNA will provide the GEB Attorney with sufficient staff and funding by LIUNA to fulfill his mandate. The GEB Attorney shall have complete and unfettered access to, and the right to make copies of, all books, records, accounts, correspondence, files, and other documents of LIUNA and its affiliated entities or of any officer, agent, representative, member or employee of LIUNA and its affiliated entities. If the GEB Attorney needs subpoena power to obtain necessary documents and testimony from outside parties, he shall seek such power from the Court by requesting it through the Investigations Officer, who shall not unreasonably deny the request. The GEB Attorney may request the Investigations Officer to assume jurisdiction over any matter at any time.


20. The GEB Attorney shall have the right to take and require the sworn statement or sworn oral deposition of any officer, agent, representative, employee or member of LIUNA and its affiliated entities. If any person who is the subject of an inquiry under this decree refuses to testify or to provide evidence to the GEB Attorney on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, discipline may be imposed on such person for that reason alone, consistent with the Code of Ethics of the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations, as adopted by LIUNA in 1958. Also, failure to testify or provide evidence in the absence of a valid claim of attorney-client privilege may be the basis for discipline. Any person so declining to testify or provide evidence to the GEB Attorney may be subpoenaed to testify before the Independent Monitor and he may be subject to punishment for contempt of court upon application to the Court by the Independent Monitor.


21. Reporting Requirements: On a quarterly basis, the GEB Attorney shall file a written status report with the Independent Monitor regarding the actions he has taken toward achieving the objectives and purposes of this Consent Decree. Copies of this report shall be provided to the GEB, the attorneys for the United States and to the Investigations Officer. The report shall also include an assessment of the progress of the adoption, implementation, and operation of the Job Referral Rules.


22. LIUNA shall publish reports by the GEB Attorney concerning his activities and the progress he is making towards achieving the objectives and purposes of this decree. These reports will be made on a bimonthly basis and will be published in LIUNA's organ, The Laborer, or other similar publication.


23. Review Authority: The GEB Attorney, in conjunction with the Investigations Officer, will study the operations of LIUNA and its affiliated entities and recommend changes to the GEB to improve those operations in order to eliminate corruption and racketeering activity. The operations that the GEB Attorney and Investigations Officer shall study include, but are not limited to, the following:


(a) the procedures used by LIUNA to investigate and discipline alleged misconduct by the officers, agents, representatives, employees, and members of LIUNA and its affiliated entities;


(b) the procedures used by LIUNA and its affiliated entities to fill vacancies in union positions;


(c) the procedures used by LIUNA and its affiliated entities to select service providers;


(d) the procedures used by LIUNA and its affiliated entities to acquire and staff training sites;


(e) the employment procedures used by LIUNA and its affiliated entities; and


(f) the practices of LIUNA relating to the imposition of trusteeships against subordinate organizations.


24. Within twelve months after entry of this decree, the GEB Attorney and the Investigations Officer are to make specific recommendations to the GEB based upon their study of the issues listed in paragraph 23 above, which the GEB shall consider in good faith. As to any such recommendation that is directly related to those disciplinary procedures or those trusteeship procedures necessary to eliminate corruption by the LCN or other criminal group, if the GEB fails to adopt the recommendations within 30 days, the Court may order LIUNA to adopt and implement such recommendations upon application of either the GEB Attorney or the Investigations Officer, if the Court finds that such additional disciplinary procedure or trusteeship procedure recommendations are necessary to eliminate corruption by the LCN or other criminal group. Copies of the recommendations by the GEB Attorney and the Investigations Officer to the GEB shall be concurrently sent to the Court, the Independent Monitor and the attorneys for the United States.


25. The GEB Attorney and the Investigations Officer also shall study the procedures used by LIUNA for the chartering and defining of jurisdiction of Local Unions, District Councils, and other subordinate bodies, and the discipline of these entities, for the purpose of assuring that these procedures will not be abused so as to encourage corruption following the expiration of this Consent Decree. When the Court determines to terminate this Consent Decree, the GEB Attorney and the Investigations Officer shall thereafter have six months in which to make specific recommendations to the GEB based upon their study of these matters. If the GEB fails to adopt the recommendations within thirty (30) days, the Court may order LIUNA to adopt and implement the recommended procedures following the termination of this Decree upon application of either the GEB Attorney or the Investigations Officer, if the Court finds that such adoption of such procedures is necessary to eliminate corruption by the LCN or other criminal group and does not impose an unreasonable burden upon the operations or self-governance of the Union. Necessary is defined as meaning that other procedures in the Consent Decree have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried Copies of the recommendations by the GEB Attorney and the Investigations Officer to the GEB shall be concurrently sent to the Court, the Independent Monitor and the attorneys for the United States.


26. Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege: The actions taken and decisions made by the GEB Attorney in the performance of his duties under this Consent Decree are not covered by the attorney-client or work-product privilege, and if so covered, those privileges are deemed to have been waived by LIUNA and its affiliated entities.

                            The Independent Monitor
 


27. The parties shall jointly select an Independent Monitor to be appointed by the Court. If the parties fail to reach agreement on selection of an individual to serve as the Independent Monitor, the parties shall follow the procedures set forth in paragraph 58 below. The Independent Monitor will supervise the removal of organized crime and all other criminal elements as a source of influence in the affairs of LIUNA. In achieving this mandate the Independent Monitor shall have the following powers, rights and responsibilities:


28. Disciplinary Powers: The Independent Monitor shall have the same rights and powers as the LIUNA General President and GEB and any other officer, agent, employee or representative of LIUNA, as well as full authority derived from any and all provisions of law, to discharge those duties which relate to disciplining officers, agents, representatives, employees, and members of LIUNA and its affiliated entities for the purposes of complying with this Consent Decree and fulfilling its mandate. The Independent Monitor shall have the authority to impose discipline for all matters within the jurisdiction and authority of the GEB Attorney and the Investigations Officer. The Independent Monitor shall preside at hearings on charges brought by the GEB Attorney and the Investigations Officer.


29. Review of the GEB Attorney: If the Independent Monitor reasonably determines that the GEB Attorney is not making sufficient progress toward the achievement of the purposes of this Consent Decree, the Independent Monitor may remove any or all of the investigative authority delegated to the GEB Attorney under this Consent Decree. In such event, those powers shall be exclusively delegated to the Investigations Officer. In such event, the Independent Monitor shall give notice to the Court and to the parties with a statement of the reasons for such action.


30. Policy Review: The Independent Monitor shall have the authority to review the policies and appointments of LIUNA and its affiliated entities as set forth below:


(a) The GEB shall submit to the Independent Monitor the names and identifying data of all persons selected to fill vacancies on the GEB between the times of regular elections for such positions, and any other appointed office of LIUNA, including, but not limited to, regional managers, international representatives, special international representatives and trustees to oversee the affairs of LIUNA district councils, local unions, and other subordinate entities during a trusteeship imposed pursuant to the provisions of 29 U.S.C. 462. Unless the Independent Monitor disapproves the appointment within 15 days of receiving the submission, based on a determination that such selection would be inconsistent with the objectives and purposes of this Consent Decree, the appointment shall be final. The Independent Monitor may submit such names to the attorneys for the United States who may submit the names and identifying data to any governmental agency for the purpose of determining if the selection would be inconsistent with the objectives and purposes of this Consent Decree.


(b) The GEB shall submit to the Independent Monitor the names and identifying data of all persons selected by LIUNA or any of its affiliated entities to fill the position of union trustee, or any other union-appointed position, on any international pension benefit plan or welfare benefit plan or other fund affiliated with LIUNA, including, but not limited to, PACs and LECET funds. Unless the Independent Monitor disapproves the appointment within 15 days of receiving the submission, based on a determination that such selection would be inconsistent with the objectives and purposes of this Consent Decree, the appointment shall be final. The Independent Monitor may provide such names to the attorneys for the United States who may submit the names and identifying data to any governmental agency for the purpose of determining if the selection would be inconsistent with the objectives and purposes of this Consent Decree.


(c) The GEB shall submit all proposed contracts of over $150,000 to be entered into by LIUNA or any of its affiliated entities to the Independent Monitor. Unless the Independent Monitor disapproves the contract within 15 days of receiving the submission, based on a determination that entry into such contract would be inconsistent with the objectives and purposes of this Consent Decree, the GEB or LIUNA may enter into such contract. In making this determination, the Independent Monitor may request the assistance of the Investigations Officer or the attorneys for the United States.


(d) The Independent Monitor shall have the authority to review all expenditures or gifts of union property by the GEB or any other entity of the International Union, including its regional offices. Within 15 days of receipt of notice of any expenditure, the Independent Monitor may seek to rescind any expenditure that is not duly authorized or, if authorized, would be inconsistent with the objectives and purposes of this Consent Decree. The Independent Monitor shall report the results of this review to the Court and to the attorneys for the United States who may use such information for whatever purpose they deem appropriate.


(e) The GEB shall give the Independent Monitor a written agenda for every meeting of the GEB, and the Independent Monitor or his designee shall have the right to attend every such meeting.


31. Hearing Procedures: At any hearing conducted by the Independent Monitor, the following procedures shall apply:


(a) Hearings before the Independent Monitor shall be initiated by the filing of a written specific charge which shall be served upon the charged party.


(b) The charged party shall have at least thirty days prior to the hearing to prepare a defense.


(c) The party charged may be represented by counsel at the hearing.


(d) A fair and impartial hearing shall be conducted before the Independent Monitor.


(e) The hearing shall be conducted under the rules and procedures generally applicable in labor arbitration proceedings and decisions shall be made using a "just cause" standard.


(f) The Independent Monitor shall have the authority pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1965(b), to issue subpoenas to all parties including LIUNA or any of its affiliated entities and to non-parties for the purpose of compelling testimony and requiring the production of books, papers, records or other tangible objects at hearings conducted by the Independent Monitor.


(g) The Independent Monitor may require any component of LIUNA, or its affiliated entities, or any officer, agent, representative, member or employee of LIUNA or any of its affiliated entities to produce any book, paper, document, record, or other tangible object for use in any hearing conducted by the Independent Monitor. Any failure by LIUNA or its affiliated entities to comply with any such request may be used by the Independent Monitor to determine whether such entity should be subject to the imposition of discipline.


(h) All testimony and other evidence shall be received by the Independent Monitor under oath and shall be subject to the penalties of perjury to the same extent as if such evidence was submitted directly to the Court.


(i) If any person who is the subject of an application for imposition of discipline, refuses to testify or to provide evidence before the Independent Monitor on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, discipline may be imposed by the Independent Monitor on such person for that reason alone, consistent with the Code of Ethics of the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations, as adopted by LIUNA in 1958. Also, failure to testify or provide evidence in the absence of a valid claim of attorney-client privilege may be the basis for discipline. Any person so refusing to testify or provide evidence before the Independent Monitor may be subject to punishment for contempt of court upon application to the Court by the Independent Monitor.


(j) At any hearing before the Independent Monitor, the Independent Monitor may receive and consider, along with any other evidence, the sworn testimony of any law enforcement officer regarding information given to a law enforcement agency by a reliable confidential source of information. In no instance shall such officer be required to reveal the identity of the confidential source of information, but the Independent Monitor can choose what weight, if any, to give such testimony.


(k) Any discipline imposed by the Independent Monitor, or other decision of the Independent Monitor, shall be final and binding on the parties to the hearing subject to review by the Court.


32. Appeals of Monitor's Decisions: Any discipline imposed by, or decision of the Independent Monitor shall be final and binding, subject to review by this Court. For a period of up to fourteen (14) calendar days after service of the Independent Monitor's decision, the person, party, or entity aggrieved by the decision shall have the right to seek review in this Court. In reviewing decisions of the Monitor, the Court shall apply the same standard of review applicable to review of final agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act, that is, that such decision shall be sustained if supported by substantial evidence on the record and if it is not an abuse of discretion.


33. Reporting Requirements: On a quarterly basis, the Independent Monitor shall file a written status report with the GEB and the Court regarding the activities of the GEB Attorney, the Investigations Officer, and the Independent Monitor toward achieving the objectives and purposes of this Consent Decree. Copies of this report shall be provided to the attorneys for the United States, to the GEB Attorney and to the Investigations Officer. The Independent Monitor may distribute written reports to the membership of LIUNA entities describing the activities of the Independent Monitor and/or any events occurring as part of the implementation of this Consent Decree. The Independent Monitor shall also make quarterly assessments of the progress being made to fulfill the mandate of this decree and these reports will also be published at union expense in The Laborer or other similar publication.


34. Court Enforcement: The Independent Monitor, the Investigations Officer, the GEB, or the parties, may apply to the Court for any orders necessary or appropriate to implement this Consent Decree.


(a) The Independent Monitor may request that the United States assist him in any manner to carry out his responsibilities and mandate under this decree, including asking the United States to represent him in any proceeding before the Court or to provide any legal assistance or advice.


(b) The Independent Monitor may apply to the Court for appropriate sanctions against any person who (i) has failed to comply with any of the Independent Monitor's decisions or orders, or (ii) has obstructed or interfered with him or anyone else in the exercise of their duties under this Consent Decree.


35. Staff: The Independent Monitor shall have the authority to employ such personnel as are reasonably necessary to assist in the proper discharge of the duties imposed by this Consent Decree. To the extent that authority under this Consent Decree is granted to the Independent Monitor, that authority is also delegated to personnel hired or retained by the Independent Monitor to carry out his mandate under this Consent Decree.


36. Term of Office: The term of the Independent Monitor shall presumptively be for three years. Any party may petition the Court to extend the period beyond three years, upon a finding that the presence of an Independent Monitor is necessary for a longer period to achieve the purposes of this decree. Any party may petition the Court to shorten the period with the agreement of the parties.

                           The Investigations Officer
 


37. The parties shall jointly select an Investigations Officer to be appointed by the Court. If the parties fail to reach agreement on selection of an individual to serve as the Investigations Officer, the parties shall follow the procedures set forth in paragraph 58 below. The mandate of the Investigations Officer is to initiate and conduct investigations to remove organized crime and all other criminal elements as a source of influence in the affairs of LIUNA. To achieve this mandate, the Investigations Officer shall have the following powers, rights and responsibilities:


38. Disciplinary Hearings: The Investigations Officer shall have independent authority to investigate the operations of LIUNA or any of its affiliated entities and to initiate disciplinary charges against any officer, agent, representative, employee or member of LIUNA or any of its affiliated entities. The Investigations Officer has the same authority to initiate and conduct investigations as does the GEB Attorney or any other officer, agent, employee or representative of LIUNA under this Consent Decree. The Investigations Officer may initiate charges and present evidence at hearings before the Independent Monitor as detailed in paragraph 30 above. The Investigations Officer may bring charges against any officer, agent, representative, employee or member of LIUNA and its affiliated entities for any matter constituting a felony violation of the laws of the United States; or any violation of any state or federal law relating to the conduct of the affairs of a labor organization or employee benefit plan. Charges may also be brought for a violation of the injunctions adopted in paragraph 14 of this Consent Decree, any provision of the LIUNA constitutions, or working rules including the Job Referral Rules.


39. Investigative Powers: The Investigations Officer shall have the authority to take such reasonable steps as are lawful and necessary to be fully informed about the activities of LIUNA or any of its subordinate regional offices, district councils, local unions or other subordinate entity. To carry out his responsibilities under this Consent Decree, the Investigations Officer shall have the same rights and powers to initiate investigations and prefer charges as the GEB Attorney as set forth in paragraph 18 above.


(a) The Investigations Officer shall have the discretion to refer allegations of misconduct by any officer, agent, representative, employee, or member of LIUNA or its affiliated entities to the GEB Attorney.


(b) The Investigations Officer shall have the discretion to assume jurisdiction over any matter referred by the GEB Attorney.


40. Access to Information: The Investigations Officer shall have the unfettered right to attend all executive board or general membership meetings of any LIUNA district council, local union or other subordinate entity and to examine and copy all books, records, and all other documents of LIUNA or its affiliated entities, and of any officer, agent, representative, employee or member of LIUNA or its affiliated entities.


41. Review Autority: The Investigations Officer shall have the authority to review the matters set forth in this subparagraph:


(a) The Investigations Officer, in conjunction with the Attorney for the GEB, will study the operations of LIUNA and its affiliated entities in the manner detailed in paragraph 23 of this Consent Decree and shall recommend changes to the GEB to improve those operations in order to eliminate corruption and racketeering activity.


(b) Within twelve months after entry of this decree, the GEB Attorney and the Investigations Officer are to make specific recommendations to the GEB based upon their study of the issues listed in paragraphs 23 and 25 above, which shall be considered in accordance with paragraphs 24 and 25 above. Copies of the recommendations by the GEB Attorney and the Investigations Officer to the GEB shall be concurrently sent to the Court, the Independent Monitor and the attorneys for the United States.


42. Reporting Requirements: On a quarterly basis, the Investigations Officer shall file a written status report with the Independent Monitor regarding the activities of the Investigations Officer toward achieving the objectives and purposes of this Consent Decree. Copies of this report shall be provided to the attorneys for the United States and to the GEB Attorney.


43. Staff: The Investigations Officer shall have the authority to employ such personnel as are reasonably necessary to assist in the proper discharge of the duties imposed by this Consent Decree. To the extent that authority under this Consent Decree is granted to the Investigations Officer, that authority is also delegated to personnel hired or retained by the Investigations Officer to carry out his mandate under this decree.


44. Term: The term of the Investigations Officer shall presumptively be for three years. Any party may petition the Court to extend the period beyond three years upon a finding that the presence of an Investigations Officer is necessary for a longer period to achieve the purposes of this decree. Any party may petition the Court to shorten the period with the agreement of the parties.

                               Elections Officer
 


45. The parties shall jointly select an Elections Officer to be appointed by the Court. If the parties fail to reach agreement on selection of an individual to serve as the Elections Officer, the parties shall follow the procedures set forth in paragraph 58 below. The Elections Officer shall supervise direct elections by the rank-and-file membership of LIUNA of persons to serve as members of the General Executive Board of LIUNA, that is, the positions of General President, General Secretary-Treasurer, and the positions of eleven International Vice-Presidents.


46. It shall be the mandate of the Elections Officer to ensure that free and fair, direct, referendum elections based on the principle of one member, one vote are held for positions on the General Executive Board of LIUNA. In achieving this mandate, the Elections Officer shall adhere to the guidelines set forth below and shall have the following powers, rights and responsibilities:


(a) The delegates to the 1996 LIUNA International Convention, and successive conventions, shall be chosen by direct rank-and-file secret balloting which shall be conducted no more than four (4) months, nor less than two (2) months, before the date on which the convention is to be held, with each delegate to be elected individually.


(b) All duly nominated candidates for the position of International Vice-President shall stand for election on the same ballot and at the same time as the election of General President and General Secretary-Treasurer, as provided herein.


(c) At the International Convention, after the voting for nominees for the position of International Vice-President, all delegates shall then vote for nominees for the offices of LIUNA General President and General Secretary-Treasurer.


(d) Any delegate may place in nomination the name of any LIUNA member in good standing for the positions of General President, General Secretary-Treasurer, or International Vice-President otherwise meeting the qualifications for office specified in Article VI, Section 4 of the LIUNA Constitution.


(e) To qualify for the ballot for direct rank-and-file voting, candidates for LIUNA General President, General Secretary-Treasurer, or International Vice-President at-large must receive at least five per cent (5%) of the delegate votes at the International Convention. Regionally selected International Vice-Presidents must receive at least five percent (5%) of the delegate votes from delegates from the region the candidate seeks to represent.


(f) No person may appear on the ballot in the same election for more than one position on the GEB.


(g) No less than two (2) and no more than three (3) months after the International Convention at which candidates were nominated, the LIUNA General President, General Secretary-Treasurer, and International Vice-Presidents shall be elected by direct rank-and-file voting by secret ballot in union-wide, one-member, one-vote elections for each position.


(h) Six of the International Vice-Presidents shall be chosen on a regional geographical basis pursuant to terms agreed upon by the GEB Attorney and the Elections Officer, such that each geographical region shall include substantially the same number of members. The candidates for these six International Vice-President positions shall be nominated on a geographical basis. All duly nominated candidates for the position of International Vice-President shall stand for election conducted at Local Unions within each region on the same ballot and at the same time as the election of General President and General Secretary-Treasurer. Five of the International Vice-Presidents shall be chosen on an at-large basis. The candidates for these five International Vice-President positions shall be nominated at the same time and in the same manner as the nominations for General President and General Secretary-Treasurer. No more than two International Vice-Presidents may be from any one region.


(i) All direct rank-and-file voting by secret ballot described above shall be by mailed ballots, in accordance with procedures developed by the Elections Officer.


(j) To the extent that the Constitution of LIUNA is inconsistent with the procedures for election of members of the GEB as set forth above, such Constitution is hereby amended to read as provided in sub-paragraphs (a) through (i) of this paragraph.


(k) The Elections Officer shall conduct a study of the procedures for filling interim vacancies on the GEB and to the extent that the procedure currently provided by the Constitution of LIUNA is inconsistent with the achievement of the objectives and purposes of this Consent Decree, shall recommend changes in such to the procedure to the GEB, which shall consider them in good faith.


(l) The Elections Officer shall have the right to distribute materials about the election to the LIUNA membership through the Laborer or other similar publication.


(m) The Elections Officer may supervise the delegate selection process at any LIUNA local union or district council in any manner he sees fit.


(n) The Elections Officer shall supervise the balloting process and certify to the Court the results of the elections as promptly as possible after the balloting.


(o) The ILLEGIBLE WORD Officer shall have the authority to resolve those disputes pertaining to the integrity of the 1996 International election for the purposes of securing a free, fair and honest election. Thereafter, the Elections Officer may have such dispute resolution authority only upon the Court's determination that such authority is required to achieve the purposes of this Consent Decree. The burden of persuasion shall be upon the party seeking to continue such dispute resolution authority of the Elections Officer.


47. Staff: The Elections Officer shall have the authority to employ such personnel as are reasonably necessary to assist in the proper discharge of the duties imposed by this Consent Decree. To the extent that authority under this Consent Decree is granted to the Elections Officer, that authority is also delegated to personnel hired or retained by the Elections Officer to carry out his mandate under this decree.


48. Term: The term of the Elections Officer shall continue until the Court determines that the presence of an Elections Officer is no longer necessary to achieve the purposes of this decree. In any event, the term of the Elections Officer shall be no less than three years from entry of this consent decree. The burden of persuasion shall be on the party seeking to discontinue the term of the Elections Officer.

                     Amendments to the LIUNA Constitutions
 


49. The constitutions of LIUNA and its affiliated entities, shall be deemed, and hereby are, amended to incorporate and conform with all of the terms set forth in this Consent Decree. By no later than the conclusion of the LIUNA convention to be held in ILLEGIBLE WORD , LIUNA shall have formally amended the LIUNA constitutions to incorporate and conform with all of the terms, including the grounds set forth for the imposition of discipline, set forth in this Consent Decree by presenting such terms to the delegates for a vote.


50. In addition to the amendments to the LIUNA constitutions deemed necessary by this decree, the parties have agreed that each of the three LIUNA constitutions shall be amended to provide that any officer, agent, representative or employee of LIUNA or any of its subordinate regional offices, district councils, local unions or other subordinate entities who is named as a defendant in an indictment or other charging document accusing him of a felony violation of the laws of the United States, or any violation of any state or federal law relating to the conduct of the affairs of a labor organization or employee benefit plan, shall be placed on temporary leave of absence during the pendency of the matter and an investigation shall be undertaken to determine if discipline should be imposed.

                               The United States
 


51. The United States has the right to intervene in any matter or to appeal any decision arising out of this Consent Decree. The United States, in its discretion, may choose to assist the GEB Attorney and the court authorized officers in the performance of their duties. The United States may appeal decisions of the GEB Attorney, the Investigations Officer, or the Elections Officer to the Independent Monitor. The United States may appeal decisions of the Independent Monitor to the Court. The United States may, if requested, also agree to represent any party or entity before this Court concerning any matter arising out of the subject of this decree.

                            Miscellaneous Provisions
 


52. Compensation and Expenses: The compensation and expenses of the GEB Attorney, Independent Monitor, Investigations Officer, and the Elections Officer, and of all persons hired under their authority, shall be paid by LIUNA. All costs associated with the activities of these officials, and of all persons hired under their authority, shall be paid by LIUNA. To effectuate this provision, LIUNA shall deposit $150,000.00 with the Independent Monitor within five days after the entry of this Consent Decree and shall maintain that amount on deposit as necessary thereafter. The amount of the deposit shall be reviewed by the Court within 90 days of the entry of this Consent Decree. The Independent Monitor will thereafter be responsible for allocating payments to all persons entitled to compensation and expenses under this provision. On a quarterly basis, the Independent Monitor and the Elections Officer shall file with the Court, and serve on the United States and on counsel for the GEB, an accounting, including an itemized bill with supporting material, for all such expenditures. LIUNA shall have the right to challenge to the Court any fees or expenses that are unreasonable. If the Court determines that a pattern of unreasonable challenges to expenses has developed, the Court may limit LIUNA's right to challenge the expenditures.


53. Costs and Fees: The United States shall not seek costs or attorneys' fees from any other party hereto, nor shall LIUNA seek costs or attorneys' fees from the United States.


54. Indemnification: LIUNA shall purchase a policy of insurance and/or bonds in an appropriate amount to protect the GEB Attorney, the court authorized officers, and any persons hired by or acting on their behalf from personal liability for any of their actions on behalf of LIUNA or pursuant to this Consent Decree. If such insurance is not available, or if the LIUNA GEB so elects, LIUNA shall indemnify the court authorized officers, and any persons hired by or acting on their behalf from personal liability (and costs incurred to defend against any claim of liability) for any of their actions on behalf of LIUNA, or the court authorized officers taken pursuant to this Consent Decree. In addition, the court authorized officers, and any persons hired by or acting on their behalf, shall enjoy whatever immunity from personal liability may exist under the law for court officers.


55. Future Practices: The parties intend the provisions set forth herein to govern the practices of LIUNA and its GEB in the areas affected by this Consent Decree, now and in the future. If the GEB wishes to make any constitutional change or change in the structure of the union, or the disciplinary or electoral practices of the union or the Job Referral Rules, the GEB shall give prior written notice to the Investigations Officer, the attorneys for the United States and to the Independent Monitor.


56. Future Actions: Nothing in this Consent Decree shall preclude the Government, or any of its departments or agencies, from taking any appropriate action in regard to the defendant or any other person who is a signatory hereto in reliance on any federal law, including any criminal investigation or prosecution or civil action.


57. Scope of Decree: This Consent Decree determines the rights of the parties hereto and concerns the affairs of LIUNA, its officers, employees, and members. Nothing, except as is specifically mentioned in this decree, shall be construed as creating any right, title or interest accruing to any third party, except the court authorized officers and any persons retained by any such officers to assist them in fulfilling their duties as described in this Consent Decree.


58. Selection of Officers: The parties shall jointly select the individuals to be appointed by the Court to the position of the Independent Monitor, the Investigative Officer, and the Elections Officer. If the parties fail to reach agreement on selection of any one of these officers, the following procedure may be used to make the selection(s):


(a) Either party may nominate one candidate for each unfilled position;


(b) Within one week of either party nominating a candidate for an unfilled position, the other party may nominate a candidate for that position;


(c) Within two weeks of a party having nominated a candidate for an unfilled position, an individual previously chosen by the parties shall make a selection between the two candidates nominated by the parties who shall be appointed by the Court; and


(d) In the event that a selection has not been made within the time permitted by subparagraph (c), then the district court shall make the selection between the two candidates.


59. Guarantee of Rights: Nothing herein shall be construed to diminish the right of every member in good standing, as guaranteed by the LMRDA, to be a candidate for union office, to be informed about financial and electoral matters, to express opinions on union affairs, to vote for candidates of choice, and otherwise participate in a democratic manner in the operations of LIUNA and its affiliated entities. Trusteeships of subordinate labor organizations shall be established and administered for the purposes specified in the LMRDA or this Consent Decree. If there is any provision of the LIUNA Constitution inconsistent with any provision of this Consent Decree, the terms of this Consent Decree shall govern and LIUNA waives any inconsistent provisions of the LIUNA Constitutions. With respect to any remedies or procedures set forth herein concerning disciplinary sanctions against individuals, supervision of subordinate labor organizations through trusteeships, or the conduct of any officer elections, the parties intend the remedies and procedures set forth herein to govern, notwithstanding any contrary provision of the LIUNA Constitutions or any statute.


60. Non-Admission Clause: Nothing herein shall be construed as an admission by the defendant or any signatory hereto of any wrongdoing, or of the truth or validity of any of the claims or allegations contained in the complaint, or any other papers filed or submitted by the United States in this action.


61. Notice of Decree: Upon the entry of this decree, written notices informing the union membership of the entry and scope of this decree will be sent to every local union and will be printed in first issue of The Laborer which is published after the date of the entry of this Consent Decree, or other similar publication. These notices will be issued by the GEB Attorney and by the United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois. These notices are to be posted in local union offices for a period of six months from the date of entry of this decree.


62. Merger. This Consent Decree constitutes a final written expression of all terms of this Decree and is a complete and exclusive statement of those terms.


63. Acknowledgment of Consultation with Counsel. The members of the GEB have read this Consent Decree and have consulted with their respective counsel before consenting to and signing this Consent Decree.


________________________________________


United States District Judge


Dated: ____________________


CONSENTED AND AGREED TO:


DATE: ____________________
---------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------
THE GENERAL EXECUTIVE BOARD OF   THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
THE LABORERS' INTERNATIONAL                                    
UNION OF NORTH AMERICA, AFL-CIO                                
______________________________   ______________________________
Arthur A. Coia,                  James B. Burns,               
General President                United States Attorney        
                                 Northern District of Illinois
______________________________   ______________________________
Rollin P. "Bud" Vinall           Paul E. Coffey, Chief         
General Secretary-Treasurer      Organized Crime and           
                                 Racketeering Section          
                                 Criminal Division             
______________________________   U.S. Department of Justice    
Mason M. "Max" Warren                                          
First Vice-President                                           
______________________________                                 
John Serpico                                                   
Second Vice-President                                          
______________________________                                 
Vere O. Hayres                                                 
Third Vice-President                                           
______________________________                                 
Samuel J. Caivano                                              
Fourth Vice-President                                          
______________________________                                 
Enrico Mancinelli                                              
Fifth Vice-President                                           
______________________________                                 
Chuck Barnes                                                   
Sixth Vice-President                                           
---------------------------------------------------------------


______________________________


Jack Wilkinson


Seventh Vice-President


______________________________


George R. Gudger


Eighth Vice-President


______________________________


ILLEGIBLE WORD Quevedo, Jr.


Ninth Vice-President


______________________________


Armand E. Sabitoni


Tenth Vice-President

                               JOB REFERRAL RULES
 

                 LABORERS' INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH AMERICA
 


In order for the Laborers' International Union of North America (LIUNA), and its subordinate local unions, to maintain and administer a processing system for referral of members to employment in a fair and equitable manner, and to establish records and procedures which will be adequate to disclose fully the basis on which each referral is made, the following rules have been promulgated and shall be adopted and implemented by each LIUNA Local Union:


1. Non-Discrimination in Job Referrals: Referrals to jobs shall be on a non-discriminatory basis and shall not be based on, or in any way affected by, race, gender, age, national origin, sexual orientation, disability, religion, or lawful union-related activity.


2. Effect of Hiring Hall Rules: All referrals by a Local Union to jobs within its jurisdiction shall be made in accordance with these rules, except where the existing collective bargaining agreement does not provide for an exclusive hiring hall. In such cases, as each such collective bargaining agreement expires, the Local Union or district council shall use its best efforts to include an exclusive hiring hall provision in the new collective bargaining agreement.


3. Registration of Availability for Referral:


A. A member seeking referral to a job must file with the Local Union a signed referral form providing name, telephone number and social security number, and stating any skills the member possesses and the jobs the member is able to perform, including any relevant licenses or certifications. Blank referral forms will be available at the Local Union. The Local Union will compile an out-of-work list, consisting of the members who have registered their availability for referral.


EXHIBIT A


B. Apprentices shall be referred under a separate out-of-work list, and shall be listed according to their apprenticeship year.


C. Only members who are not currently employed at the trade may register their availability for referral. Members who, after registering their availability for referral, on their own obtain employment at the trade, lasting eleven (11) days or more, must advise the Local Union immediately. Those members will then be removed from the out-of-work list.


D. Members shall be removed from the out-of-work list upon receiving a job referral, subject to the provisions at 4(C) on short-term referrals. A member who is laid off or discharged from a job must again register his or her availability in order to be included on the out-of-work list.


E. Once a member has registered his or her availability for referral, by filing a signed referral form with the Local Union, the member may afterward register his or her availability by telephone to the Local Union.


F. A member's registration of availability for referral shall be in effect for ninety (90) days. A member must again register his or her availability before the expiration of that period in order to retain his or her position on the out-of-work list.


4. Referral Procedure:


A. Members on the out-of-work list shall be referred to jobs in the order in which they have registered their availability for referral, with the first registered member referred first, provided that the member has indicated that he or she has the qualifications requested by the employer.


B. Requests by an employer for specific members employed by the employer within the previous six months shall be fulfilled, as required by applicable collective bargaining agreements.


C. A member who is referred to a job lasting ten (10) days or less will return to his or her position on the out-of-work list prior to receiving the referral. However, after receiving a job referral immediately following such a short-term referral, regardless of its length, that member must again register in order to be included on the out-of-work list.


D. To notify a member of a job referral, the Local Union shall call the member at the telephone number on file. The Local Union shall record the date and time of the call, the person making the call, the name of the employer, the location of the job, and the start date of the job.


E. Any member who refuses or is unavailable for two consecutive referrals shall be moved to the bottom of the out-of-work list. A member will be considered unavailable if he or she cannot be reached after three calls have been placed to the telephone number provided by the member, unless the member has given the Local Union notice in writing of unavailability for a period not to exceed thirty (30) days.


F. When the Local Union determines that the member who is first on the out-of-work list cannot be referred because of refusal, unavailability, or lack of required skills, the Local Union shall then refer the next member on the out-of-work list who is willing, available, and has the required skills.


G. A member shall not be referred to an employer if the member was previously discharged for cause by the same employer. Members who are twice lawfully rejected by an employer for lack of skills, after referral by the Local Union, shall not be eligible for referral to a job requiring the same skills without first providing the Local Union with references from two previous employers, showing that the member has demonstrated the skills required.


5. Dissemination of the Job Referral Rules: These rules shall be (a) conspicuously posted at the offices of each Local Union; and (b) published in the Laborer. Additional copies of these rules shall be made available to members upon request, subject to the payment of reasonable copying costs. New members shall receive a copy of the job referral rules upon admission to membership.


6. Job Referral Information: A Local Union shall maintain accurate and current records of all job referrals. The records shall be preserved for a period of three (3) years from the making of each record. The records shall include ILLEGIBLE WORD information:


A. All registration by members of their availability for referral, including the date of each member's registration;


B. A current out-of-work list, including all members whose registration of availability for referral are then in effect, and the date of each member's registration;


C. All requests from employers for workers, including the date of each request, the location of the job site, and the length of the job, if known;


D. All instances where a job referral is not made because a member (1) refuses the referral, (2) is unavailable, or (3) lacks the required skills, including (where applicable) the date and time of the call(s), the person making the call(s), the name of the employer, the location of the job site, the start date of the job, and the basis for not making the referral; and


E. All job referrals made, including the member referred, the date on which that member registered his or her availability for employment, the date of the referral, the employer, the location of the job site, and the date the member was hired.


7. Access to Job Referral Information:


A. Any member of a Local Union can inspect or copy any record containing the job referral information described in 6. An appointment for inspection shall be scheduled for within five (5) days of a request. Copies of 500 pages or less shall be provided within ten (10) days of a request. Copies of more than 500 pages shall be provided within thirty (30) days of a request. A Local Union may charge $ .50 per page to copy the first twenty (20) pages, and $ .25 per page thereafter.


B. Lists containing the information described in 6(B) and (E) shall be conspicuously posted, or otherwise immediately available for inspection, at the offices of a Local Union on a weekly basis, so that the previous week is posted or immediately available by the close of business on the following Monday. The information shall remain posted or immediately available for at least two weeks.

                                 EXHIBIT NO. 5
 

                                THE WHITE HOUSE
 

                                   WASHINGTON
 

                                 EXHIBIT NO. 6
 
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Citation               Rank(R)   Database   Mode
10/21/93 CHICAGOTR 1   R 1 OF 1  CHICAGOTR  Page
10/21/93 Chi. Trib. 1                           
1993 WL 11115453                                
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Chicago Tribune


Copyright 1993

                           Thursday, October 21, 1993
 

                                  CHICAGOLAND
 

                     U.S. READIES LABORERS UNION CRACKDOWN
 

                      John O'Brien, Tribune Staff Writer.
 


In a move reminiscent of the government's highly successful effort to purge the Teamsters Union of mob influence, the Justice Department is preparing legal action to achieve the same effect on the Laborers International Union of North America.


Federal and labor officials have declined public comment on the pending action against a union that at times has resembled a power base for organized crime.


But sources in the Justice Department and organized labor said a lawsuit being drafted by aides to U.S. Atty. Gen. Janet Reno declares the union is beset with pockets of corruption and asks that outside controls be imposed on its management, financial affairs and elections.


In addition, the suit, expected to be filed in the next few months, will seek court-appointed administrators with independent authority to root out corrupt officers.


Word of the government inquiry of the LIU has spread in recent weeks in labor circles.


"There is an extensive investigation going on of the Laborers, but how it will play out remains to be seen," said Susan Jennik, executive director of the New York-based Association for Union Democracy, a watchdog group.


Much of the LIU's strength is in the Midwest, where many of the union's 650,000 members are employed. Their jobs range from asbestos removal and digging tunnels to handling mail bags and resurfacing highways.


Chicago has been an integral part of the union's power for nearly 60 years, with Peter Fosco; his son, Angelo Fosco; and other family members holding high LIU office during much of that time, seemingly as a family birthright.


Copr. (C) West 1996 No claim to orig. U.S. govt. work


To what extent the union may challenge a government suit remains to be seen, labor sources said. Furthermore, they said any attempt at reform may be difficult. There is no recognizable reform movement among the Laborers, they said, and dissidents are few and scattered.


The International Brotherhood of Teamsters, hauled into court on similar charges, acknowledged the influence of mobsters in a 1989 consent decree with the Justice Department. Since then, 200 Teamster officials have been removed from office or accused of wrongdoing by a federal judge and a three-member review board.


While that number is small in comparison to the 4,200 Teamster officials nationwide, the financial burden of implementing the consent decree has been staggering. Since 1989, the Teamsters have shelled out $32 million in legal fees and other administrative and investigative costs incurred by a court-appointed review panel.


While most Teamster activity has remained unchanged under court supervision, such as negotiating contracts and resolving member grievances, the intrusion has had an impact on how local unions handle their finances, as well as on the delegate-selection process for union elections.


As in the Teamster case, sources said, the legal initiative against the Laborers is intended to stop extortion schemes, embezzlement of union funds and fraud in contracts involving millions of dollars in health and pension benefits.


Of a dozen LIU locals in the Chicago area, several have been linked to organized crime by U.S. Senate hearings, grand jury investigations and federal convictions of officials for labor racketeering. Among them:


- Chicago Local 1, whose veteran president, the late Vincent Solano, was frequently identified by law-enforcement authorities as a North Side mob boss. His successor, Frank Colaianni, has pledged reforms.


- Chicago Local 1006, whose president, Frank "Tootsie" Caruso, is the son of the late Frank "Skids" Caruso, a reputed gambling boss in Chinatown. Tootsie Caruso's uncle is former 1st Ward Ald. Fred Roti, tagged by some investigators as the mob's connection to the City Council. Roti was convicted this year of federal racketeering and bribery charges.


- Chicago Local 1001, whose president, Ernest Kumerow of ILLEGIBLE WORD Hills, was subpoenaed before a federal grand jury in Chicago last year that investigated suspected mob involvement in several car bombings.


- Chicago Heights Local 5, where three officials have gone to prison. Dominick Palermo and Nick Guzzino, former field representatives, are serving terms for extorting money from bookmakers.


Alfred Pilotto, former Local 5 president, was identified as a mob boss in southern Cook and northern Will Counties before going to prison in 1982. He served 10 years for conspiracy to defraud the union of $2 million.


Others convicted in the Pilotto case were James Corporale, secretary-treasurer of the Laborers' Chicago district council; Salvatore Tricario, recording secretary of Local 767 in Palm Beach, Fla.; and John Giardiello, president of Local 767.


According to sources familiar with the upcoming suit, the government intends to use the testimony of federal investigators, mob informants and disgruntled insiders and evidence from a series of criminal prosecutions of union officials.


Eleven people, including several members of the Genovese crime family in New York City, were indicated in 1990 on numerous charges, including trying to control the LIU's New York locals.


Findings in a 1986 report on labor racketeering in the Chicago area by the President's Commission on Organized Crime accused the Laborers of being "a union with clear ties to organized crime."


The report singled out John Serpico, then Chicago regional vice president and now a member of the Laborers' executive board, as a "friend" of powerful mob bosses, including imprisoned Joseph Aiuppa and the late Anthony Accardo, but it stopped short of alleging wrongdoing.


Serpico has acknowledged social contacts with some individuals identified by authorities as organized crime figures, but he maintains that such association was merely an outgrowth from boyhood days.


Long regarded by law-enforcement officials as a haven for reputed mobsters and former convicts, the LIU in recent years has taken steps, albeit cautiously, to improve its image and the safety of members.


Each year, a modern LIU center in Carol Stream trains 1,400 ILLEGIBLE WORD members in the use of machinery and ILLEGIBLE WORD procedures "at a tremendous reduction in health ILLEGIBLE WORD costs," said Hugh Arnold, a Chicago lawyer who represents the Chicago district council.


He said he was unaware of any inquiry involving the union in Chicago.

                           ---- INDEX REFERENCES ----
 


KEY WORDS: FEDERAL; PROBE; LAWSUIT; LABOR; ORGANIZED CRIME; PROFILE


NEWS SUBJECT: LAWSUITS; LABOR & PERSONNEL ISSUES; LAW ENFORCEMENT ILLEGIBLE WORD LEN)


GOVERNMENT: FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (FDL)


EDITION: NORTH SPORTS FINAL; N


Word Count: 981


10/21/93 CHICAGOTR 1


END OF DOCUMENT

                                 EXHIBIT NO. 7
 


(Date)


TO: FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION


EXECUTIVE AGENCIES DISSEMINATION UNIT


FROM: LLOYD N. CUTLER


COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT


SUBJECT: FBI INVESTIGATIONS


Applicant's Name Arthur A. Coia


Social Security Number 037-26-3032


Date of Birth 3/21/43


Place of Birth Providence, RI


Home Address 20 Pavne Road


Barrington, RI 02806


We request: __________ Copy of Previous Report


X Name Check


__________ Expanded Name Check


__________ Limited Update


__________ Other


The applicant named above is being considered for:


X Presidential Appointment


__________ Requiring Senate Confirmation


X Not Requiring Senate Confirmation


__________ White House Staff Position


Remarks/Special Instructions:

                                 EXHIBIT NO. 8
 


MEMORANDUM DATE:


SUBJECT: DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE URGENT REPORT


TO: Janet Reno


Attorney General


Jamie S. Gorelick


Deputy Attorney General


FORM: Jo Ann Harris


Assistant Attorney General


Criminal Division


DESIGNATION: Criminal


SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified


ORIGINATING UNIT: Organized Crime and


Racketeering Section


Paul E. Coffey, Chief


514-3595


CLARIFICATION AND FOLLOW-UP: John C. Keeney


Deputy Assistant Attorney General


514-2621


ISSUE: Appointment of Arthur A. Coia, General President, Laborers' International Union of North America, to Presidential Advisory Council


SYNOPSIS:


On October 5, 1994, the Organized Crime, Drug Operations Section of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (F.B.I.), advised that it had received an inquiry from the White House requesting information about Arthur A. Coia, General President of the Laborers' International Union of North America, AFL- CIO (LIUNA), who is being considered for appointment to a Presidential council on competitiveness.


The Criminal Division has long had information, including public testimony and information from cooperating witnesses, that Coia was associated with and controlled by the New England family of La Cosa Nostra (LCN). Additionally, the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section and the United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois are preparing to file a civil RICO complaint which will accuse Coia and his two immediate predecessors as General President of LIUNA of being puppets of the LCN. It is expected that the complaint will be filed within the next several weeks.


Further information may be obtained from Paul E. Coffey, Chief of the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section.

                                 EXHIBIT NO. 9
 

                             An F.O.B. and the Mob
 

         The Laborers' Arthur Coia has built himself into a Washington
 

              power player. But his union still needs cleaning up
 


BY JOHN E. MULLIGAN AND DEAN STARKMAN


With droopy eyes and an engaging, boyish smile. Arthur A. Coia presents himself as the new face of Amencan labor Coia is the general president of the Laborer's International Union of North America, the sprawling association of toxic waste handlers, oil riggers, and tunnel diggers. An unabashed supporter of free trade and "worker-management cooperation," Coia has successfully sold himself to journalists and politicians as an avatar of reform.


Also a staunch ally and financial supporter of President Clinton, Coia was an early backer of the new leadership at the once-listless AFL-CIO. His efforts to recruit low-paid, disenfranchised workers and to raise the profile of labor in the political arena are part of a trend that many say has reenergized organized labor. Meanwhile, Coia claims decisive victories in breaking labor's longstanding and notorious partnership with organized crime.


But the odd case of Arthur Coia illustrates a less sanguine picture of unions in 1996: one of lingering corruption, mob ties, and political influence--a volatile mix. On November 4, 1994, Coia was served with a 212- page draft racketeering complaint from the Justice Department's Organized Crime and Racketeering Section. The document accused Coia of extortion, pilfering union funds, and ruthlessly crushing dissent in his union. Charging that the Laborers' International was under the mob's thumb, the Justice Department served notice of its intent to take over and throw Coia out.


But then something strange happened. The racketeering complaint was never filed. Instead, Coia hired Brendan V. Sullivan Jr.--Oliver North's Iran-Contra lawyer--plus a veteran of the Organized Crime section to fend off prosecutors. Negotiations lasted three months and involved the Criminal Division chief at Justice. The settlement, when it came, was an enormous victory for Coia. Not only did he keep his position atop the union, he also beat back reforms that would have brought real democracy to the Laborers and handed power to the rank and file.


Coia's story is one of a great failure of law enforcement, set in a rarified atmosphere of multi-million dollar campaign contributions and intimate White House dinners. Federal law enforcement officials involved in the case, who wanted Coia removed but were overruled, grumble about a link between the toothless settlement and Coia's political friendship with the President. The few union members willing to speak out say they don't understand how Coia slipped through the Justice Department's net. "It's like everything Coia does is okay because he's a friend of Clinton," says Alex Coms, a hod carrier in Northern California.


John E. Mulligan is the Providence ILLEGIBLE WORD Washington bureau chief Dean Starkman is chief of the newspaper's investigative team.


Carl Stern, a spokesman for Attomey General Janet Reno, says any such suggestion is "moronic." But whatever the case, the membership is further from taking control of their union today than a year ago, and deep corruption persists. Bizarrely, Reno echoes Coia's boast that the agreement is a model for future racket-busting, part of a trend toward self-regulation. In reality, prosecutors have farmed out the task of mob-busting to a union boss they once charged as a racketeer.

Son of the Union
 


Arthur Coia's father, Arthur Ettore Coia, was the general secretary-treasurer of the Laborers' International, which represents 750,000 unskilled workers in dozens of fields. Almost single-handedly, he molded the union into a political force that still holds Providence city hall in its grip. The union doled out pensions to City Council members and hired Providence political figures and their relatives. The old man had the ear of Rhode Island governors and the late House Speaker Thomas P. "Tip" O'Neill Jr.


Coia's father also had other, sinister contacts. He had a relationship--casual, he insisted--with the legendary boss of New England organized crime, Raymond L.S. Patriarca, that dated to their youth in the 1930s. FBI wiretaps, planted in the early 1960s, crackled with the sound of Patriarca meddling in everything from Laborers elections to decisions on who got kickbacks on union coffee machines. "Hit them, break legs to get things your way," Patriarca was overheard saying.


According to Ronald M. Fino, a Laborers executive turned government infornant, the elder Coia reported regularly to mobsters around the country: the Chicago Syndicate, the Todaro family of Buffalo, and the Gambino and Genovese families of New York. Fino says Coia's father also confided that he took kickbacks and bribes, and used training funds as open-ended expense accounts


The younger Coia followed his father into the union and, by his mid twenties, was the chief of the Rhode Island Laborers. In 1981, Coia, his father, and ILLEGIBLE WORD were indicted for ILLEGIBLE WORD and taking bribes from an insurance swindler who had been the younger Coia's law client. The case never went to a jury because a judge ruled that the statute of limitations had expired. In 1986, the Coias and their union received more unwanted attention when the President's Commission on Organized Crime weighed in with a 393-page report on labor rackets that called the Laborers one of the nation's "Bad Four," the worst of the worst corrupt unions, alongside the Teamsters, Hotel Workers, and Longshoremen. The commission, made up of federal judges and former U.S. attorneys, ILLEGIBLE WORD the looting of benefit plans, death threats, and murders of opposing candidates.


The mob's grip on the Laborers was particularly ironclad because the union has such broad authority over its workers. If you want work as a Laborer--say, cleaning toxic-waste--you don't go to an employer. You go to the union "hiring hall." Local officers there decide who works and who doesn't, so complaining about mob influence gets you blackballed. Real troublemakers might draw beatings, or worse. And workers never even see the complicated kickback schemes, real estate frauds, and other misuse of their dues. Such investments are made by union leaders, beholden not to the rank and file but to bosses whose chain of command runs straight to the general president's office and, from there, to the mob.


In 1989, Coia sought to replace his ailing father as general secretary-treasurer. When he flew to Chicago to a lobby union a vice president, John Serpico, Coia says Serpico greeted him warmly at O'Hare, then steered him into an airport coffee shop to meet Vincent Solano, a capo regime in the Chicago Mafia. In a scene out of The Godfather, Solano bestowed on him the Mafia's blessing for the No. 2 job. But Coia was warned not to try for the general presidency, a job reserved for Serpico.


Coia described this scene in testimony before a closed union disciplinary hearing last May. Serpico's lawyer, Matthias A. Lydon of Chicago, hotly disputes Coia's account. True or not, the story belies Coia's public denials of mob influence in the Laborers.


As Coia leapfrogged through the ranks of the Laborers, he built an interlocking network of interests that blurred the line between his profit-making businesses and his union duties. He started a law firm that for years has billed Rhode Island Laborers' trust funds. He formed a real estate partnership with a top city official and a prominent local contractor, and became the landlord for some of his own union's offices and the contractor's headquarters. This has been illegal since 1947, when the Taft-Hartley Act barred union officials from accepting outside payments from anyone employing workers from the union. And just before the Justice Department came calling in the fall of 1994, a Laborers legal fund bought a souring real estate investment from Coia's partnership--for $2.3 million.


The outside income has augmented Coia's union salary, $218,959 in 1994. He owns homes on Rhode Island's Narragansett Bay and in Delray Beach, Florida. Last year, he pulled up to a Providence nightclub in a fire-engine red Ferrari, a make of automobile for which he confesses a particular weakness. Coia and his wife Joanne also have engaged in the costly hobby of championship dog breeding. At one point, Coia tried to mate his stud dog with a bitch owned by Raymond J. "Junior" Patriarca, then underboss of the New England mob. The coupling failed to produce puppies.


In 1993, Coia completed his rise to the general presidency of the Laborers' International. He set right to work on a campaign for legitimacy. He revved up the union's pitiful public relations operation. He embraced progressive causes, including the Clintons' health-care reform effort. And he opened the Laborers' checkbook. The union ranked sixth in "soft money" donations to the Democratic Party in 1994 and political action committees under Coia's control have given more than two million dollars to congressional candidates--mostly Democrats-- for 1994 and 1996. Coia has attended several affairs with the President and First Lady. With Robert Strauss, Vemon Jordan, Dwayne Andreas, and Ronald Perelman, Coia co-chaired a 1994 Democratic fundraiser that raised $3.5 million.


By the end of that year, Coia could secure an audience with the President in the Oval Office. "We aren't being paid attention to," Coia says he told Clinton, complaining that his union had been bypassed for federal grants and contracts. According to Coia, the President told him to take such problems to Deputy Chief of Staff Harold Ickes, who sat nearby. Clinton also produced a Calloway "Divine Nine" golf club and presented it to the union boss as a gesture of friendship. Coia soon returned the favor with a custom-made driver crafted by a Rhode Island artisan and decorated with the presidential seal and Bill Clinton's signature. "Thanks for the gorgeous driver," read Clinton's thank- you note. "It's a work of art!"


Coia, who lives a life beyond the fantasies of the union's chicken-pluckers and auto part assemblers, nevertheless presents himself as a champion of the ordinary worker. He took out an ad on the op-ed page of The New York Times to denounce Pat Buchanan and tout "a vision to restore the American standard of living." In a campaign that echoes John J. Sweeney's plan for the AFL-CIO, Coia launched a widely publicized, $5 million organizing drive to rally low-wage workers such as poor schoolbus drivers and catfish farm workers.


The labor community applauded. "He's trying to turn his union around," says Barbara Easterling of the Communications Workers of America. "Now the talk is of a different face of the Laborers." Coia has also drawn praise for his work to rid his union of mob corruption. He has "done a hell of a job trying to clean up his own union," says Gerald W. McEntee, president of the 1.3 million-member American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees.


But some things at the Laborers haven't changed. In 1994, according to the government's draft racketeering complaint, Coia conspired with organized crime elements to drain pension funds from locals in upstate New York. As part of the scheme, he tried to force Local Union 435 in Rochester, New York, into a new regional organization whose top two officers were mob associates, according to the government. Coia denies the allegation and says he was only trying to streamline the bureaucracy. A federal judge voided Coia's takeover. But around the country, would-be dissidents got the message.


Just as Coia was reaching the pinnacle of his power, the Laborers was hitting bottom. Locals in Chicago, Cleveland, and Buffalo were all under Mafia rule. Strong-armed union bosses ruled out West, as well. But nowhere was it worse than at the Greater New York Mason Tenders District Council, a Laborers affiliate representing about 6,000 asbestos workers, brickhaulers, and common laborers in a dozen locals. There, the mob ruled openly, brutally, and brazenly. The president of one Laborers local was a Genovese capo. The president of another was a Luchese soldier. A De-Cavalcante acting boss was the business manager of a third. Union officers took kickbacks with their morning coffee. Builders who wanted to use cheap, non-union labor could be guaranteed that union leaders--elected to protect the interests of workers--would look the other way in return for a payoff. Professional groups--often with links to the mob-- would grossly overcharge union medical, pension, and legal funds. This all happened on Coia's watch. He and the rest of the international's general executive board, who have a fiduciary duty to protect members from such abuses, kept themselves transcendentally ignorant about the open looting of the New York Laborers. In 1989, after an official of Queens Local 46 was convicted of racketeering, Coia and two other top international executives assured the Labor Department in writing that "honest and effective representation is finally being provided." While there is no evidence that Coia knew the mob was still in control, sworn statements and government wiretaps later showed that the new local president was hand-picked by the Luchese family.


The open corruption at the Mason Tenders drew the attention of federal prosecutors. In 1989 and 1990, the Justice Department won a string of very public cases that smashed the mob's grip on the Laborers' unit. Trial evidence showed the direct involvement of mobsters such as Gambino family don John Gotti. In 1993, the president of the New York Laborers pleaded guilty to one of the largest cases of real estate fraud in U.S. labor history. Corrupt union leaders had used union funds to buy run-down property for far more than its value, a good way to funnel cash to mobsters but devastating to the pension funds of the rank and file.


Eventually, prosecutors announced plans to take over the entire New York affiliate. The lead prosecutor, Alan N. Taffet, repeatedly demanded to know "whether and when" Coia would move to end the "systematic corruption" in New York, according to court documents. Even in the face of overwhelming evidence of the union's subjugation to the mob, a judge ruled, Coia failed to act.


By this point, a separate investigation was lining up a new target: Coia himself. On November 4, 1994--the same day President Clinton dashed off a note thanking Coia for his golf club--the Justice Department delivered the 212-page draft racketeering complaint to the union with allegations, among other charges, of Coia's longstanding collusion with the Mafia.


The document also contained a new charge: that Coia's takeover of the Rochester local had been part of a conspiracy with the Todaro organized crime family of Buffalo to drain benefit funds. The government was planning to ask the court for its silver bullet: a full-scale takeover by a federal judge.


That's what happened in 1989, when the government kicked in the doors of the notoriously corrupt International Brotherhood of Teamsters. In that case, prosecutors won a sweeping mandate and imposed a trusteeship answerable to a federal judge. The takeover caused nothing less than a revolution. It spurred the first free elections in Teamsters' history, sweeping into power Ron Carey, a reformer who promptly sold off the union's Lear Jets and limousines, cut staff salaries, including his own, and slashed bureaucracy. Carey may be no angel, but he represents a genuine grassroots insurgency made possible by the United States government. Local elections are free and fair. Members have real power to throw Carey out.


Prosecutors wanted to effect the same sweeping changes at the Laborers. But Coia had something else in mind. He fought back, hiring the power-house law firm of Williams & Connelly and, as his personal lawyer. Brendan Sullivan, famous for his performance at the Iran-Contra hearings. Coia also hired Robert D. Luskin, formerly of the Justice Department's Organized Crime Section, to negotiate with Justice. The lawyers staunchly refused even to consider Coia's resignation and promised a scorched-earth fight if the government tried to take over.


Word of the investigation reached the White House, which canceled the speech that Hillary Clinton had planned to give at a union conference in Florida on Feb. 6, 1995. But Coia argued strenuously to have the speech put back on the schedule, reminding the White House of his past political help, according to the union. Mrs. Clinton kept the engagement. Deputy Chief of Staff Ickes advised the First Lady to avoid private meetings or conversations with Coia because the White House considered Coia "currently under investigation." Meanwhile, negotiations between the Laborers and Justice continued. A week after Mrs. Clinton's appearance there was a deal. The two sides signed a document about a page-and-a-half in length that essentially asked Coia to clean up the Laborers' act--on his own terms. Coia responded by hiring his own "reform team," a group to work inside the Laborers to root out corruption.


Whatever the government's intentions, the agreement has actually consolidated Coia's position within the union and deflected open scrutiny of his past. But this should come as no surprise. The agreement put Coia and his old board in firm control of the reform campaign, including the power to hire and fire the reform team's members. There is no judicial oversight. "To make an agreement like this work you have to have the muscle," says a federal law enforcement official. "We don't have the muscle." And "muscle," this source explains, is a federal judge enforcing the terms of the cleanup.


Some law enforcement officials suspect the worst: that somehow Coia's political influence was brought to bear at Justice. "I'm sure it happened," says one such official. "I just don't think we'll ever find out who made the call." The agreement of Feb. 13, 1995, opened a split between federal agents and prosecutors in the field and their Justice Department overseers in Washington. The ILLEGIBLE WORD has widened in the year since. "I don't think anybody is happy with the way things have progressed," says the official. "It hasn't been a pretty picture."


Coia and his PR shop have loudly trumpeted the reform program and the ILLEGIBLE WORD array of former federal prosecutors and FBI agents now on the Laborers' payroll. Coia designated Luskin to head up the campaign. In other words, the same man who had won the sweetheart deal for the Laborers in the first place would be in charge of rooting out corruption.


Prosecutors' only leverage is the threat of a government takeover, but since this move was rejected in the recent negotiations, the threat doesn't carry much weight. Luskin is defensive about being perceived as Coia's ally. "I'm not Arthur Coia's attorney," he snapped to the Buffalo News in February. But he is being rewarded handsomely. He confirms that he's billed the union at least $500,000 so far. Asked if his billings have topped $1 million, he says, "I don't know." Coia and the union also hired W. Douglas Gow, a former FBI agent, as the union's new inspector general. Gow declines to say how much he is paid and referred questions about the cost of the cleanup to the union's PR operation, which did not return telephone calls. So far, the disciplinary team has forced the resignations of 27 mob-linked union members; six trusteeships have been imposed on wayward locals and four tainted local elections were overturned.


The awkwardness of the arrangement, though, was illustrated in the case of Cruz Gutierrez, a 52-year-old foreman in Local 261 in San Francisco and an outspoken critic of local bosses. He took a blackballing complaint to Gow last year, and soon received a menacing phone call from from a local boss. "I want to thank you for jeopardizing the lives of my family and myself." Gutierrez wrote to Gow. For his part, Gow says he made a mistake and has not repeated it. He also says he has "100 percent autonomy" in pursuing corruption, and that he has been effective.


But the old guard still rules. Gene Johnson, a Laborers officer from central Illinois for 35 years, says that since the February 1995 agreement, the international has tried to force the merger of his district organization into another controlled by a Coia ally. Johnson says he has resisted--and been threatened and harassed for his trouble. He also says that during a May 1995 meeting, Coia promised to "take care of" two of Johnson's sons on the union payroll and enhance Johnson's union pension in return for his cooperation. Johnson refused.


Johnson says that at that same meeting, Coia learned that Gow and his agents had cleared Johnson of a misconduct complaint brought by a rival. Coia got angry at Gow and his agents, according to Johnson. "These sons of bitches are supposed to do as I tell them," Coia said, according to Johnson. Says Johnson: "I think the mob has better control of this union than it has in the 35 years I've been here." By presstime, Coia and the union had not responded to repeated telephone calls and a letter detailing Johnson's charges.


Some law enforcement officials, who ask for anonymity, describe the Laborers' cleanup effort as an elaborate and artfully crafted charade. They say its main result has been to strengthen Coia's hand and purge his rivals, noting that cases that have veered toward Coia have all folded like $3 suitcases. When Samuel J. Caivano was bounced from the union's executive board, he sued and charged that Coia was the true mob associate and should be the target of any reform effort. A federal judge in Washington. Emmet G. Sullivan, was puzzled too. During a hearing in April, 1995 he remarked: "A deal was cut; obviously something happened with regard to Coia. A deal was cut. Why wasn't Coia removed?" The case was settled--on financial terms favorable to Caivano-- before the question could be answered. And last May in Chicago, minutes before a lawyer for Serpico, another suspended vice-president, was to cross-examine Coia under oath. Luskin asked for a recess and settled that case.


The bottom line is that the government is on the outside looking in. "We're always on them to do more, and they're always resisting our attempt to tell them what to do," says Craig Oswald, an assistant U.S. attorney in Chicago and a key player in negotiations with the Laborers. For instance, prosecutors had hoped for real election reform. But Coia failed to produce. Prosecutors were so unhappy that, months after the original agreement, they recommended to Washington that the government take over the Laborers after all. But instructions came back to compromise again. So Coia got another nice deal: watered-down democracy that all but guarantees his reign into the next century. That's because only the union's top two officers are subject to direct elections. The rest of the executive board will continue to be selected under the old rules that allowed a half-century of mob dominance. "Token democracy," Chris White, a bus driver from Fairbanks, Alabama, called the plan. White plans a symbolic "Dump Coia" campaign this year. But he doesn't stand a chance. Coia will have a hefty war chest to finance a national campaign. More importantly, he commands the loyalty of hundreds of local and regional officials. Dissidents say their only chance to gain any power is to pick off regions one at a time through direct elections of the executive board. But that won't happen for at least five years.


In an interview in his eighth-floor executive suite, Coia is a paradox. Dressed in a dark, chalk-striped shirt with French cuffs and sipping Evian water, he slips regularly into Providence street-talk. His position on reform at Laborers is also a paradox. First, he denies that there's much of a problem--only negligible "pockets of corruption," he says. Then he insists on getting the credit for the cleanup. "This is my process, my suggestion, my development, and my implementation of it," he says, growing animated," "Mine."

                                 EXHIBIT NO. 10
 

                                                                         L 00603
 

                                 EXHIBIT NO. 11
 

                            SUMMARY OF TRANSACTIONS
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
  DATE                               EVENT                           
---------------------------------------------------------------------
  1993    LIUNA loans $100,000 to President Clinton's Inaugural      
          Committee                                                  
  1993    LIUNA gives $100,000 to DNC                                
03/11/93  Coia becomes head of LIUNA                                 
03/26/93  Letter from Coia to White House                            
04/02/93  Letter from Coia to White House                            
04/08/93  Letter from White House to Coia                            
05/27/93  Letter from Coia to White House                            
06/93    Invite from White House to attend evening at White House   
06/16/93  Coia and wife attend White House for dinner and watch NBA   
          playoff game                                               
06/18/93  Letter from Coia to White House. Gift of autographed       
          basketball and Book of Psalms                              
06/28/93  Letter from White House to Coia                            
08/06/93  Letter from White House to Coia                            
08/31/93  Letter from Coia to White House                            
09/93    Invite from White House to attend Israeli-Palestinian peace
          signing                                                    
09/01/93  Coia and President Clinton attend Labor Day reception      
09/01/93  Letter from Coia to White House                            
09/10/93  Coia regrets 9/93 invite                                   
09/13/93  Letter from Coia to White House                            
09/16/93  Letter from Coia to White House                            
10/14/93  Coia and President Clinton attend DNC reception            
10/28/93  Invite from Coia to Mrs. Clinton to address 1994 Tri-Fund   
          conference                                                 
11/03/93  Invite from Coia to Mrs. Clinton to be guest at 1st annual
          Laborers' reception                                        
11/09/93  Letter from White House to Coia                            
11/12/93  Mrs. Clinton regrets 10/28 invite                          
11/19/93  Letter from Coia to White House                            
11/23/93  Mrs. Clinton regrets 11/3 invite                           
12/93    Invite from White House for 12/8 event                     
12/01/93  President and Mrs. Clinton host evening for DNC's managing
          trustees including Coia                                    
12/08/93  Coia attends Presidential Dinner/Holiday Reception         
12/08/93  Letter from Coia to White House. Includes gift of golf     
          balls and golf hat                                         
12/14/93  White House confirms 11/12 regrets                         
12/20/93  Letter from White House to Coia                            
12/28/93  Letter from Coia to White House                            
06/16/05  Coia donates $1,000 to President Clinton's Legal Defense   
          Fund                                                       
01/11/94  Letter from Coia to White House                            
01/21/94  Letter from White House to Coia                            
01/27/94  Letter from Coia to White House                            
01/31/94  Letter from White House to Coia                            
02/14/94  Letter from White House to Coia                            
02/16/94  Letter from White House to Coia                            
03/94    Invite from White House to attend 3/9 event                
03/94    LIUNA gives $100,000 to DNC                                
03/09/94  Coia attends Presidential Announcement Ceremony (re:       
          reemployment)                                              
04/94    Invite from White House to 4/19 event                      
04/19/94  Coia attends Presidential Dinner                           
05/94    Coia or LIUNA donates $50,000 to U.S. Botanic funds (as    
          part of $100,000 total gift)                               
05/94    Invite from White House to attend School-to-Work bill      
          signing                                                    
05/94    Invite from White House to greet Emperor of Japan          
05/94    Invite from White House to "First Ladies' Gala"            
05/04/94  Coia attends School-to-Work bill signing ceremony          
05/05/94  Letter from Coia to White House                            
---------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------
   05/11/94     Coia attends "First Ladies' Gala"                    
   05/12/94     Coia attends reception with President Clinton (type   
                and place unknown)                                   
   05/19/94     Letter from Coia to White House. Includes photo      
                discussed by Coia and First Lady                     
   05/26/94     Mrs. Clinton regrets unspecified invitation          
   05/31/94     Coia regrets on 5/94 (Emperor) invite                
    06/94       LIUNA gives $15,000 (White House memo lists only as  
                "federal")                                           
    06/94       LIUNA gives $15,000 (White House memo lists only as  
                "non federal")                                       
    06/94       Invite from White House to breakfast                 
   06/22/94     Coia co-hosts $1,500-a-plate dinner for DNC          
   06/28/94     Coia attend breakfast at White House                 
   06/29/94     Letter from Coia to White House                      
   06/30/94     Letter from Coia to White House                      
    07/94       LIUNA gives $100,000 (White House memo lists only as
                "non federal")                                       
    07/94?      Invite from Coia to First Lady to address 1995       
                Tri-Fund conference                                  
   07/07/94     Letter from White House to Coia                      
   07/14/94     Letter from White House to Coia                      
   07/15/94     Letter from White House to Coia                      
   07/19/94     Letter from Coia to White House                      
   07/21/94     Letter from Coia to White House                      
   08/03/94     Coia attends Health Care Bus Express Arrival         
   08/04/94     Letter from White House to Coia                      
   08/05/94     Invite from Coia to President Clinton to address a   
                labor event                                          
   08/10/94     Letter from Coia to White House                      
   08/16/94     Letter from White House to Coia                      
   08/26/94     White House regrets 8/5 invite                       
   09/01/94     Letter from Coia to White House                      
   09/30/94     Coia and President Clinton attend DNC Labor Council   
                breakfast                                            
    10/94       LIUNA gives $50,000 (White House memo lists only as  
                "non federal")                                       
   10/03/94     Letter from White House to Coia                      
   10/11/94     Letter from Coia to White House. Includes gift of    
                handmade golf shirt                                  
   10/20/94     Meeting between Coia and Clinton. Clinton presents   
                Coia with "Divine Nine"                              
   10/20/94     Coia and President Clinton attend DNC dinner         
   10/21/94     Letter from White House to Coia. Letter from Coia to
                White House                                          
  10/23/94?     Coia attends dinner at White House                   
   10/24/94     Letter from Coia to White House                      
10/94 or 11/94  Coia sends President Clinton a golf club             
    11/94       Invite from White House to 11/8 event                
   11/04/94     Letter from White House to Coia                      
   11/08/94     Coia attends Election Day Reception                  
   11/08/94     Letter from White House to Coia                      
   11/10/94     Coia attends Health Care reception                   
   12/16/94     Two letters from Coia to White House                 
   12/20/94     Two letters from Coia to White House                 
   01/25/94     Letter from Coia to White House                      
   02/06/95     Mrs. Clinton speaks at Tri-Fund conference           
   02/07/95     Letter from White House to Coia                      
   02/13/95     Letter from Coia to White House                      
   03/06/95     Letter from White House to Coia                      
   03/13/95     Letter from Coia to White House                      
   03/28/95     Letter from White House to Coia                      
   04/03/95     Coia regrets invite from Harold Ickes to join        
                President Clinton on trip to Haiti                   
    05/95       President Clinton and Coia attend Labor Council      
                reception                                            
   05/23/95     Letter from White House to Coia                      
   06/08/95     Invite from Coia to President Clinton to address     
                convention                                           
   06/16/95     White House regrets 6/8 invite                       
   09/11/95     Coia attends White House for DNC Business Leadership
                event                                                
---------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------
   05/11/94     Coia attends "First Ladies' Gala"                    
   05/12/94     Coia attends reception with President Clinton (type   
                and place unknown)                                   
   05/19/94     Letter from Coia to White House. Includes photo      
                discussed by Coia and First Lady                     
   05/26/94     Mrs. Clinton regrets unspecified invitation          
   05/31/94     Coia regrets on 5/94 (Emperor) invite                
    06/94       LIUNA gives $15,000 (White House memo lists only as  
                "federal")                                           
    06/94       LIUNA gives $15,000 (White House memo lists only as  
                "non federal")                                       
    06/94       Invite from White House to breakfast                 
   06/22/94     Coia co-hosts $1,500-a-plate dinner for DNC          
   06/28/94     Coia attend breakfast at White House                 
   06/29/94     Letter from Coia to White House                      
   06/30/94     Letter from Coia to White House                      
    07/94       LIUNA gives $100,000 (White House memo lists only as
                "non federal")                                       
    07/94?      Invite from Coia to First Lady to address 1995       
                Tri-Fund conference                                  
   07/07/94     Letter from White House to Coia                      
   07/14/94     Letter from White House to Coia                      
   07/15/94     Letter from White House to Coia                      
   07/19/94     Letter from Coia to White House                      
   07/21/94     Letter from Coia to White House                      
   08/03/94     Coia attends Health Care Bus Express Arrival         
   08/04/94     Letter from White House to Coia                      
   08/05/94     Invite from Coia to President Clinton to address a   
                labor event                                          
   08/10/94     Letter from Coia to White House                      
   08/16/94     Letter from White House to Coia                      
   08/26/94     White House regrets 8/5 invite                       
   09/01/94     Letter from Coia to White House                      
   09/30/94     Coia and President Clinton attend DNC Labor Council   
                breakfast                                            
    10/94       LIUNA gives $50,000 (White House memo lists only as  
                "non federal")                                       
   10/03/94     Letter from White House to Coia                      
   10/11/94     Letter from Coia to White House. Includes gift of    
                handmade golf shirt                                  
   10/20/94     Meeting between Coia and Clinton. Clinton presents   
                Coia with "Divine Nine"                              
   10/20/94     Coia and President Clinton attend DNC dinner         
   10/21/94     Letter from White House to Coia. Letter from Coia to
                White House                                          
  10/23/94?     Coia attends dinner at White House                   
   10/24/94     Letter from Coia to White House                      
10/94 or 11/94  Coia sends President Clinton a golf club             
    11/94       Invite from White House to 11/8 event                
   11/04/94     Letter from White House to Coia                      
   11/08/94     Coia attends Election Day Reception                  
   11/08/94     Letter from White House to Coia                      
   11/10/94     Coia attends Health Care reception                   
   12/16/94     Two letters from Coia to White House                 
   12/20/94     Two letters from Coia to White House                 
   01/25/94     Letter from Coia to White House                      
   02/06/95     Mrs. Clinton speaks at Tri-Fund conference           
   02/07/95     Letter from White House to Coia                      
   02/13/95     Letter from Coia to White House                      
   03/06/95     Letter from White House to Coia                      
   03/13/95     Letter from Coia to White House                      
   03/28/95     Letter from White House to Coia                      
   04/03/95     Coia regrets invite from Harold Ickes to join        
                President Clinton on trip to Haiti                   
    05/95       President Clinton and Coia attend Labor Council      
                reception                                            
   05/23/95     Letter from White House to Coia                      
   06/08/95     Invite from Coia to President Clinton to address     
                convention                                           
   06/16/95     White House regrets 6/8 invite                       
   09/11/95     Coia attends White House for DNC Business Leadership
                event                                                
---------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------
09/21/95  Letter from Coia to White House                            
10/06/95  Letter from Coia to White House                            
10/16/95  Coia sends President Clinton a LIUNA tie                   
11/17/95  Invite from Coia to President Clinton to attend Wolf Trap's
          25th Anniversary gala                                      
11/22/95  Letter from White House to Coia                            
12/06/95  Coia and President Clinton attend holiday reception        
01/11/96  White House regrets 11/17 invite                           
01/25/96  Letter from White House to Coia                            
01/26/96  Letter from White House to Coia                            
02/21/96  Letter from White House to Coia                            
03/96    Invite from White House to Italy State dinner              
03/26/96  Letter from Coia to White House                            
04/23/96  Letter from White House to Coia                            
05/10/96  Letter from White House to Coia                            
---------------------------------------------------------------------

     * Note: The term "White House" means the President, First Lady, or their
scheduling staff. It does not include the letters to/from Harold Ickes and
George Stephanopoulos among others. Dates with no specific day are approximate.
 
 

                                 EXHIBIT NO. 12
 


October 21, 1994


Mr. Arthur A. Coia


General President


Laborers' International Union


of North America


905 16th Street, N.W.


Washington, D.C. 20006-1765


Dear Arthur:


Thanks for the great golf shirt and the copy of your article in Northeast Golfer. I am also sorry that we did not have the chance to play golf together this season. You might have helped me break 80.


Your thoughtfulness and continued support mean a lot to me. Please give my best to Joanne.


Sincerely,


BC/DWB/EKS/ws (Corres. #1874160)


(10.coia.aa)


cc: WH Gifts

                                 EXHIBIT NO. 13
 

                                Donald L. Fowler
 

                         Democratic National Committee
 

            430 South Capitol Street, SE ?? Washington, D.C. 20003
 

                                 ILLEGIBLE LINE
 

                                 EXHIBIT NO. 14
 


Donald L. Fowler


National Chair

        Democratic Party Headquarters ?? 430 South Capitol Street, S.E
 

                           ?? Washington, D.C. 20003
 

                      202.863.8000 ?? FAX: 202.863.8174
 


Paid for by the Democratic National Committee. Contributions to the Democratic National Committee are not tax ILLEGIBLE WORD .

                                 EXHIBIT NO. 15
 

                                Donald L. Fowler
 

                      Chair, Democratic National Committee
 

            430 South Capitol Street, SE ?? Washington, D.C. 20003
 

                      (202)863-8121 ?? Fax (202)863-8174
 

                      Chair, Democratic National Committee
 

                                 EXHIBIT NO. 16
 

            430 South Capitol Street, SE ?? Washington, D.C. 20003
 

                      (202)863-8121 ?? Fax (202)863-8174
 


(1) "THE EDGE: Organized Crime, Business, and Labor Unions;" President's Commission on Organized Crime, 1986, p. 31.


(2) Ibid., pp. 30, 31.


(3) Testimony of Louis J. Freeh before the Senate Subcommittee on Technology and the Law, on March 18, 1994.


(4) See: "FBI: An Introduction to Organized Crime in the United States," July 1993.


(5) "The 50 Biggest Mafia Bosses," Fortune Magazine, November 10, 1986.


(6) See Exhibit 1 -- Excerpts from Draft Civil RICO Complaint at 1.


(7) Ibid.


(8) Ibid. at 32-33.


(9) Ibid. at 108-109.


(10) Ibid. at 152-155.


(11) See Exhibit 2.


(12) See Exhibit 3.


(13) Complaint Excerpts at 208.


(14) See Exhibit 4.


(15) See Exhibit 5.


(16) See Exhibit 6.


(17) See Exhibit 3.


(18) See Exhibit 7.


(19) See Exhibit 8.


(20) See Exhibit 2.


(21) See Exhibit 9.


(22) See Exhibit 10.


(23) See Exhibit 11.


(24) See Exhibit 12.


(25) See Exhibit 13.


(26) See Exhibit 14.


(27) See Exhibit 15.


(28) See Exhibit 16.


(29) See notes 92-111, infra, and accompanying text.


(30) See A Report, "The Administration's Efforts Against the Influence of Organized Crime in the laborers' International Union of North America," Subcommittee on Crime, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, 104th Cong., 2d Session, at p. 4 (hereinafter referred to as the "Majority Report").


(31) See notes 14-23, infra, and accompanying text.


(32) See note 14, infra, and accompanying text.


(33) See notes 14-23, infra, and accompanying text.


(34) See notes 25-26, infra, and accompanying text.


(35) See note 26, infra, and accompanying text.


(36) See note 17, infra, and accompanying text.


(37) See Majority Report, at 6; see note 27, infra, and accompanying text.


(38) See notes 28-34, infra, and accompanying text.


(39) See notes 35-75, infra, and accompanying text.


(40) See notes 40-44, infra, and accompanying text.


(41) See notes 76-111, infra, and accompanying text.


(42) See Majority Report.


(43) Republican Rep. John Boehner, Chairman, House Republican Conference, wrote his Republican Colleagues on March 28, 1996 that he was disturbed by " the action by Clinton appointees in the Justice Department to quash the efforts by Justice Department career prosecutors to clean up Coia's union ..."


(44) For example, on April 2, 1996, the House Republican Conference Chair issued a "report," titled, "Washington Union Bosses: A Look Behind the Rhetoric," claiming the "Washington Union Bosses" were "winning favor with the Clinton Administration to block Justice Department investigations into union boss corruption." More specifically, the Chair alleged that "Arthur Coia, President of the Laborers International Union of North America, recently received a 'sweetheart' deal from the Clinton DOJ Department of Justice in the face of a 212 page racketeering complaint." See House Republican Conference, Rep. Boehner Report, dated April 2, 1996, at pp. 12-13.


(45) The Republican House leadership asked House Staff "to cull all congressional committees for information" on three topics: (1) "waste, fraud and abuse in the Clinton Administration," (2) influence of Washington Labor Union Bosses/Corruption," and (3) "examples of dishonesty or ethical lapses in the Clinton Administration." See Reps. Walker and Nussle Memorandum, dated April 23, 1996, addressed to all Committee and Subcommittee Chairmen, asking them to "have your staff review pertinent GAO Reports, Inspector General reports or committee investigative materials or newspaper articles for departments and agencies within your jurisdiction that expose anecdotes that amplify these areas.".


(46) The Majority briefly discusses the settlement in the most conclusory and derogatory terms (see Majority Report), disregarding the context of the settlement, the reasons justifying the settlement, and the results achieved by the settlement. As these elements received such short shrift in the Majority's Report they are discussed in some detail below. See notes 76-111, infra, and accompanying text.


(47) Assistant Attorney General Jo Ann Harris was the only presidential appointee involved in the decision to settle, rather than prosecute, the Laborers. The Republican Leadership's remarks were thus directed at her, though she was unnamed. Her following remarks on this settlement, the four points she made on the second day of the congressional hearing, concisely and eloquently dispose of this question of direct (or indirect) influence:


"First, the resolution of the LIUNA Laborers' matter involved the approval by me Asst. AG Harris of a recommendation made by career prosecutors in the criminal division. I followed the advice of the seasoned lawyers who were assigned to the case. The recommendation to enter into the settlement was made to me by Mr. Paul Coffey, Chief of the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, and Mr. Jack Keeney, then Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Criminal Division -- two career prosecutors with a combined total of over 70 years of experience at the Department of Justice.


"I considered their advice to be sound at the time, and I consider it sound today. I did not direct, influence or attempt to influence the career attorneys in the Criminal Division to resolve the LIUNA Laborers' matter in any particular way. I always expected them to give me their best professional advice as to the appropriate disposition of matters that came to my attention, and the LIUNA case was treated no differently.


"Second, I had no contact with the White House before, during, or after my tenure as Assistant Attorney General regarding Arthur Coia, LIUNA Laborers , the decision to initiate a civil RICO prosecution against LIUNA, or the decision to settle the case. No one from the White House attempted to influence me in any way with respect to LIUNA.


"Third, neither the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, nor anyone from their staffs, ever directed or attempted to influence in any manner the outcome of the LIUNA matter.


"Finally, I did not feel any pressure from anyone to resolve the LIUNA Laborers' matter in any particular way. Matters such as purported political connections played no part in my actions in this case, and have never influenced my decision in any case." See Hearing Tr., July 25, 1996, at 111.


(48) See Hearing Tr., July 24, 1996, at pp. 60-61.


(49) See Hearing Tr., July 24, 1996, at p. 60.


(50) Id.


(51) See Majority Report.


(52) In April 1996, the Republican National Committee complained that the AFL-CIO had pledged to raise $35 million "to run negative ad against Republican members in 75 congressional districts." See Chairman Barbour's Memorandum to Republican Leaders, dated April 30, 1996.


(53) See Transcript, Evans and Novak, May 18, 1996.


(54) Id.


(55) See Letter of Messrs Gingrich, Hyde and others to Attorney General Meese, dated December 10, 1987.


(56) See Hearing Tr., July 24, 1996, at p. 95.


(57) See Hearing Tr., July 24, 1996, at p. 99.


(58) See Hearing Tr., July 24, 1996, at p. 107.


(59) Fino confided that members of Buffalo's organized crime family headed by Joseph Todaro forced Laborers' Local 210 to endorse then Rep. Jack Kemp (R.-N.Y.) over Democratic Councilman, James Keane. Fino said that members of the Local had already voted to endorse Keane, the Democrat, but "made" members of the Todaro crime family "found out about it and really put me to the wall." According to Fino, one top union leader asked, "Who the ... do you think you are?" Fino reportedly replied, "It's the way the members voted. It's their union." In response Fino was reportedly told, "Ronnie Fino ... r emember one thing, it's not their union." See Michael Beebe, "Ex-Local 210 official who aided probe sees vindication in deal to reform union," Buffalo News, February 19, 1995.


Fino alleged that Republican Vice-Presidential Kemp associated with mob associates and officials within the Laborers, who prior to the consent agreement, were involved in illegal activities. More specifically, this Republican-called witness alleged that Secretary Kemp claimed to have personal knowledge that certain named individuals were involved with organized crime, that alleged associates of organized crime contributed to Secretary Kemp's political campaigns, and that such persons benefitted from federal grants and contracts as a result of Secretary Kemp's efforts on their behalf. Further this Republican-called witness alleged that an allegedly prominent and well known organized crime figure supported a fund-raising event for Secretary Kemp. A 1988 Congressional Hearing confirmed that one of Secretary Kemp's contributors was tied to Envirosure Management Corp., a corporation linked to firms with alleged organized crime connections in Buffalo and Kansas City.


(60) See Rep. Conyers letter to Chairman Hyde, dated September 18, 1996, at p. 2.


(61) Id.


(62) See Viveca Novak, "Singing Another Tune," Time Magazine, September 30, 1996, at p. 16.


(63) See Commission Report, The Edge, at p. 30.


(64) Id.


(65) The Majority's Report quotes the Commission's concern about "appearances" in the Reagan Administration. See Majority Report. But the Majority left a gaping hole, and inserted instead an ellipsis, concealing:


(1) why the Commission was concerned about "appearances" in the first place, namely, because the Reagan Administration had delayed the Teamsters' investigation (see underscored language below following 1 ), and


(2) the Commission's admission that, notwithstanding these "appearances," the Commission had absolutely no proof the Reagan Administration had done anything improper (see underscored language following 2 below).


The Commission's complete statement on the subject of appearances was as follows:


"Even when there are no actual attempts to tamper with the prosecutorial process by using political power, certain political alliances and well-timed political contributions can create an appearance of impropriety. 1 In the current Administration, the long delays in reaching a resolution of a Department of Justice investigation concerning the IBT president Jack Presser have led to a similar concern -- whether Presser's support of the Administration in the 1980 and 1984 election campaigns influenced the conduct of the investigation. 2 Although the Commission did not conduct an investigation for any evidence of wrongdoing in the Presser investigations just described, it is convinced that the impact of such contacts can lead to an erosion of public confidence and dampen the desire to end racketeering. Organized crime is aware of this and purposefully seeks to cultivate and benefit from political influence" (the underlined material was left out in the Majority Report). See Commission Report, The Edge, at pp. 30-31.


(66) A photograph evidencing President Bush's "association" with Fosco was referred to as an exhibit during the first day of the congressional hearings. See Hearing Tr., July 24, 1996, at p. 5.


(67) A photograph evidencing former Senator Dole's "association" with Presser was referred to as an exhibit during the first day of the congressional hearings. See Hearing Tr., July 24, 1996, at p. 5.


(68) See Hearing Tr., July 25, 1996, at p. 194.


(69) See Hearing Tr., July 25, 1996, at p. 166.


(70) See Hearing Tr., July 25, 1996, at p. 178.


(71) Id.


(72) See Hearing Tr., July 25, 1996, at p. 167.


(73) See Majority Report.


(74) Id.


(75) See Hearing Tr., July 25, 1996, at pp. 162-163.


(76) See Hearing Tr., July 25, 1996, at pp. 163, 179.


(77) The document, read into the record in party by the Crime Subcommittee Chair said, "Caution should be exercised in discussing information relating to this matter as any disclosure of the investigation could jeopardize the investigation." See Hearing Tr., July 25, 1996, at p. 162.


(78) See Hearing Tr., July 25, 1996, at pp. 161-163.


(79) This is not the only presidential note that concerned the Majority. The President wrote another note thanking Mr. Coia for a golf club. The Majority thought it was significant that this happened on the same day the draft civil RICO complaint was forwarded to the Laborers. The Majority took the conjunction of these two events, the exchange of the note and the forwarding of the civil RICO complaint on the same day, as evidence that the relationship between the President and Mr. Coia was "flourish ing ." See Majority Report. During the hearing, Rep. Melvin L. Watt wondered aloud how close the President and Mr. Coia were, "whether they were real good friends ... when he the President wrote him Coia a note thanking him for the driver and the Government served a complaint on him Coia on the same day -- laughter --I had to conclude that they must have been ace buddies." See Hearing Tr., July 25, 1996, at p. 184. If anything, this shows the President had no idea what Justice had planned, nor did he interfere.


(80) See Majority Report.


(81) See Hearing Tr., July 24, 1996, at p. 67. See also Racketeering Section Chief Coffey's testimony, id., p. 127.


(82) See Hearing Tr., July 24, 1996, at p. 162.


(83) See Hearing Tr., July 25, 1996, at p. 113.


(84) See Hearing Tr., July 25, 1996, at p. 123.


(85) See Hearing Tr., July 25, 1996, at p. 135.


(86) See Majority Report (repeated references) and 31, and Exhibit 3.


(87) See Hearing Tr., July 25, 1996, at p. 125.


(88) See Hearing Tr., July 25, 1996, at p. 127.


(89) See Majority Report.


(90) See Hearing Tr., July 24, 1996, at p. 68.


(91) See Hearing Tr., July 24, 1996, at p. 74.


(92) See Hearing Tr., July 25, 1996, at p. 141.


(93) See Majority Report.


(94) See Special Counsel John Flannery's Notes, Ross Interview, dated July 10, 1996, at p. 189 et seq.


(95) See Hearing Tr., July 24, 1996, at p. 73.


(96) See Hearing Tr., July 25, 1996, at p. 142.


(97) See Majority Report.


(98) See Majority Report.


(99) See Draft RICO Complaint, 14.a, at pp. 32-33.


(100) See Majority Report.


(101) See note 27, supra, and accompanying text.


(102) See notes 85-91, infra, and the accompanying text.


(103) See Hearing Tr., July 24, 1996, at pp. 70, 73.


(104) The recent Crime Subcommittee's hearings by comparison, taking less than two full days, involving only 11 witnesses and failing to call the most obvious witness, the Laborers' President Arthur Coia, despite the fact that it was his conduct that was the focus of the hearing and Mr. Coia said, by his counsel, he would voluntarily appear and testify.


(105) See generally, R. Kennedy, THE ENEMY WITHIN (Popular Library ed. 1960)


(106) See President's Commission on Organized Crime, Report to the President and the Attorney General, "The Edge: Organized Crime, Business and Labor Unions," at p. 6 (hereinafter "Commission Report, The Edge, p. __").


(107) "Although LIUNA has not achieved the notoriety of the Teamster's Union, it is nevertheless a union with clear ties to organized crime." See Commission Report, The Edge, p. 162. The Commission Report cited four key unions with histories of control or influence by organized crime: the International Longshoremen's Association, the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees International Union, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, and the Laborers International Union of North America.


(108) See Commission Report, The Edge, at p. 6.


(109) The Majority Report refers to 19 civil RICO cases, see Majority Report, apparently to demonstrate how "easy" it is for Justice to file and win a civil RICO case. But it's not that simple. The Majority has consistently failed to appreciate the truly significant difference in scale and difficulty, both as a matter of law and of proof, between prosecuting a civil RICO case against a single local union (almost every one of the 19 cases) and a civil RICO case against an International that itself encompasses many locals. For example, in the case of the Laborers' International, the Laborers has 60 District Councils and more than 500 locals. It seems obvious just from these statistics that a civil RICO prosecution against a local is a relatively simpler matter than against an International. For a discussion of the specific concerns that the U.S. Attorney had in the Laborers' case, see note 25, infra, and the accompanying text. It is instructive that there was only one civil RICO case involving an International, the Teamsters case, before the Justice Department focussed on the Laborers International. It is hardly a break with tradition, as the Majority suggests, to learn from the first and only prosecution of an International, the Teamsters, and to apply those lessons to the very next prosecution, the Laborers.


(110) See Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1964-1968.


(111) See Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1961-1963.


(112) See Letter of Messrs Gingrich, Hyde and others to Attorney General Meese, dated December 10, 1987. For the relevant excerpt from letter, see note 27, supra, and the accompanying text.


(113) The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations issued a report in 1990, "Federal Government's Use of the RICO Statute and Other Efforts Against Organized Crime," at p. 13, commenting disapprovingly of the fact that:


"each trusteeship is tailored by the court to meet individual union or business needs and to address specific problems of corruption and thus the nature of trusteeships imposed can vary greatly. In the most extreme case, the trustee may be responsible for day to day operations and report directly to the court. In other instances, the court may elect to leave the existing leadership of the organization in place, but grant broad powers to a court-appointed official to monitor their activities."


(114) The P.S.I. Report concluded:


"Absent some clear cut limitations on the use of this remedy, there is a valid public concern that the tremendous power which the statute offers may be abused." Id., at p. 33.


(115) The P.S.I. Report provided: "In the case of labor unions, the Department of Justice should study and consider the feasibility and potential effectiveness of alternative remedies for the Government, short of the imposition of a civil RICO trusteeship. A trusteeship is clearly an extreme remedy in the case of a labor union in that it entails the removal of the elected officers of the union. A non-elected, court-appointed trustee is installed to run the day-to-day operations of the union.... As a preferable alternative, these labor witnesses suggested other methods, including those available under the Landrum-Griffin Act, by which Government monitoring of union activities is substantially increased, while the union's elected officers retain their positions" (emphasis supplied). Id., at p. 34.


(116) The Report stated that: "In fact, in at least three of the cases where the Government had originally sought a trusteeship (Local 814, Local 30/30B, and the IBT cases), the reorganization ultimately imposed allowed elected union officers to retain their positions." Id., at p. 34.


(117) In the case of Teamsters, Local 560, in Newark, the Genovese Crime Family had dominated that local for about 30 years and used Anthony "Tony Pro" Provenzano, Nunzio Provenzano and the Provenzano regime within the Local to maintain their control following a pattern of violence and extortion. The government got rid of Tony Pro but got his alter ego instead:


"After 20 months of trusteeship, an election was held on December 6, 1988. For the first time since 1965, there were three slates of candidates. Sixty two percent of the membership voted and elected a slate allegedly tied to the Provenzanos. In view of the election outcome, some have suggested that the Local 560 Trusteeship was demonstrably a failure." See PSI'S "Federal Government's Use of the RICO Statute and Other Efforts Against Organized Crime," at p. 19.


(118) The Majority's Report implied there hadn't been any "congressional scrutiny," see Majority Report, blithely disregarding the highly critical remarks of congressional leaders including the Speaker and Judiciary Chair and the P.S.I. hearings that adduced highly critical observations and conclusions regarding civil RICO. See notes 27, and 85-91, supra, and accompanying text.


(119) See Majority Report.


(120) "The President's Commission believes there is little chance that the LIUNA membership will be able to eliminate organized crime's influence, or control their union, if a the current leadership or b governance structure remains intact. The Commission believes that federal law enforcement agencies should give high priority to investigations of LIUNA and its locals." See Commission Report, The Edge.


(121) "On the international level organized crime exerts its influence principally through top officers who are associates of organized crime. This judgement is supported by surveillance of LIUNA General President Angelo Fosco meeting with members of the Chicago La Cosa Nostra group known to its members as the 'Outfit'." See Commission Report, The Edge, at p. 146.


(122) In 1981, in Chicago, relying on a government informant named Joseph Hauser, the government prosecuted Angelo Fosco, mob bosses Tony Accardo and Al Pilotto, and others, claiming they had set up insurance companies and induced LIUNA locals to funnel business to them. Then Fosco and the others allegedly looted the pool of assets generated by the high insurance premiums. Supposedly President Fosco received kickbacks from the business. Both Fosco and Accardo were acquitted but not Pilotto, president of LIUNA Local 5.


(123) See generally Civil Rico Complaint, 14, at p. 38 et seq.


(124) 18 U.S.C. 1961(5) defines a pattern of racketeering activity as "at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity."


(125) Paul Coffey, Chief, Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, Justice said it was "for the purpose of protecting persons who have provided us the government with information during the investigation leading to this complaint." See Coffey correspondence to Connerton, Ray & Simon, dated November 4, 1994.


(126) U.S. Attorney Jim Burns had no concerns that the complaint was made in good faith but, as he explained, every litigation has its risk and he had "lingering concerns" about venue, the predicates and who was alive and who was dead; Paul Coffey, the Department's Organized Crime Chief, was not concerned. See Special Counsel notes, Burns interview, dated July 8, 1996, at p. 154 et seq. AUSA Tom Walsh, Chief, Civil Division, ND of Illinois, said a lot of the predicate convictions necessary to this RICO suit involved Local or District Councils and not the International and that concerned him as well. See Special Counsel John Flannery's notes, Walsh interview, dated July 8, 1996, at p 160 et seq. The Majority has never appreciated the subtle but significant difficulty this threshold question raised for the prosecution of any civil RICO prosecution of the Laborers. See note 81, supra, and accompanying text.


(127) "One of LIUNA's vice presidents is John Serpico. Serpico is also president of LIUNA Local 8 in Chicago. In testimony before the commission in 1985, Serpico admitted that he is a friend or personal acquaintance of virtually every important organized crime leader in Chicago ... Serpico also knows several LCN territorial bosses ... including Vincent Solano, president of LIUNA Local 1...." Commission Report, The Edge, at pp. 146-147.


(128) See Draft Civil RICO Complaint, U.S. v. Laborers' International Union of North America, AFL-CIO, et al., 14(d), at p. 34 (hereinafter "Draft Civil RICO Complaint, __, at p. __").


(129) See Draft Civil RICO Complaint, 14(a), at p. 33. Special Agent Mike Ross compared the strength of the evidence as between Serpico and Caivano in response to questions from the majority and minority staff. Ross was of the view, particularly after his experience with the Teamsters RICO case, that, informants alone were not enough to oust a union leader; it was necessary to have wiretaps and surveillance. As to Coia, he said, they had three "sources" and "two of the three had credibility problems." See Special Counsel John Flannery's notes, Ross interview, dated July 10, 1996, at p. 189 et seq.


(130) The Quayle/Starr Report said: "America has become a litigious society. In 1989 nearly 18 million new civil cases were filed in the state and federal courts. This amounts to one civil lawsuit for every ten adults. In the federal courts alone, the number of (civil) lawsuits filed each year has almost tripled in the last thirty years -- from approximately 90,000 in 1960 to more than 250,000 in 1990. This dramatic growth in litigation carries with it very high costs for the US economy. A recent article in Forbes estimates that individuals, businesses and governments spend more than $80 billion a year on direct litigation costs . . . and a total of up to $300 billion indirectly. *  *  * Moreover t he current procedural system e.g., discovery abuse adds costs by prolonging resolution of disputes and encouraging wasteful litigation." See Report from the President's Council on Competitiveness: Agenda for Civil Justice Reform in America (August 1991).


(131) The Report stated: "The federal district and appellate caseloads have skyrocketed in the past decade, creating endless delays and adding substantially to the cost of litigation." Id., at __.


(132) See notes 87-88, supra, and accompanying text.


(133) General Executive Board (G.E.B.), the Board of the International.


(134) Coffey correspondence to Luskin, cc: Sullivan, dated December 14, 1994, w/ consent decree attached. See Draft Consent Decree, at p. 3 (under heading, "Purpose and Summary", 2.)


(135) See Draft Consent Decree, at p. 8 (under heading, "Union Action: Status of Current GEB Members," 14(e).


(136) See Consent Agreement, dated February 13, 1995, 1.


(137) Id.


(138) See Consent Agreement, dated February 13, 1995, 2.


(139) See Hearing Tr., July 24, 1996, at p. 61.


LANGUAGE: English

SUBJECT:  UNIONS (99%); ORGANIZED CRIME (99%); LAWYERS (98%); CAMPAIGNS & ELECTIONS (96%); ATTORNEYS GENERAL (96%); EVIDENCE (96%); WITNESSES (96%); EMPLOYEE BENEFITS (95%); TESTIMONY (95%); BALLOTS (94%); SUBPOENAS (94%); FRAUD & FINANCIAL CRIME (93%); BRIBERY (92%); CANDIDATES (92%); ATTORNEYS FEES (92%); LABOR DISPUTES & NEGOTIATIONS (91%); CONFLICTS OF INTEREST (91%); EYEWITNESSES (91%); SENTENCING (91%); SOCIAL WELFARE (91%); MISCONDUCT (86%); SETTLEMENTS & DECISIONS (86%); JURISDICTION (85%); ETHICS (74%); LITIGATION (72%); INJUNCTIONS (72%); BUSINESS LIABILITY (71%); EXECUTIVE ORDERS (71%); VIOLENT CRIME (69%); CAMPAIGN FINANCE (69%); EXTORTION (68%); EMPLOYMENT (68%); DRUG RELATED CRIME (59%); VOTERS AND VOTING (59%); BURDEN OF PROOF (59%); JUDGES (59%); STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (59%); REAL ESTATE INDUSTRY (59%); SPORTS (59%); 

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