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Laborers for JUSTICE presents the House Judiciary Committee report on
ADMINISTRATION'S EFFORTS AGAINST THE
INFLUENCE OF ORGANIZED CRIME IN THE
LABORERS' INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH AMERICA
January 2, 1997
I. Executive Summary
The forces of organized crime, particularly La Cosa Nostra, have inflicted
immeasurable harm on every American, from the price of goods in a store to the
presence of drugs on the streets. The mob routinely targets labor unions and
brings untold damage on rank-and-file workers by, among other things, stealing
their jobs for well-placed friends, forcing them to pay unnecessary fees, and
stealing from their pension and welfare trust funds.
The mob-busters at the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Department of Labor
(DOL), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) decided in 1991, during the
Bush Administration, to begin an all-out attack against the influence of
organized crime within the Laborers' International Union of
North America (LIUNA), a union with a membership that exceeds 700,000
individuals. In preparation for its attack, DOJ, with the assistance of DOL and
the FBI, compiled over one million pages of evidence. This documentation stood
as the backbone for the 212-page civil racketeering complaint against LIUNA and
a number of its officers, including the union's General President, Arthur A.
Coia.
In the complaint, Mr. Coia is identified as an individual who "has
associated with and been controlled and influenced by, organized crime
figures," associated "with members of the New England La Cosa Nostra
for a substantial period of time," and for three years with his father
received kickbacks that were shared with Raymond Patriarca, head of the New
England Crime Family.
Meanwhile, Mr. Coia, shortly after becoming the General President of LIUNA in
March 1993, also became a professional, social and personal friend of the
President and First Lady of the United States. Despite repeated notice to the
White House by DOJ, DOL, and the FBI, including an FBI memorandum to the White
House Counsel's office which stated, "Coia is a criminal associate of the
New England Patriarca organized crime family," the relationship between Mr.
Coia, the President and First Lady continued to grow.
The Federal Government's decades-long fight against mob corruption in labor
unions took a historic turn in early 1995. In 19 previous cases, the Department
of Justice filed and won civil anti-racketeering (RICO) complaints in federal
court. Independent monitors were appointed to rid the unions of organized crime
control.
But in February of 1995, the Department switched to a new mob-busting technique
-- self-policing. In the case against LIUNA, DOJ reached a settlement with the
union and its president which allowed a team chosen by LIUNA to undertake the
task of cleaning out mobsters from the union. A retired senior FBI official was
named as inspector general, a former organized crime prosecutor and LIUNA lawyer
was hired to be the prosecutor, and a former U.S. attorney was retained to be
the judge. To date, many LIUNA members associated with the mob have been
expelled from the union. In addition, LIUNA signed a consent decree which allows
DOJ to file the RICO complaint at any point and have an independent monitor
appointed.
While the settlement has produced positive results, troubling questions remain.
First and foremost, Arthur Coia, LIUNA's politically well-connected president,
is still in charge, despite being characterized by the head of DOJ's Organized
Crime and Racketeering Section as a "mob puppet." In late 1994, after
receiving the 212-page RICO complaint filled with allegations of wrongdoing
leveled against him, Mr. Coia faced the ordeal of battling to save his job
against a court-appointed monitor. Now he appears stronger than ever. Mr. Coia
went from being characterized as a "mob puppet" in 1994 to President
Clinton's head table at a multi-million dollar, black-tie fundraising dinner
sponsored by the Democratic National Committee earlier this year.
Second, Mr. Coia's lawyers argue that DOJ has promised not to "pull the
plug" on the internal clean-up process unless the union acts in bad faith.
They may attempt to litigate for breach of contract if DOJ files the consent
decree.
Third, President Clinton maintained a strong personal relationship with Arthur
Coia even as the Justice Department zeroed in on the union president. White
House officials ignored repeated notifications by law enforcement officials of
Mr. Coia's connection to organized crime. These coexistent facts -- namely 1)
that Mr. Coia is one of the biggest financial supporters of the Administration
and 2) that he has escaped from the clutches of the Justice Department --
present a disturbing appearance of conflicting interests. This appearance, at
the very least, severely undermines the public's confidence in the integrity of
the justice system.
II. Introduction
Ten years ago, the President's Commission on Organized Crime (PCOC) identified
organized crime as a plague on society that had to be surgically and
meticulously excised from legitimate institutions. It also identified what came
to be known as the "Bad Four," the four most corrupt unions in
America: the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT), the Longshoremen, the
Hotel Employees and Restaurant Workers, and the Laborers'
International Union of North America.
Since then, the Federal Government has spent tens of millions of tax dollars to
rid these and other unions of mob control. Federal prosecutors chose the civil
remedies of the federal anti-racketeering statute (RICO) as the legal mechanism
to accomplish this mission because it was crafted for the specific purpose of
excising organized crime from legitimate institutions. In 19 civil RICO cases
over the past decade, the Department of Justice has won 19 times.
And then came LIUNA and Arthur Coia. After years of work and the preparation of
a 212-page civil RICO complaint supported by millions of pages of documents, the
Justice Department made a historic law enforcement concession. It reached a
settlement with LIUNA which turned the mob-busting mission over to the union
itself.
Such a change in direction deserves congressional scrutiny. Given the severe
harm inflicted on America by organized crime, the general public, including
law-abiding union members in particular, deserves to know whether such a shift
in policy is consistent with the interests of public safety. Moreover,
maintaining public confidence in the integrity of the criminal justice system is
vital to public order. Yet, the circumstances surrounding the LIUNA settlement
have severely threatened public confidence.
In its 1986 report, the PCOC criticized then President Reagan for associating
with and accepting political support from Teamsters' President Jackie Presser
while the Department of Justice was investigating racketeering activities within
the IBT. (1) The Commission noted that personal relationships between political
officials and union officials connected to organized crime can undermine public
confidence in the criminal justice system. The Commission observed:
Even when there are no actual attempts to tamper with the prosecutorial process
by using political power, certain political alliances and well-timed political
contributions can create an appearance of impropriety.... The Commission...is
convinced that the impact of such contacts can lead to an erosion of public
confidence and dampen the desire to end racketeering. (2)
This is clearly the same issue at stake in the saga of the Federal Government's
enforcement of anti-racketeering laws against the Laborers'
International Union of North America. Two points are indisputable: 1) in 1994,
the Department of Justice was closing in on LIUNA and Mr. Coia after years of
investigation; and 2) at the very same time, Mr. Coia had established himself as
a major political force within the Democratic party and built a personal
relationship with the President and the First Lady. The extensive media
attention paid to this matter is evidence enough of the troubling connection
between these facts.
On July 23 and 24, 1996, the Subcommittee on Crime of the Committee on the
Judiciary conducted a two-day hearing entitled, "The Administration's
Efforts Against the Influence of Organized Crime in the Laborers'
International Union of North America (LIUNA)." During the course of the
two-day hearing, the Subcommittee heard from a total of eleven witnesses. These
witnesses included high ranking DOJ officials, organized crime experts, and the
former business manager of LIUNA Local 210 who was an eyewitness of organized
crime control within the union. Prior to the hearing, the Subcommittee
interviewed more than fifty individuals and reviewed hundreds of documents. Mr.
Coia did not testify because his attorney refused to allow the bipartisan
subcommittee staff to interview Mr. Coia prior to the hearing. It is standard
procedure in oversight hearings that witnesses be interviewed before testifying
publicly. Indeed, all eleven hearing witnesses agreed to be and were interviewed
before testifying.
The Crime Subcommittee's investigation focused on the connection between the
Justice Department's actions and Mr. Coia's privileged position. While the facts
gathered to date do not reveal a direct connection, serious concerns exist about
the propriety of the White House's extensive dealings with someone who was
simultaneously battling federal prosecutors.
The PCOC's warnings regarding the erosion of public confidence apply squarely to
the LIUNA case. Millions of tax dollars were spent in pursuit of organized crime
influences within LIUNA. Instead of seeking an independent court-appointed
monitor to clean-up the union, the Justice Department gave this responsibility
to the union and reserved the option of going to court if the self-policing
approach was unsatisfactory. The Administration should have expected that such a
change in direction would give rise to careful scrutiny.
Many will argue that the Department's decision has given Mr. Coia not just a new
lease on life within LIUNA but, ironically, a unique opportunity to strengthen
his hold on the union. Rivals have been removed through the clean- up efforts
that have occurred and Mr. Coia's continued leadership presents the image of a
reformer rather than the man once described by a senior Justice official as a
"mob puppet."
Of course, the Justice Department and LIUNA officials strongly disagree. They
assert that Mr. Coia is precariously situated at the present time because he is
subject to continuous investigation by the LIUNA enforcement team. The
Department will "pull the plug" on the enforcement team and take the
union to court if Mr. Coia fails to comply with various demands.
Only time will tell if the taxpayers have been well served. It is regrettable,
however, that while the nation waits, a cloud of suspicion, emanating from the
apparently conflicting actions of the Administration, hangs over the entire
matter.
III. Background
A. Organized Crime in America
For too long, organized crime has had a choke hold on society. It is a problem
affecting every man, woman and child in the United States. In 1994, Louis J.
Freeh, Director of the FBI, testified before the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary as follows:
In the 1986 report called 'The Impact: Organized Crime Today,' the President's
Commission on Organized Crime...estimate(d) the cost of organized crime on the
economy, in terms of sustained higher prices and the continued underpayment of
taxes to the federal government. The Commission concluded that the estimated
economy-wide impact of organized crime, excluding drug trafficking
organizations, was as follows:
output was reduced by $18.2 billion in 1986 dollars,
employment was reduced by 414,000 jobs;
Consumer prices were higher by 0.3 percent; and
Per capita personal income was lower by $77.22, measured in 1986 dollars.
Director Freeh further noted that "although figures abound with regard to
the billions of dollars in federal, state, and local seizures of drugs, illegal
drug proceeds (cash and other assets), etc. the fundamental harm to society is
incalculable." (3)
The destructive nature of organized crime was similarly described at the
Subcommittee's two-day hearing. Outlining the harmful impact of organized crime
from his own personal experience, James Moody, the recently retired Deputy
Assistant Director of the Organized Crime, Drug and Criminal Intelligence Branch
of the FBI's Criminal Investigations Division, reported to the Subcommittee that
there are currently about 2000 La Cosa Nostra (LCN) members in the United
States. He went on to report that each member has about ten associates, meaning
that about 22,000 people throughout the United States are actively engaged in
loan-sharking, prostitution, pornography, extortion, drug trafficking, fraud,
gambling, bribery, racketeering and, of course, murder.
B. Organized Crime and Labor Unions
Mr. Moody and other witnesses confirmed that the customary targets of organized
crime are labor unions. According to the FBI, the close relationship which has
historically existed between organized crime and labor is based on several
factors Specifically, unions enable organizations like the LCN to:
convert financial resources, such as members' dues, union assets, or worker
benefit funds to the mob's own use (There are over $115 billion in some 4,500
union benefit funds in the U.S., and a large local may have as much as $200
million in its retirement fund);
use union dues to exact payoffs from businesses in the form of sweetheart
contracts or strike insurance;
influence an entire market, through various bribes and payoffs with union money,
as part of a general market corruption scheme; and
gain access to and protection from the political and governmental process.
Corrupt, LCN-influenced union authorities dictate their wishes to political
figures, tempting them with substantial campaign contributions and union voting
power. (4)
Edward McDonald, chief of the federal Organized Crime Strike Force in Brooklyn,
once characterized the correlation between organized crime and labor unions as
follows:
A corrupt union is a profit center. It offers almost unlimited opportunities for
extortion through the use of "ghosts" (fictitious workers and
"no-shows" -- employees who do not come to work) and the threat of
slowdowns. Mobcontrolled unions and labor-leasing companies supply security
guards for nuclear power plants, garbage collectors for most New York City
office buildings, and truck drivers for Shell Oil, Coca-Cola, and International
Paper, among many others. A union can be used instead of a gun or a baseball
bat. (5)
In its final report to President Reagan in 1986, the PCOC identified the four
largest unions that were infiltrated by organized crime. These four unions,
which became known as the "Big Four," are the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, the Longshoremen, the Hotel Employees and Restaurant
Employees Union, and LIUNA.
In connection with the PCOC's findings, Clark Hall, who held the position of an
acting unit chief and supervisory agent at the FBI, stated at the Subcommittee's
hearing the following with regard to unions and organized crime:
The higher levels of the Big Four have been so pervasively corrupted in the
past...that, indeed each of those presidents of each of those Big Four
international unions were hand-picked by La Cosa Nostra. There is no question
whatsoever.
In fact, the corruptive influence of organized crime in LIUNA has been so
extensive that, according to Mr. Moody, a successful prosecution of an
individual union officer has resulted in the union replacing such officer with
another mob figure, a frustrating fact for dedicated law enforcement officials.
C. Organized Crime, LIUNA and Arthur Coia
LIUNA was established in 1903, and has a membership that exceeds 700,000
individuals. It is comprised of 60 district councils and more than 5000 local
district offices, and, according to the Department of Justice, has long been a
tool of corrupt union officials acting in concert with members of organized
crime families.
Since March of 1993, Arthur A. Coia has served as LIUNA's General President Mr.
Coia won the position of General President after the death of Angelo Fosco, a
well known associate of organized crime. Mr. Coia joined LIUNA, with his
father's help, in 1957, and held numerous positions within LIUNA prior to
becoming the General President. Over the past 40 years, Mr. Coia has served as
the Vice President of Local 271, the Assistant Regional Manager of New England,
the Business Manager of the Rhode Island District Council and the General
Secretary-Treasurer of the International Union. His father was also an associate
of the mob according to the Justice Department.
During the Subcommittee's investigation, LIUNA went to great lengths, including
full page newspaper ads, to assert that Mr. Coia is leading the union through a
process of honest reform. The information gathered by the Subcommittee provides
ample justification for any objective observer to remain skeptical. The
Subcommittee received a significant amount of information indicating that Mr.
Coia was influenced and controlled by organized crime. Much of this information
was provided by credible law enforcement officials, including officials in the
Justice Department and the FBI.
In 1994, the Justice Department, with the assistance of the Department of Labor
and the FBI, prepared a 212-page civil racketeering complaint which it intended
to file against LIUNA. In the complaint, DOJ asserts that the action was brought
against LIUNA and others for the following reasons:
...to rid the union of domination and influence by members and associates of
organized crime. LIUNA has been infiltrated at all levels by corrupt individuals
and organized crime figures who have exploited their control and influence over
the union for personal gain and to the detriment of the union and its members.
LIUNA union officials and employees at all levels, including the general
presidency, have been chosen, subject to the approval of, and have been
controlled by, various members and associates of organized crime. (6)
That same complaint identifies individuals who were both members of LIUNA and of
LCN With regard to Mr. Coia, the complaint includes the following allegations:
Mr. Coia has "associated with, and been controlled and influenced by,
organized crime figures;" (7)
Mr. Coia was associating with members of the New England La Cosa Nostra for a
substantial period of time. Mr. Coia was a defendant in a case involving a scam
whereby they would loot the health and welfare benefit funds in 1980. The case
was dismissed because the statute of limitations had run; (8)
Mr. Coia and his father received kickbacks for three years from Joseph Hauser
and Farmer's National Life Insurance Co. with the intent to influence their
actions concerning the Rhode Island Laborers' District Counsel
Health and Welfare Fund and the Rhode Island Laborers' Heavy
and Highway Health and Welfare Benefit Fund for the purchase of group life
insurance. They shared their kickbacks with Raymond Patriarca, the head of the
New England Crime Family; (9) and
Mr. Coia and others attempted to induce upstate locals to surrender control of
their education and training funds. Mr. Coia and others were conspiring to
obtain property under false pretenses. (10)
Along with the complaint, the testimony of long-term civil servants from the
Department of Justice and the FBI, the same people whose credibility LIUNA now
relies upon in defense of its settlement with the government, raised serious
allegations against Arthur Coia. Michael Ross, a supervisory agent at the FBI,
advised the White House in an October, 1994, memorandum that "Coia is a
criminal associate of the New England Patriarca organized crime family."
(11) Explaining his characterization of Mr. Coia in the memorandum to the
Subcommittee, Mr. Ross stated that Mr. Coia "is a person we feel has,
through their past associations, shown a nexus and an affiliation with the LCN,
and that's why we classified him as an LCN associate." When asked if he
still stands by this characterization, Mr. Ross said that he did.
A similar characterization was offered by Mr. Moody. He stated that in his
opinion Mr. Coia could not have become president of LIUNA without LCN approval.
Finally, Paul Coffey, the head of the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section
(OCRS) at DOJ and the lead prosecutor in the LIUNA case, said in a 1994
memorandum that Mr. Coia was a "mob puppet." (12) Indeed, federal law
enforcement officials felt so strongly about Mr. Coia's mob connections that the
draft complaint's demand for relief included a request that various named
defendants, including Arthur Coia, be enjoined:
...from participating in, or having any future dealings of any nature whatsoever
with any officer, agent, representative or employee of LIUNA or any other labor
organization about any matter which related directly or indirectly, to the
affairs of LIUNA or any other labor organization, and from owning or operating
any business which employee members of LIUNA or any of its subordinate bodies in
the Northern District of Illinois or elsewhere. (13)
In addition to the extensive allegations against Mr. Coia in the complaint,
which was supported by thousands of documents, and the testimony of law
enforcement officials, the Subcommittee also received testimony from a former
LIUNA member and business manager of LIUNA Local 210. Ronald Fino testified at
length during the hearing regarding the mob, its influence upon LIUNA members,
and Mr. Coia's relationship with organized crime.
Mr. Fino, the son of a mob associate and a highly regarded DOJ informant,
painted a grim picture of the negative impact that organized crime has upon
members of organized labor. He discussed the "new look" of mob
associates and his personal relationship and experiences with Mr. Coia. Mr. Fino
noted, "Constituents, relatives, associates, and cronies of the mob would
be and are always first in line when plush working assignments were and are
handed out." As for organized crime's control of union leadership, Mr. Fino
stated the following:
control and policy-making and the appointments throughout the infrastructure of
the Laborers' International Union lay with the Cosa Nostra. You
could not become a general president nor an international officer of LIUNA
without mob approval. This doesn't mean that each and every official is aware of
the heavy hand that dictates that official's each and every move.
With regard to the "new look" of the mob, Mr. Fino said the following:
Many creative members and associates of the Cosa Nostra are no longer adorned in
the fedoras, and you will find that they are well-educated and take full
advantage of that education and the moneys that they have accumulated. Today you
will find that the mob is as reliant on the public relations firms as it is with
its high-powered attorneys and accountants. Projecting an image of goodness and
popping up at charitable fund-raising functions, combined with a voice for
social justice, the racketeer builds a formidable defense against prosecution by
the Justice Department and prosecution.
Mr. Fino described for the Subcommittee, under oath, his first-hand, personal
and frequent contact with Mr. Coia. Estimating that he saw Mr. Coia 25-30 times
annually, Mr. Fino talked of dinners, golf games and other business and social
functions that he attended with Mr. Coia during the 1980s.
One conversation between Mr. Fino and Mr. Coia occurred at a time when Mr. Fino
was considering running for the position of international vice-president.
Because of this interest, Mr. Fino decided to speak to his friend and
influential member of LIUNA's General Executive Board, Arthur Coia. Mr. Fino
recounted discussing with Mr. Coia the need for mob approval of Mr. Fino's
appointment to the Board. In particular, Mr. Fino said that he and Mr. Coia
discussed Joseph Todaro, Sr., the boss of the Buffalo LCN family, and John
Riggi, the boss of the DeCalvacante faction of the Genovese family. At the
conclusion of that conversation, Mr. Coia told Mr. Fino that he was to listen to
whatever mob member Joe Todaro told him, relaying the fact that "you know
as well as I do where those decisions are going to be made."
IV. The Administration's Enforcement Efforts Against LIUNA and Mr. Coia
A. The Complaint
To rid unions of mob influence over the past decade, DOJ has filed civil
anti-racketeering complaints in federal court. These cases are brought under the
"Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act," also known as
RICO (18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq.). The purpose of this statute is to eliminate the
infiltration of organized crime and racketeering from legitimate organizations
operating in interstate commerce.
There are five elements necessary to establish a RICO violation under 18 U.S.C.
1962. These elements are the following:
any person;
who conspires to or invests in, acquires or maintains an interest in, or
conducts or participates in the affairs of;
an enterprise;
which engages in, or whose activities affect interstate or foreign commerce;
through the collection of an unlawful debt, or patterned commission of various
state and federal crimes.
It was pursuant to this statute that the Justice Department, with the assistance
of the Department of Labor and the FBI, drafted a 212-page complaint that named
as defendants, LIUNA and, among others, Arthur Coia, its General President. This
complaint, according to Mr. Coffey, took about three years to complete and was
based upon more than a million pages of documentation. In 19 similar complaints
filed by DOJ over the past decade, DOJ has never lost.
The Department intended to file the complaint in the Northern District of
Illinois. But on November 4, 1994, the Department provided a draft copy of the
complaint to the union and its General President.
B. The Settlement and the Consent Decree
Shortly after receiving the draft complaint on November 4, Robert Luskin was
hired by LIUNA to represent the union in its dealings with the Justice
Department. Mr. Luskin was and still is a partner in the law firm of Comey, Boyd
& Luskin, and formerly held the position of Special Counsel to the Organized
Crime and Racketeering Section at DOJ.
After recognizing that there was a potential conflict of interest between Mr.
Coia, among others, and LIUNA, Mr. Luskin recommended that private counsel be
retained by certain named defendants. In response to this recommendation, Mr.
Coia hired Brendan Sullivan, Jr., and Howard Gutman, both of the D.C. law firm
of Williams & Connolly.
Between November 1994 and February 1995, LIUNA and Mr. Coia, represented by
their counsels, and DOJ engaged in negotiations in pursuit of a settlement of
the case. Despite the extensive documentation of the allegations in the
complaint and the Department's perfect track record in RICO cases, Mr. Coffey
and his colleagues persisted in the quest for a negotiated resolution. Mr.
Coffey testified that he received no pressure from anyone within the
Administration to continue to negotiate. Rather, he asserts that his willingness
to negotiate rested in the potential weaknesses of the government's case, which
could have spelled trouble if DOJ went to court, and the continual concessions
being offered by LIUNA and Mr. Coia to avoid the filing of the RICO complaint.
At the end of this three month period, a novel settlement agreement was
executed. The core of the agreement required LIUNA to sign a consent decree,
which DOJ could file in court along with the complaint and which includes
LIUNA's acquiescence to the appointment of an independent monitor. The agreement
also requires LIUNA to maintain a self-sustaining, self-policing internal
structure to rid itself of mob influence, under the watchful eye of DOJ, DOL and
the FBI. Although never spoken, the settlement did not require the removal of
Mr. Coia, despite the allegations of wrongdoing against him in the draft
complaint. (14)
The self-policing structure established by LIUNA consists of an Inspector
General who investigates allegations of wrongdoing, a General Executive Board
(GEB) Attorney who serves as prosecutor, a Hearings Officer who serves as judge,
and an appellate officer. The Inspector General is a retired senior FBI
official. Mr. Luskin, who negotiated the settlement on behalf of LIUNA,
continues to serve in the position as GEB Attorney, and the Hearing Officer is a
former U.S. Attorney. Each of these individuals was chosen by the union and
approved by DOJ.
The consent decree executed as part of the settlement agreement permits the
Justice Department to impose, through the court, an independent monitor if the
Department is not satisfied with the internal actions of LIUNA in ridding itself
of mob influence and control. This option was described by Mr. Coffey at the
Subcommittee's hearing as a "hammer" because the Justice Department is
poised to strike whenever it concludes that LIUNA's reform efforts are
inadequate.
However, during the Subcommittee's investigation, another perspective on the
significance of the consent decree and the ability of the Department to swing
the hammer was identified. According to Mr. Gutman, Mr. Coia's personal
attorney, Mr. Coffey once stated to him that no one issue would ever be the
basis for filing the consent decree (ie., swinging the hammer). This was
interpreted by LIUNA and Mr. Coia's attorneys to mean that no one disagreement
between LIUNA and DOJ would cause the government to impose the consent decree
and force a court-appointed monitor take control of the union.
Sometime after this statement was made, DOJ and LIUNA disagreed vehemently with
regard to the progress being made by the union in the area of election reform.
LIUNA did not want to agree to the election of officers by all union members -
one person, one vote. This disagreement occurred after LIUNA had implemented
other reforms, employed a staff to conduct internal investigative activities,
and adopted new ethics and disciplinary procedures.
According to Mr. Gutman, when Mr. Coffey threatened to file the consent decree
in court, thereby taking over the union, he and LIUNA determined that the
Department was not acting in good faith. Moreover, filing the consent decree
would be inconsistent with Mr. Coffey's earlier statement about the significance
of any one issue of disagreement. As a result, Mr. Gutman told Subcommittee
investigators that he prepared the legal documents necessary to enjoin the
government from imposing the consent decree. In particular, Mr. Gutman told
Subcommittee investigators that he prepared a breach of contract complaint
asserting detrimental reliance on the Department's good faith.
Ultimately, LIUNA and DOJ settled their differences on the election issue.
Nevertheless, the experience reveals a potentially serious problem for the
United States in this new approach to combating organized crime's control of
labor unions.
Another troubling feature of the settlement agreement is that the Inspector
General and GEB Attorney have the responsibility of investigating wrongdoing by
Mr. Coia. While the Subcommittee was consistently informed by current and former
law enforcement officials that the Inspector General and GEB Attorney are held
in high regard for their professionalism and integrity, there nevertheless
exists an apparent conflict of interest. LIUNA has gone to great expense in
publicizing its selfpolicing efforts and the reform-minded leadership of Mr.
Coia. The vigor of the internal watchdogs' pursuit of Mr. Coia must remain as a
concern, particularly when those who pay their salaries are committed to the
improvement of Mr. Coia's image.
V. The White House and Mr. Coia
Mr. Coia was granted the position of General President of LIUNA on March 11,
1993 Shortly thereafter, a strong professional and personal relationship
steadily developed among President Clinton, the First Lady and Mr. Coia. Yet
this relationship grew in the midst of an escalating federal organized crime
investigation of Mr. Coia and LIUNA.
A striking example of the overlapping nature of Mr. Coia's relationship with the
President and the civil RICO case against him is found in the events of November
4, 1994. On the same day that the Justice Department sent the RICO complaint to
Mr. Coia, the President sent him his own handwritten correspondence:
Dear Arthur -- I just heard you've become a grandfather -- Congratulations!
Thanks for the gorgeous driver -- It's a work of art. Best, Bill (15)
Most disturbing, this relationship flourished at a time when the White House
received repeated warnings and notifications by law enforcement officials of Mr.
Coia's alleged ties to organized crime.
A. Warnings to the White House Concerning Mr. Coia
1. Early Warnings
Throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, it was common knowledge within law
enforcement and organized labor circles that LIUNA had been targeted by federal
organized crime investigators. As stated above, the Justice Department,
following on the heels of the PCOC, had set its sights on LIUNA as far back as
1986. Former FBI Director William Sessions publicly declared the Bureau's
intentions to root out mob influence from the major labor unions. Moreover,
numerous news reports chronicled the connections between organized crime and
LIUNA. For example, on October 21, 1993, the Chicago Tribune reported that DOJ
was preparing legal action to purge LIUNA of mob influence. That same article
identified a number of individuals who were affiliated with LIUNA as well as
organized crime. (16)
2. The "Mob Puppet" Memorandum
Shortly before January 11, 1994, an employee of the Office of the Inspector
General at DOL contacted Paul Coffey. He had been advised that the First Lady
was considering whether to accept an invitation to speak at LIUNA's annual
Tri-Fund Conference to be held in Florida the following month. After receiving
this information, Mr. Coffey prepared a memorandum addressed to his immediate
supervisor, John Keeney, the Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal
Division at DOJ.
In this memorandum, Mr. Coffey notes that in February 1994, OCRS intended to
recommend that a civil racketeering case be filed against LIUNA, including its
General President, Arthur Coia. Mr. Coffey states, "It might be prudent to
recommend that she (the First Lady) avoid any direct contact with Coia, if
possible, inasmuch as we plan to portray him as a mob puppet." (17)
This memorandum was not provided to the White House because it was DOJ's
understanding that Mrs. Clinton's staff had already been alerted by DOL that
some of the conference attendees would be defendants in an upcoming DOJ
anti-racketeering case. The First Lady subsequently declined Mr. Coia's
invitation to speak at the 1994 Tri-Fund Conference, however she did appear at
the 1995 conference with Mr. Coia (which is discussed below).
3. The FBI Background Check and Related Warnings to the White House
On September 15, 1994, the White House Counsel's Office contacted the FBI and
requested that a name check be conducted on Mr. Coia. (18) The catalyst for the
name check request was that Mr. Coia was being considered by the White House for
a position on the prestigious President's Council on Competitiveness.
In early October, Mr. Coffey was advised by the FBI of the White House's
request. This resulted in Mr. Coffey drafting another memorandum. This
memorandum addresses the possible appointment of Mr. Coia to the President's
Council on Competitiveness, and in it Mr. Coffey states. "The Criminal
Division has long had information from cooperating witnesses, that Coia was
associated with and controlled by the New England family of LCN." (19)
This memorandum was addressed to Attorney General Janet Reno and Deputy Attorney
General Jamie Gorelick, from Jo Ann Harris, the former Assistant Attorney
General in charge of DOJ's Criminal Division. Surprisingly, this memorandum was
never provided to Attorney General Reno or Ms. Gorelick, but was provided to
another member of DOJ staff, David Margolis, Associate Deputy Attorney General.
On or about October 6, 1994, Mr. Margolis contacted the White House Counsel's
Office by telephone and expressed DOJ's concern with Mr. Coia's appointment in
light of the on-going and intensive investigation into Mr. Coia's alleged mob
connections. In fact, based upon information provided by the White House, Mr.
Margolis, over a period of months, contacted the White House Counsel's office
from time-to-time to ensure that Mr. Coia did not receive the appointment to the
President's Commission on Competitiveness because of his alleged mob ties.
On October 7, 1994, the FBI responded to the White House Counsel's September 15,
1994, inquiry. This response states, in pertinent part, "Coia is a criminal
associate of the New England Patriarca organized crime family." (20)
Former White House Counsel Abner Mikva, who was in office for just one month
prior to the White House's receipt of the FBI's response, told the Subcommittee
that he does not know what happened to this communication after it was received
by the White House.
4. The Second Tri-Fund Conference
Based upon interviews with Judge Mikva and Deputy Chief of Staff Harold Ickes,
the White House on yet another occasion became aware of concerns surrounding Mr.
Coia. Mr. Ickes contacted Judge Mikva regarding the First Lady's anticipated
appearance at LIUNA's 1995 Tri-Fund Conference. In response to Mr. Ickes'
inquiry, Judge Mikva spoke to Ms. Gorelick. According to Judge Mikva, Ms.
Gorelick noted that DOJ had several concerns about Mr. Coia which he
subsequently passed on to Mr. Ickes. It has been reported that Judge Mikva
advised Mr. Ickes that the First Lady should avoid one-on-one contacts with Mr.
Coia.
Mr. Ickes did not recall advising the First Lady of any of the concerns
expressed by the Deputy Attorney General with regard to Mrs. Clinton's
anticipated appearance with Mr. Coia at the Tri-Fund Conference in Florida. It
should be noted, however, that press accounts indicate that Mr. Ickes advised
the First Lady of the concerns surrounding Mr. Coia and his alleged ties to
organized crime. (21)
Whether Mr. Ickes advised the First Lady of the concerns expressed to him by
White House Counsel Mikva regarding her appearance at the Tri-Fund Conference is
not clear. What is clear, however, is that the First Lady's speech writer
appears to have been briefed. At the top of the page of her preparation notes
for Mrs. Clinton's Tri-Fund remarks are the words, "They are mob."
(22)
B. Mr. Coia's Relationship with the President, First Lady and
the Democratic Party
IfDOJ and DOL warnings to the White House were intended to discourage conduct
which would appear to conflict with the Federal Government's anti-racketeering
efforts, then they certainly failed to achieve their purpose. The Subcommittee's
review of documents provided by the Administration has turned up over 120
transactions within a three-year period of time between the White House and Mr.
Coia. (23) In addition, the Democratic National Committee accepted financial
contributions from Mr. Coia during this period of time amounting to at least
$280,000.
The contacts between the White House and Mr. Coia range in nature from rather
innocuous official correspondence to personal gifts, including an autographed
basketball, golf balls, a golf hat, a golf shirt, a golf club from the President
to Mr. Coia, and a custom made golf club from Mr. Coia to the President. Also
included in the list are numerous personal notes between the President and Mr.
Coia, and White House invitations relating to breakfasts, dinners, special
events, and flights aboard Air Force One.
One example of how law enforcement warnings went unheeded can be found in the
events of October, 1994. In the first week of that month, as noted above, a
senior Justice Department official had informed White House officials of the
connection between Mr. Coia and organized crime, and the FBI had sent a
memorandum to the White House Counsel's office informing it that Mr. Coia was
"a criminal associate of the New England Patriarca organized crime
family." Nevertheless, on October 21, 1994, President Clinton wrote to Mr
Coia the following:
Dear Arthur: Thanks for the great golf shirt and the copy of your article in
Northeast Golfer. I am also sorry that we did not have the chance to play golf
together this season. You might have helped me break 80. Your thoughtfulness and
continued support mean a lot to me. Please give my best to Joanne. Sincerely,
Bill Clinton (24)
Mr. Coia's relationship with the Democratic National Committee (DNC) presents
the same story of conflicting appearances and impropriety. This is demonstrated
vividly by reviewing several exchanges of correspondence.
After the White House was advised of the serious concerns held by DOJ, DOL, and
the FBI regarding Mr. Coia's relationship with organized crime, the DNC
continued to demonstrate a close and friendly relationship with Mr. Coia. For
example, Donald Fowler, Chairman of the DNC, sent to Mr. Coia a tie bar with the
Presidential seal on it. Included was a hand-written note in which Mr. Fowler
thanked Mr. Coia for his help and his "friendship." (25) Shortly
thereafter, Mr. Fowler again sent a hand-written note to Mr. Coia thanking him
for a pen that was given to him by Mr. Coia as a gift. (26) Sometime later, Mr.
Fowler again contacted Mr. Coia through another hand-written note. In that note,
the Chairman of the DNC thanked Mr. Coia for a tie and for a contribution that
Mr. Coia had made. In particular Mr. Fowler said:
Thank you for the tie. I appreciate it, and appreciate your friendship even
more. Our conversation on Sunday was good. Thank you for your contribution. We
will keep in mind the items that we discussed: President Clinton attending your
convention, your role in the '96 Convention, follow up with other union
presidents, etc. We will stay in touch. Dan. (27)
On November 19, 1995, Mr. Fowler wrote to Mr. Ickes at the White House. In that
handwritten note, Mr. Fowler advises Mr. Ickes, "Arthur Coia, President of Laborers'
International Union, would like a speaking role at the '96 convention. He has
been a very good supporter of the President and the Democrat party. Dan"
(28)
VI. Conclusion
There are those who are quick to dismiss the Subcommittee's review of the
Administration's conduct in the LIUNA matter as election-year politics and pay
back for the Washington union boss' campaign against Republicans in Congress.
Such views may be politically convenient, but they ignore a central truth: the
impartial administration of justice is ill-served when targets of investigations
by the executive branch regularly and publicly associate with the most senior
officials within the same branch of government.
Why is it that Justice Department career officials were concerned about White
House associations with Mr. Coia? The answer is obvious. They were deeply
troubled by the appearance of such associations because of their effect on the
public's confidence in the impartial administration of justice. The considerable
experience of these officials had taught them that a storm of controversy could
erupt if federal law enforcement was perceived to be serving political
interests.
And indeed, that is exactly what happened. After DOJ and LIUNA reached a
settlement in the case, suspicions soon emerged that Mr. Coia's extraordinary
political connections had paid off. These suspicions cast a shadow of
impropriety over hard-working public servants at DOJ -- the very result these
prosecutors had tried to avoid with their warnings to the White House.
Much has been said about Arthur Coia's associations with organized crime. Mr
Coia fervently denies such claims. Mr. Coffey at DOJ insists that the
allegations in the complaint are valid but "the jury is still out" on
whether Mr. Coia is still associated with the mob. Yet putting aside concerns
about the outcome of ongoing criminal investigations or the ultimate success of
LIUNA's self-policing efforts, White House officials acted irresponsibly in not
being sensitive to the appearance of a conflict of interest.
Moreover, this appearance of a conflict continues to this day. According to
testimony at the Subcommittee's hearing, Mr. Coia is still under investigation
by both the Justice Department and the LIUNA enforcement team. If DOJ files the
consent decree or if criminal charges are brought against Mr. Coia, then the
case against LIUNA and Mr. Coia, the President's friend, will become much more
visible to the American public. How then can it be appropriate for the President
and Mr. Coia to be such high profile political allies? And does this high
profile political alliance make it more difficult for the Department to file the
consent decree?
To date, the Subcommittee has not received any indication from any political
official in the Administration that there is a concern about the appearance of
impropriety outlined in this report. Until that happens and, more importantly,
until steps are taken to eliminate this serious problem, the interests of
justice will continue to suffer.
DISSENTING
VIEWS OF
Hon.
Charles E. Schumer
Hon.
Robert C. Scott
Hon.
Zoe Lofgren
Hon.
Sheila Jackson Lee
Hon.
Melvin L. Watt
Hon.
John Conyers, Jr.
I. INTRODUCTION
These hearings, as described by the hearing title, were concerned with the
Clinton "Administration's efforts against the influence of organized crime
in the Laborers." According to every one of the Majority's
witnesses, the Clinton Administration's efforts were a success, particularly the
ongoing efforts to rid the Laborers' International Union, N.A.
("Laborers") of mob influence following the
unprecedented settlement agreement the Department of Justice
("Justice") signed with the Laborers in February
1995. (29) Even the Majority's Report concedes the settlement has "produced
positive results." (30)
This congressional investigation began in March 1996 when the Majority claimed
that the Clinton Administration improperly influenced career prosecutors at
Justice to settle the civil racketeering law suit involving the Laborers.
(31) Yet, the Majority's Report now admits there is no direct evidence of
"improper influence." (32)
The investigation began with the unfounded charge of "improper
influence." (33) Indeed, there are a series of memos and reports by the
Republican Leadership repeating these charges against the Administration.
The Majority announced the investigation in a presidential election year soon
after the unions committed themselves to an informational campaign against some
Republican congressional candidates. (34) At this time, the Judiciary Chair
said, "If Organized Labor launches a $35 million campaign against you,
you're not going to lay down and play dead." (35)
In an attempt to find some evidence to back up the unfounded charges, the
Majority circulated a memo directing Republican congressional staff to collect
derogatory information on the Clinton Administration and the unions. (36)
Despite their efforts, they found no evidence to support their charge of
"improper influence."
The Majority's expressed preference for a government takeover of the Laborers
in this case was the rationale for opposing the civil RICO settlement that, in
the Majority's words, "turned the mob-busting mission over to the union
itself;" but the Speaker and Judiciary Chair earlier opposed any government
takeovers of unions as "inherently destructive." (37)
When the Majority called an insider witness. Ron Fino, to testify, they said he
was "as knowledgeable a witness about the Laborers as
there is." (38) But the Majority preferred to limit what Fino had to say to
matters involving the Clinton Administration and did not want to hear or credit
what Fino alleged about questionable associates of Republican Vice Presidential
Candidate Jack Kemp.
And when the Majority Report found no direct evidence of wrongdoing by the
Administration, it turned to the specter of "appearances" to justify
its "investigation." (39) The Majority's discussion of
"appearances" was not particularly rigorous. It consisted of general
observations on "associations," never precisely defined, that involved
the President and, seemingly, any individual under investigation. The Majority's
position careened perilously close to guilt by association. The Majority invoked
as its ethical standard the findings of a Crime Commission Report that was
critical of "the propriety" of conduct in Reagan's Administration, and
the Majority quoted a passage from that report out of context, to criticize the
Clinton Administration's handling of the Laborers' case. The
Majority overlooked the distinction, however, that was critical to that
Commission's recommendation. Whereas the Reagan Administration did nothing to
prosecute the Teamsters, the Clinton Administration took action against the Laborers.
By the Majority's overbroad "associational" standard against anyone
"under investigation," as former White House Counsel Abner Mikva
(Counsel Mikva) observed, the President shouldn't even have meetings with the
Speaker of the House while he is under investigation.
To paraphrase Counsel Mikva, the evidence is clear: nothing the President did,
and nothing that anybody in the official family did, could in any way be
construed by anybody in Justice as pressure to do, or not do something. (40) By
this standard, not only did the Clinton Administration not in fact influence
anyone, the Clinton Administration did not do anything that could even be
construed as influencing anyone.
We have also set forth below in a separate section some background of what
happened in earlier Administrations to set the stage for what happened in this
Administration and why settlement discussions made sense, how they proceeded,
and a brief review of the results already achieved. (41)
II. THE INVESTIGATION
A. THE MOTIVATION FOR THIS CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION WAS
UNNECESSARILY PARTISAN
1. The Majority Never Had Any Evidence To Support The Unfounded Charge of
"Improper Influence" That Began This Investigation
At the end of the day, the Majority conceded in its Report that there was no
evidence of the charge, "improper influence," that began the
investigation. " T he facts the Majority gathered to date do not reveal a
direct connection, (42) the Report said.
However, as early as March 28, 1996, and without regard for the reputations of
the career prosecutors involved, the Chair of the House Republican Conference
said that " President Clinton 's appointees" improperly influenced
career prosecutors at the Department of Justice to settle a civil racketeering
law suit against the Laborers. (43) And he repeated this
unfounded charge afterwards. (44)
In an effort to find some evidence, the Majority circulated a memo to Republican
House Staff insisting they search after any information they could find on
waste, fraud, abuse and influence involving the Clinton Administration and the
unions. (45)
When the congressional "investigation" got under way, the Majority
Staff interviewed present and past White House counsel, the White House Deputy
Chief of Staff, all the key career prosecutors involved in the Laborers'
investigation, key F.B.I. supervisory agents, and counsel for the Laborers
and for the Laborers' President. The Majority's staff requested
documents that finally totaled 20,000 pages from the White House, Justice,
various agencies, and the Laborers themselves. The fifty or
more interviews conducted by the Majority Staff and the 20,000 pages collected
by the Majority produced no proof that any person, directly or indirectly,
improperly influenced anyone. What the Majority found instead was proof there
had been no influence.
Ms. Jo Ann Harris, formerly the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal
Division, is the only Clinton appointee who could possibly have
"influenced" any career prosecutors. It was after a meeting in her
office that the disputed settlement with the Laborers occurred.
(46)
Ms. Harris testified that she was not in a position to "influence" any
career prosecutors as she was the one who "followed" their
recommendation and Ms. Harris further reassured the members that no person at
the White House, nor at Justice, nor anyone from anyplace else had even tried to
influenced her. (47)
The former F.B.I. Deputy Assistant Director for the Criminal Investigations
Division, James E. Moody, responsible for racketeering investigations, dismissed
the charge of "improper influence" as frivolous since he'd been
present during the settlement negotiations, and knew Justice's principal
negotiator for twenty years, trusted him and trusted the independence of all the
other public servants involved in the negotiations. (48) Moody testified the
enforcement agreement was "different but it was not a sweetheart
deal." (49) If he believed for a moment it was a "sweetheart
deal," Moody said he would have blown the whistle on the enforcement
agreement. (50) Despite this testimony, the Majority claimed in its Report that
"a shadow of impropriety" hung over these distinguished career
prosecutors. (51)
2. The "Investigation" Got Underway in a Presidential Election Year
The timing of the investigation during a presidential election year suggests of
partisan motive. No member of the Majority objected to the enforcement agreement
with the Laborers when it was announced in February 1995. But
shortly after the AFL-CIO and the Laborers announced a
well-funded informational campaign to oppose Republican congressional
candidates, the Republican National Committee Chair complained about the unions'
informational campaign. (52) and, about the same time, the Chairman of the House
Republican Conference made the factually unsupported charges we discussed in the
last section, that " President Clinton 's appointees" improperly
influenced career prosecutors at Justice.
3. The Majority Was Not "Going To Lay Down And Play Dead"
Asked in a television interview to confirm or deny whether the congressional
investigation was retaliatory, the Judiciary Chair said, "They the unions
might have a point ." (53) Nor did the Chair hesitate to explain why:
"If Organized Labor launches a $35 million campaign against you, you're not
going to lay down and play dead." (54)
4. The Majority's Objection To The Laborers' Policing
Themselves Was
Undermined By The Republican Leadership's Past Opposition To The
Government Taking Over Any Union as "Inherently Destructive"
The Majority objected that the settlement "turned the mob-busting mission
over to the union itself," and apparently preferred that the government do
the job instead. This is in remarkable contrast to an earlier position. The
Speaker and Judiciary Chair had opposed any government takeover of a union as
"inherently destructive":
W e are very troubled by reports that the Department of Justice has chosen a
broad and unprecedented enforcement strategy that must, of necessity, undermine
the ability of a union to perform its statutory functions as the collective
bargaining representative of its members. Labor unions in this society serve as
a counter-balance to the institutions of government and corporations and afford
workers a vehicle for exercising a voice in the determination of national policy
as well as their wages and working conditions. To function properly, unions must
be independent of government or corporate control in order to reflect and
represent the interests of their members. The imposition of trustees to
administer an international union by the government is, on its face, inherently
destructive of the ability of workers to represent and speak for themselves
through their unions. The exercise of such authority by the government to
essentially remove one of the major participants in the democratic process,
establishes a precedent which strikes at the very foundation of our democracy.
(55)
5. The Majority Accepted Ron Fino's Testimony Concerning the Clinton
Administration But Ignored His Accusations Concerning Jack Kemp
The Majority's principal witness, Mr. Ron Fino, testified about Coia's alleged
associations with organized crime, but knew nothing about Mr. Coia's leadership
since Fino had left the Laborers before Coia became the
International's President. Fino's allegations about Coia were otherwise
uncorroborated by any other witness, document, wire or recording device. Since
about the late 1980's, Mr. Fino's workaday life has been spent, and all his
income apparently derived from what he had to say about "wise guys."
When the FBI cut off Mr. Fino's stipend, he sold a story to that supermarket
tabloid, the Globe, alleging O.J. Simpson "had drug links to the mob,"
according to the headline emblazoned across the tabloid's front cover.
The Majority lionized Fino. Rep. Fred Heineman called Fino "a gutsy
guy." (56) Rep. Ed. Bryant praised Fino for "hav ing consistently
provided what I believe to be accurate information to the F.B.I. in regard to
the union and mob activities." (57) The Crime Subcommittee Chair told Fino
he was "probably about as forceful and as ... knowledgeable a witness about
Laborers' International Union and Racketeering as there is --
period -- anywhere." (58)
When it was rumored that the Republican Leadership planned additional hearings,
Minority Staff contacted Fino. In those conversations, Fino alleged that former
Rep. Jack Kemp associated with mob associates. (59)
On September 18, 1996, Rep. John Conyers (D-MI), Ranking Minority Member of the
Judiciary Committee, wrote the Chair to ask "out of a sense of
evenhandedness and fair play" for approval for Fino to travel to
Washington, D.C. so Fino might be deposed by Judiciary Committee Staff. (60)
Rep. Conyers explained that "the fact that such serious allegations are
being made by a witness the Majority obviously consider ed so credible ...
indicates to me that further inquiry into this matter is required." (61)
On September 23, 1996, Time Magazine reported Fino's allegations against Kemp.
(62) There followed several more news reports and, on September 25, 1996, when
ABC Network TV asked Vice-Presidential Jack Kemp about Fino's allegations, Kemp
said he "welcome d anybody who would lay out any fact that would accuse me
Kemp of any active crime or being tied to the mob." Rep. Conyers said he
"couldn't agree more" but the Judiciary Chair did not grant Rep.
Conyers' request.
The Majority preferred to limit what Fino had to say to matters involving the
Clinton Administration and did not wish to hear what Fino alleged about
associates of then Republican Vice Presidential Candidate Jack Kemp.
B. THERE IS NO APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY CONCERNING THE
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT BETWEEN JUSTICE AND THE LABORERS
Having failed to demonstrate there was evidence of any improper influence in
reaching the settlement in the Laborers' case, the Majority
insists instead its concern is the "appearance" of impropriety. But
the Majority's suggested standard for "propriety" is overbroad and the
related discussion about "propriety" is replete with undocumented
assertions, factual inconsistencies, and false and misleading statements.
1. THE MAJORITY'S STANDARD IS OVERBROAD
First, consider the Majority's standard prohibiting any "association"
that involves the President and, seemingly, any individual "under
investigation." For the statement of this proposition, the Majority relies
on a recommendation found in the Crime Commission Report (63) critical of the
Reagan Administration's handling of the Teamsters Union. (64) The Majority's
Report relies on the Commission's observation about "appearances" in
the Reagan Administration to criticize the Clinton Administration's prosecution
of the Laborers' case. But the Majority overlooks the
distinction that was critical to the Commission: whereas the Reagan
Administration did nothing to prosecute the Teamsters, the Clinton
Administration acted against the Laborers. (65)
In essence, the question the Majority posed in its Report was why the President
and the First Lady associated with the Laborers' President,
Arthur Coia. The Majority apparently does not consider Mr. Coia's representative
capacity as the leader of 750,000 working men and women or his support of the
President's policies as either good or sufficient cause for this association.
The Majority apparently is of the view that it is inappropriate for President
Clinton -- and presumably for any President -- to meet with any official or
person while that official or person is "under investigation."
Consider, by was of example, that Republican President George Bush met with the Laborers'
President Angelo Fosco while he was under investigation. (66) The F.B.I. stated
Fosco was an associate of and under the direct influence of the Chicago Crime
Family founded by the infamous Al Capone. According to the Majority's apparent
prohibition. President Bush's meeting with Fosco would be ill-advised and
unethical and possibly illegal.
Similarly, Former Senator Robert Dole met with Teamster President Jackie Presser
while Presser was under federal investigation when there was no question that
Presser was "mobbed up." (67) Should Senator Dole have avoided contact
with the Teamsters? Alternatively, as suggested by former Counsel Mikva,"
does the Majority mean that President Clinton may not "associate" with
Speaker Gingrich simply because the Speaker is "under investigation"?
As Counsel Mikva suggested, "appearances" are important as " t
his Government operates on trust and wants people to believe in the Government
which is why we do all the things we do." (68) But, while perception and
appearances are "incredibly important," Counsel Mikva explained that a
President could not restrict his meetings or "associations" to
"altar boys and Sunday school choir s during his public career." (69)
Counsel Mikva commented that the problem with "perceptions" based on
"appearances" is that you can't "control the problem that some
people for example, looking at that picture of Mr. Bush with Jackie Presser
might say, 'Aha, he President Bush was in the Teamsters' pocket." (70)
Mikva concluded, since we "can't control some third party's perception w e
try to minimize it if we can." (71) Mikva then narrowed the question,
testifying that the "ethical propriety" that this Subcommittee was
legitimately concerned with, was "that nothing the President did and
nothing that anybody in his official family did ... could in any way be
construed by anybody in Justice as trying to put pressure on them at Justice to
lay off." (72)
2. THE MAJORITY'S ASSERTIONS ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS
Second, the Majority Report distorts the hearing record and asserts: (1) the
President knew something he did not, (2) Justice went "easy" on the Laborers'
President, Arthur Coia, (3) Coia was more involved with organized crime than
Justice contends, and (4) union self-policing has never been previously
considered.
a. The President did not receive a "law enforcement warning"
concerning Arthur Coia
The Majority charged there was a "law enforcement warning" about a
criminal investigation of Arthur Coia and it "went unheeded" in
October 1994. (73)
The Majority contends a senior Justice Department official "informed White
House officials of the alleged connection between Mr. Coia and organized
crime" and "sent a memorandum to the White House Counsel's
Office" with this same investigative information and
"nevertheless" President Clinton sent Mr. Coia a thank you note for
the golf shirt and a magazine article Coia had forwarded to the President."
(74)
In fact, the "warning" was not "unheeded" in the sense that
the information requested by and provided to the White House was used for its
intended purpose, a name check. Mr. Coia was under consideration for an unpaid
position on the President's Council on Competitiveness. A name check was
requested of the F.B. I. by one of those few people concerned with that review
process. The paper work was directed to a clerk or intern in the White House
Counsel's office. (75) Mr. Coia, for whatever reason, was not appointed. (76)
Moreover, the name check report came with a cautionary proviso, not to circulate
it. (77) White House Counsel testified he did not see the report and did not
inform the President of its content. (78) As a result, when the President penned
his thank you note to Mr. Coia, thanking him for a shirt and a magazine, the
President was completely unaware of the contents of the name check." (79)
b. The Justice Department Did Not Go "Easy" On Coia
The Majority concludes, as a result of the settlement, Laborers'
President Coia "has escaped from the clutches of the Justice
Department." (80)
A review of the records indicates that this is not the case. First, Coia is
subject to intense scrutiny. As a result of the consent agreement, Mr. Coia
waived his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. FBI Racketeering Chief Moody
testified he couldn't recall any Union President ever agreeing to do that. (81)
This waiver is significant in that Coia is currently the subject of both an
internal disciplinary investigation by the Laborers Inspector
General, Doug Gow, and by Justice. Former FBI Chief Moody said he'd known Doug
Gow for "twenty some years," from when Gow was number three in charge
of the FBI and swore " Gow will go right after you," and after Mr.
Coia, if he has the evidence. (82) John Keeney, the Assistant Attorney General
for the Criminal Division at Justice, said that Coia had earned no right to
delay any investigation, nor any immunity from prosecution. (83)
Second, Coia must free the union from the mob. Racketeering Section Chief Coffey
said Coia had to get rid of the mob and if "he can't do it, doesn't want to
do it, he's slow to do it, he's playing both sides of the street ... then
sitting in the wings waiting for him is a court and a bunch of officers,
court-appointed officers and the Government sitting there with all its
powers." (84) Put most succinctly, Coffey said, "the mob goes or these
officers including Coia go; it's one or the other." (85)
c. Coia's "Associations" with Organized Crime Have Not Been
Established
The Majority also repeatedly refers to Coia as a "mob puppet" based on
a report written by Coffey in 1994. (86) The Majority failed, however, to note
that by the time of the hearings in 1996. Mr. Coffey's view had changed. When
asked at the hearing whether Coffey had called Coia a "mob puppet,"
Coffey responded, "I think that's what I said but ... the jury's out on
whether he is today." (87)
Coffey explained that "the interesting thing about Coia is that he's the
first guy to come to the Government and he says, 'It ain't true that I'm a mob
puppet ' ... and 'I can prove it's not true' ..." by ridding the union of
organized crime influence. (88) As for the contention that FBI Chief Moody said
that's how Coia became President of the Laborers, with mob
support, (89) Moody testified that "in the past" that's how the
leadership was selected (90) but the mob's influence had "greatly lessened
within the last 10 to 12 years." (91) Coffey explained, "At the time
Coia got his job as the Laborers' President , the wheels were
coming off the mob's hold of the Laborers ." (92)
The Majority also charges that Mr. Coia "associated 'with members of the
New England La Cosa Nostra for a substantial period of time." (93) The
draft complaint merely alleges Coia has been "associating with members of
the New England LCN ..." (emphasis supplied). This is a distinction with a
difference. Special Agent Mike Ross explains that "associating" meant
as little as " hanging out" whereas an "associate" or
"associated" meant "influenced and perhaps with historic or
familial ties." (94) And on the question of whether Coia was a mob
"associate," Moody testified that there was not "sufficient
evidence" to say Coia was an associate of organized crime. (95) Coffey
testified. "So far, the evidence does not suggest that he's now an
associate." (96)
Finally, the Majority charges that "for three years with his father Coia
received kickbacks that were shared with Raymond Patriarca, head of the New
England Crime Family," (97) and says it again later in the Report. (98) The
statement is unfair since the charges involved events in and around 1973 that
were not proven in court and were eventually dismissed in 1984. The draft civil
RICO complaint makes this abundantly clear. (99) But the Majority did not make
it clear in its Report.
d. Congress and Others Have Previously Advocated Union Self-policing
The Majority claims that self-policing by the target union is a new mob-busting
technique requiring special scrutiny that was somehow proposed as a
"sweetheart" deal by the Clinton Administration. (100) Yet, as noted
elsewhere in these dissenting views, prior to the Laborers'
settlement, the Speaker and Judiciary Chair previously supported unions cleaning
their own house and vigorously opposed the destruction inherent when the
government acted instead. (101) The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
also reviewed this matter with some care in 1990 and recommended, where
possible, that unions be left in place and went on to cite examples where this
had occurred. (102) Moody explained that it was because the Teamsters case
served as a precedent and the ongoing threat of RICO that the Laborers
instituted the necessary changes themselves. (103)
III. BACKGROUND AND SETTLEMENT
To fully understand the import and utility of the Laborers'
settlement it is useful to consider the overall context and evolution of our
nation's battle against organized and the particular facts of Justice's case
against the Laborers.
A. The Fight Against "The Enemy Within"
Senators Kefauver and McClellan thoroughly investigated organized crime's
corrupting influence on the labor movement. 1,525 witnesses testified at Senate
hearings conducted over a three year period. (104) The historic clash between
then Committee Chief Counsel Robert F. Kennedy and Teamster Leader Jimmy Hoffa,
televised nationwide, symbolized the combatants' respective roles, Kennedy's
struggle to uncover and destroy mob influence, and Hoffa's resistance.
Kennedy persisted, however, and, after becoming Attorney General, successfully
prosecuted Hoffa and other corrupt leaders in an unprecedented effort to rid the
unions of "the enemy within." (105) Unfortunately, the convictions
Kennedy obtained, the prison sentences imposed, and the gains made in the 60's,
were relatively short-lived.
By 1986, President Reagan's Commission on Organized Crime ("the
Commission") focussed on the mob's "market place corruption" --
"the control and exploitation of labor unions by organized criminals."
(106) The Commission concluded that the mob influence by the Teamsters was as
intrusive and pervasive as ever and extended to three other Internationals
including the Laborers. (107)
Former Chief Circuit Judge Irving R. Kaufman, the Chair of the Commission, urged
"the adoption of a national strategy to remove organized crime from the
marketplace... ." (108) He insisted that President Reagan prosecute the
Teamsters, as well as the Laborers, Longshoremen, and the Hotel
Workers, but the Reagan Administration limited its efforts largely to the
Teamsters. (109)
In fact these troubles derived from the Commission's insistence that the
Administration use civil RICO to take over the unions. (110) Since its enactment
in 1970, prosecutors considered the RICO statute a powerful weapon to combat
organized crime. (111) But the statute had not been widely used in the civil
context before the Commission's recommendation and its use against unions posed
unforeseen problems.
B. Limitations and Failures of Civil RICO
After the Commission proposed using civil RICO, and Justice was preparing to
comply, its use was roundly criticized by Congress, by no less than the current
Speaker and the Chair of the Judiciary, in a forceful letter of denunciation
addressed to then Attorney General Meese on December 10, 1987. (112)
The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (P.S.I.) was critical of the
varying powers and responsibilities exercised by a court-appointed trustee in a
civil RICO case. (113) The PSI was concerned about possible government abuse,
(114) and therefore recommended that the union leadership be left in place,
(115) citing precedent to do so (long before the Laborers).
(116) PSI further cautioned the government, based on the past failures of RICO,
that it was not necessarily the best device to oust union leadership under mob
influence. (117) The Commission's recommendations were therefore subject to
significant criticism and close congressional scrutiny. (118)
In the Teamsters' civil RICO case, notwithstanding wiretaps, surveillance, and
its array of proven informants, the parties fought for years, spending millions
of dollars, before the federal district court appointed a court monitor to run
the Teamsters. That civil RICO prosecution was expensive, time- consuming,
inefficient, and, in one notorious example, resulted in the substitution of one
set of "mobbed-up" union officials by another.
Neither the Reagan or Bush Administrations pursued the Laborers
in any significant way other than to collect and organize the information it had
relating to the Laborers (about a million documents). But as
the years ran by following upon the Commission's Report, the underlying charges
against the Laborers grew stale, the most significant targets
of the investigation died or were replaced, and the evidence Justice had against
those remaining was uncorroborated by any wiretap evidence or surveillance
witnesses. The Majority refers to the Laborers' documents,
without mentioning how problematic the information was, as "the
backbone" of the civil RICO complaint that was drafted during the Clinton
Administration. (119) Notwithstanding the difficulties caused by the delays
following the Commission recommendations in 1986, and in spite of the evidential
shortfall, the Clinton Administration finally took action where the earlier
Administrations had failed to act.
C. Clinton Administration Efforts to Fight the Mob
When the Justice Department finally completed a draft civil RICO complaint
against the Laborers, they forwarded the draft to the Laborers'
counsel, rather than filing it with the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, preferring to negotiate if they could before beginning
what promised to be costly litigation. There was good reason for both sides to
talk.
Eight years had passed since the Commission had complained about mob influence
in the Laborers. (120) The government had F.B.I. surveillance
of Laborers' President Angelo Fosco meeting with the mob. (121)
But they had failed to successfully prosecute Fosco once before (122) and in
1993 Fosco died and was replaced as General President by Arthur Coia, Jr. A
number of mobsters and union leaders died since the President's Commission
though they were named in the complaint as co-conspirators. (123)
Justice knew its evidence was stale. They had to consider the likelihood they
might have difficulty seeking an injunction based on events more than ten years
old. (124)
Another problem was that the government was unwilling to disclose some of its
most recent evidence. The Department blacked out paragraphs and even pages of
its draft complaint. (125) Justice apparently hoped a settlement would make
disclosure unnecessary.
Further, while the government had evidence implicating some of the Locals and
the District Councils, the U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois
and his Civil Division Chief had "lingering concerns" about the
strength of the evidence against the International, the object of the draft
civil RICO complaint. (126)
The Department and the F.B.I. also understood that they had stronger evidence
against some individuals than others. The F.B.I. felt confident about evidence
that Laborers' Vice President John Serpico from Chicago was
"mobbed up" (127) and was "influenced by the Chicago LCN
family" (emphasis supplied). (128) However, the F.B.I. concluded they could
only allege Coia had been " associating with" organized crime figures.
They could not contend that the mob influenced him in his decisions or actions.
(129)
Both sides appreciated the risks of litigation. The Laborers
were particularly concerned about the disastrous effects this civil RICO suit
would have on their ability to negotiate contracts for their members. Justice
was further constrained by an executive order prohibiting litigation unless
there was first an attempt to settle the matter. President Bush's Council on
Competitiveness (130) prompted Executive Order 12778, (131) specifically Section
1(a), that said in the strongest possible terms that:
"No governmental litigation counsel shall file a complaint initiating civil
litigation without first making a reasonable effort a to notify all disputants
about the nature of the dispute and b to attempt to achieve a settlement. . . .
." (emphasis and brackets supplied).
Robert Luskin, formerly the Special Counsel to the Department's Organized Crime
and Racketeering Section appeared for the Laborers to discuss
settlement. Soon after Washington attorneys Brendan Sullivan and Howard Gutman
appeared for Laborers' President Coia. They discussed
settlement with Paul Coffey, the Department's Chief of the Organized Crime and
Racketeering Section. The Laborers, while asserting that the
evidence against them was poor, still offered to address alleged mob influence.
They asked Coffey if he would consider alternatives to court-appointed officers
and allow the Laborers to police themselves. (132)
On December 14, 1994, Coffey forwarded a proposed consent decree. It was
objectionable to the Laborers because it called for court
supervision. It contained a partial acknowledgment to the Laborers'
offer, however, to clean themselves up by providing for an in-house attorney
"who has the GEB's (133) Board's mandate to take whatever action is
necessary to accomplish the removal of organized crime and all other criminal
elements from all levels of the union." (134) The Department's draft decree
also provided for the removal from the Board of Vice President Serpico. Vice
President Caivano and Bob Connerton, the Board's General Counsel, but not for
the removal of President Coia. (135) The Laborers objected to
removing officers without any due process.
The Laborers' counsel then prepared a counter proposal in
response with elaborate procedures to reassure the Department of their good
faith.
Coffey rejected the proposal. He had the fixed view that there had to be a
signed consent decree. When the Laborers asked for a review
within the Department, by John Keeney, the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for
the Criminal Division. Keeney supported Coffey's decision. So the Laborers
sought review to Jo Ann Harris, the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal
Division.
In advance of meeting with Jo Ann Harris, the Laborers convened
a full Board meeting on January 18, 1995 to make significant changes to help
convince Justice, and presumably the federal district court of their good faith.
The Board approved an internal disciplinary code that replaced the authority of
the President and the Board in disciplinary matters with an entirely independent
review process. The procedure passed by a vote of 10-2.
The Code expressly barred any member or officer from "knowingly
associating" with any member or associate of organized crime or
"knowingly permitting" any member or associate of organized crime from
influencing union affairs or obstructing or interfering with any investigation.
The Board created four new independent positions within the union (1) an
Inspector General to investigate allegations of wrongdoing, (2) a Board Attorney
to prosecute the charges, (3) a Hearings Officer to hear these charges, and (4)
an Appellate Officer to review the Hearing Officer's rulings. In addition, the
Board immediately suspended Vice-Presidents Serpico and Caivano pending the
filing of charges by the newly appointed Board Attorney, Luskin. General Counsel
Connerton also resigned.
The Laborers and Coia's counsel met at Harris' office shortly
afterwards on January 19, 1995. By all accounts, there were twenty or more
investigative agents and lawyers present from the F.B.I., the Department of
Labor, the U.S. Attorney's Office from the Northern District of Illinois, and,
of course, from Main Justice. The Laborers reported their
accomplishments in the few days since their last meeting with Keeney and Coffey
and asked once again for 90 days to show they could perform the job themselves.
But the Department wanted insurance against failure. The Department obtained its
insurance when the Laborers' counsel agreed to sign a consent
decree provided the Department agree not to file the decree unless and until the
Laborers actually failed in their efforts to remove the mob.
This insurance policy was reduced to writing on February 13, 1995, that provided
for:
"a period of internal reform, lasting at least ninety (90)days, aimed at
further investigating and disciplining individuals within any entity of LIUNA
the Laborers for wrongful association with, or corruption by,
members of organized crime, as well as instituting other reforms." (136)
The Department agreed to "provide any assistance allowed by law to
LIUNA." (137)
After the ninety days it was up to "the Assistant Attorney General for the
Criminal Division Jo Ann Harris to determin e , in her sole discretion, that the
imposition of a consent decree was necessary or desirable." (138) The Laborers
have since described the oversight agreement they signed as "a gun pointed
at their head" for the Department can pull the trigger at any time the Laborers
fail.
The four months spent to make this enforcement agreement appear to have been
time well spent. Since February 1995, the Laborers have removed
36 individuals from Office or membership, 21 of whom were allegedly mob-
affiliated. Board Attorney Luskin negotiated settlements with or brought charges
against another 13 individuals, 7 of whom were alleged to be mob-affiliated. The
Laborers recently filed disciplinary charges against 28 targets
in their investigation of Buffalo Local 210. This was among the Laborers'
most significant accomplishments. Deputy Assistant F.B.I. Director Moody
testified at the congressional hearings that Buffalo Local 210 "was the
most blatant example of La Cosa Nostra control of a local union in the United
States" and that the F.B.I. had had "trouble making criminal cases
against that local." (139) The Laborers also imposed
Trusteeships for Locals 1278, 853, 210, 602, the Baltimore District Council, and
Local 73. They consolidated the Mason Tenders District Council in New York, an
act that assured the removal of the allegedly corrupt officers of ten locals and
their substitution by provisional officers vetted by the F.B.I.
Lastly, the Laborers concluded the direct election of their
President and Secretary-Treasurer, and a referendum to find out whether the
members want to elect the remaining International officers as well.
IV. CONCLUSION
We commend this Administration's successful efforts to rid the Laborers
International of Organized Crime. While much remains to be done, a lot has
already been accomplished. No Administration should ever interfere in an ongoing
investigation. We are satisfied, however, that there was no improper
interference here. While the Majority's motivation has been suspect in this
presidential election year, we sincerely hope that we may now work together to
study this enforcement agreement as a model for prospective civil RICO
settlements and consider legislative and statutory reforms that may help working
men and women.
______________________________
Charles E. Schumer
______________________________
Robert C. Scott
______________________________
Zoe ILLEGIBLE WORD
______________________________
Sheila Jackson Lee
______________________________
Melvin L. Watt
______________________________
John Conyers, Jr.
Editor's note.--For complete information concerning Exhibit No. 1 please refer
to subcommittee hearings entitled, "Administration's Efforts Against the
Influence of Organized Crime in the Laborers' International
Union of North America," Serial No. 116, July 24 and 25, 1996, beginning
with page 355.
EXHIBIT
NO. 1
UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN
DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN
DIVISION
-------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
V. ) NO.
)
LABORERS' INTERNATIONAL UNION OF )
NORTH AMERICA, AFL-CIO, )
) DRAFT
JOSEPH AIUPPA, )
ARTHUR J. BERNE, )
LOUIS CASCIANO, )
JAMES B. CASTALDO, )
JOHN CATANZARO, )
RAYMOND FLYNN, )
JAMES J. GALLO, )
JOHN GIARDIELLO, )
MICHAEL LABARBARA, JR., )
GENNARO LANGELLA, )
ANTHONY D. LIBERATORE, )
CHESTER J. LIBERATORE, )
LOUIS ANTHONY MANNA, also known as )
"Bobby Manna," ) COMPLAINT
JAMES MESSERA, )
ROCCO J. NAPOLI, )
CARMINE PERSICO, )
ALFRED PILOTTO, )
JOHN RIGGI, )
JOSEPH P. ROSATO, )
DANIEL G. SANSANESE, JR., )
JOSEPH A. TODARO, SR., )
JOSEPH A. TODARO, JR., )
SALVATORE TRICARIO, )
MATTHEW MICHAEL TRUPIANO, JR., )
PETER VARIO, also known as "Jocko," )
PETER A. VARIO, also known as )
"Butch," )
)
THE GENERAL EXECUTIVE BOARD OF )
THE LABORERS' INTERNATIONAL )
UNION OF NORTH AMERICA, AFL-CIO, )
)
ARTHUR ARMAND COIA, )
General President, )
ROLLIN P. "BUD" VINALL, )
General Secretary-Treasurer, )
MASON M. "MAX" WARREN, )
First Vice-President, )
-------------------------------------------------
D-0003
--------------------------
--------------------------
First Vice-President, )
JOHN SERPICO, )
Second Vice-President, )
VERE O. HAYNES, )
Third Vice-President, )
SAMUEL J. CAIVANO, )
Fourth Vice-President, )
ENRICO MANCINELLI, )
Fifth Vice-President, )
CHUCK BARNES, )
Sixth Vice-President, )
JACK WILKINSON, )
Seventh Vice-President, )
GEORGE R. GUDGER )
Eighth Vice-President )
MICHAEL QUEVEDO, JR. )
Ninth Vice-President, )
ARMAND E. SABITONI )
Tenth Vice-President )
ROBERT J. CONNERTON, )
General Counsel )
--------------------------
D-0004
not participate in any conference regarding the filling of the proposed
complaint.
Sincerely,
Paul E. Coffey
Chief, Organized Crime and
Racketeering Section
Enclosure
D-0005
INDEX
------------------------------------------------
PAGE
------------------------------------------------
I. INTRODUCTION........................ 1
1-3
II. JURISDICTION........................ 2
4
III. VENUE............................... 2
5-6
IV. LA COSA NOSTRA...................... 2
Introduction........................ 3
7
Judicial Authority for the Existence
of the LCN.......................... 4
8
The LCN Commission.................. 4
9
LCN Families........................ 5
10
V. THE PARTIES......................... 8
The Plaintiff....................... 8
11
The Union Defendant................. 8
12
Individual Defendants............... 12
13
------------------------------------------------
D-0006
--------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------
Defendant LIUNA International
Officials.............................. 32
14
VI. CO-CONSPIRATORS NOT NAMED AS DEFENDANTS 37
15
VII. THE ENTERPRISE......................... 47
16
VIII. COUNT ONE, VIOLATION OF TITLE 18,
UNITED STATES CODE SECTION 1962
(b).... 48
Acquiring and Maintaining Control
of
LIUNA............................... 48
17
The
Enterprise......................... 49
18
Methods and
Means...................... 49
19
a. Selection of Officers to Control
LIUNA.................................. 49
19 a.
(1) Selection of the General
President.............................. 49
19 a. (1)
(2) Selection of Regional,
District Council and
Local
Officials........................ 51
19 a. (2)
b. Acts of Violence to Control
LIUNA.................................. 59
19 b.
--------------------------------------------------
D-0007
-------------------------------------
-------------------------------------
c. Appointment and Retention of
Corrupt LIUNA Officials to
Control LIUNA.................. 61
19 c.
d. Use of Election and Other
Internal Procedures to Control
LIUNA.......................... 70
19 d.
(1) Constitutionally Prescribed
Procedures..................... 71
19 d.(1)
(a) Office of The General
President...................... 71
19 d.(1)(a)
(b) Method of Nominating
Candidates for
International Officer
Positions...................... 71
19 d.(1)(b)
(c) Filling of Vacancies
on the General
Executive Board................ 72
19 d.(1)(c)
(2) Control of Elections 74
19 d.(2)
(3) Manipulation of the Hiring
Hall Used to Gain
Employment for Rank and
File Members of LIUNA.......... 75
19 d.(3)
(4) Use of Trusteeships to
Prevent Opposition to
Entrenched Leadership
Within LIUNA................... 79
19 d.(4)
-------------------------------------
D-0008
------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------
(a) Local 853.......................... 79
19 d.(4)(a)
(b) Local 13........................... 80
19 d.(4)(b)
(c) Local 66........................... 82
19 d.(4)(c)
(d) Local 46........................... 83
19 d.(4)(d)
(e) Local 7............................ 84
19 d.(4)(e)
(5) Formation of District
Councils to Prevent
Opposition to Entrenched
Leadership Within LIUNA................ 85
19 d.(5)
e. Cronyism and Nepotism in LIUNA...... 87
19 e.
IX. COUNT TWO, CONSPIRACY TO VIOLATE TITLE
18, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 1962(b) 96
Conspiracy to Acquire and Maintain
Control of LIUNA....................... 96
20
The Enterprise and Manner and Means.... 97
21-22
X. COUNT THREE, VIOLATION OF TITLE 18,
UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 1962(c).... 97
Conducting the Affairs of the
Enterprise Through a Pattern of
Racketeering Activity.................. 97
23
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