APPLICATION
FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING
Pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ. P. 12(d),
the plaintiffs submit this memorandum of law in support of a
preliminary hearing to show an enterprise in the meaning of 18 USC
1961 (4) and the facilitating of said enterprise in violation of 18
USC 2 by Defendant Luskin.
RULE 12(d) "PRELIMINARY HEARING.
The defense specifically enumerated (1) - (7) in subdivision (b) of
this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the motion
for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be
heard and determined before trial on application of any party,
unless the Court orders that the hearing and determination thereof
be deferred until the trial."
GROUNDS FOR PRELIMINARY
HEARING
The plaintiffs move this Court for a preliminary
hearing subject to Rule 8(b) F.R.C.P. The plaintiffs assert that the
defendant has filed a patently invalid defense that violates the
requirements of Rule 8(b) F.R.C.P.
RULE 8(b) IN ITS PERTINATE
PART
"DEFENSE: FORM OF DENIALS. A party shall state in short
and plain terms the party's defense to each claim asserted and shall
admit or deny the averments upon which the adverse party relies. If
a party is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth of an averment, the party shall so state and
this has the effect of a denial. Denials shall fairly meet the
substance of the averments denied"----
The primary reason for
a request for a preliminary hearing is Attorney Reeds intentional
avoidance of the averments asserted in the "Re-pleading of second
amended complaint against all named defendants in all their
capacities including as individuals associates with an enterprise 18
USC 1961 (4) second amendment pursuant to leave of Court and Rule
15(a) F.R.C.P" attached to the second amended complaint form. Rather
than answer the averments in said (re-pleading of 2d AC), which was
per the instruction of the Courts Ruling dated July 29, 1999 at 6,
"Because plaintiffs are pro se the Court will allow them one final
opportunity to replead their claims if they have a proper basis to
do so".
Rather than answering said Re-pleading Attorney Reed
answers only the complaint form. And then sates at 3 and 4 "simply
listing federal statutes, and alleging that they were violated on
unspecified occasions by someone is insufficient to state a pattern
of racketeering activity by Mr. Luskin". This is not an error by
Defendant Luskin's attorney. It was a strategy to avoid answering…
1) Re-pleading of second amended complaint against all named
defendants in all their capacities including as individuals
associates with an enterprise 18 USC 1961 (4) [attached to second
amended complaint (Docket #99) per the instructions of the Deputy
Clerk]. 2) Plaintiffs response to the Courts non-reference to, and
the significance of the non-reference to, the nature of an
enterprise in the meaning of 18 USC 1961(4) [attached to second
amended complaint (Docket #99) per the instructions of the Deputy
Clerk]. 3) Plaintiff's response motion to Courts "ruling on
defendants motion to dismiss" dated July 19, 1999 Docket #97
[attached to second amended complaint (Docket #99) per the
instructions of the Deputy Clerk]. 4) Motion in Support of the right
to collectively plead against an enterprise in the meaning of 18 USC
1961(4) [attached to second amended complaint (Docket #99) per the
instructions of the Deputy Clerk]. 5) Plaintiffs motion to add two
new defendants pursuant to rule 15(a) [granted by Court Docket
#102]. 6) Affidavit of Judith Dobrich [Docket #100]. 7) Affidavit of
Stephen Manos [Docket #101]. Attorney Reed also states at 3: "As to
Defendant Luskin, the above quoted language constitutes plaintiff's
complete effort to cure the pleading deficiencies identified by this
Court. Its effort is completely non-responsive to this court's
ruling".
Also at 3 of defendant memorandum " A. Plaintiffs
have failed to allege any new factual or legal contentions in
support of this RICO claim against Defendant Luskin".
Notwithstanding the fact that Attorney Reed does not
mention or address the Courts error of not mentioning the enterprise
element and the nature of the enterprise, or the Court error in
identifying the threshold Hobbs Act violations . By scheming to only
answer the complaint form, which states on page 3 in its pertinate
part regarding instructions---"state the facts clearly in your own
words without citing legal authority or argument". By said scheme
Attorney Reed employed an evasive tactic to destroy the efficacy of
the re-pleading and avoid the Courts error of the enterprise element
and Hobbs Act violations and in doing so evaded the primary charge
against Mr. Luskin facilitating [18 USC 2] a RICO ENTERPRISE
violating 18 USC 1962(d) (b,c) by doing so.
No where
in Defendant Luskin's memorandum are even the words enterprise or
facilitating to be found a clear violation of Rule 8(b) F.R.C.P. one
thing has to be made clear here concerning this case at BAR, That
is: The plaintiffs in this instant case have standing under 18 USC
1964(c) not against a securities firm like Merrill Lynch but against
a ruthless effective date RICO enterprise in the meaning of what 18
USC 1961 (4) was mandated for and the U. S. Attorney's office and
the FBI are not going to do anything here, because they have been
compromised in the meaning of a racketeering scheme known as the
Operational Agreement. Also at 3 of the defendants memorandum,
referring only to the complaint form again. The defendant states:
"allegations of predicate mail and wire fraud acts should state the
contents of the communications, who was involved, where and when
they took place, and explain why they were fraudulent".
See
Exhibit J Docket #37 titled standing order #5(c) mail fraud/wire
fraud Rule 9 F.R.C.P.
See letter dated July 24, 1996 from
Robert D. Luskin to Marc P. Mercier Esq. Re: Gary Wall and William
Cooksey letter mailed 18 USC 1341 and wired interstate 18 USC 1343
two predicate act violations against Wall and two predicate act
violations against Cooksey. See contents of letter July 24, 1996: "I
have directed Local 230 to permit Messrs. Wall and Cooksey to
exercise their right to readmission. For your information, I
enclosed a copy of my letter to Mr. Cheverie setting out my decision
in this matter.
As I understand matters, it is now for
Messrs. Wall and Cooksey to decide whether or not they wish to
exercise their right to re-admission, based in part upon the issues
that you and I discussed" signed by Robert D. Luskin.
Just
prior to that letter Attorney Marc Mercier advised Mr. Luskin that
he was going to file suit because of Mr. Luskins stalling and none
action in the matter. That fraudulent letter delayed the filing of
the suit in the companion case LMRDA 3:97-CV00942, in which the
plaintiffs are now on appeal because of a judgment on tolling lost,
because of that fraudulent letter. The purpose of said letter was to
stall and eventually stop two known out spoken critics of Arthur A.
Coia from regaining membership in Local 230 and in doing so
protecting Mr. Coia's associates in fact in Local 230, See also
Docket #37 Exhibit J at 1 and 2 regarding Mr. Luskin. Said
fraudulent letter dated July 24, 1996 from Robert D. Luskin to Marc
P. Mercier - Pleaded with particularity pursuant to Rule 9(b) is
where Defendant Luskin directly violated the Fed. Mail and Wire
Fraud Statutes 18 USC 1341 and 18 USC 1343 for the purposes to
maintain and control of the enterprise. In October 1997 Mr. Luskin,
with full knowledge of the facts, facilitated (USC 2) the entire
executive board (wrongdoer #1) mass fraudulent mailing to the
membership, See: Scheme #4 at 16, 17, & 18 of Re-Pleading of 2d
AC Dkt. #99. Both schemes "related" to the nature of the enterprise
possessing the same "common goal" to maintain and control the
enterprise against anyone who questions it. Both schemes vertically
related to the enterprise in violation of 18 USC 1961 (5) and both
schemes in violation of 18 USC 1962(d)(b,c). There are over (700)
seven hundred mail fraud violations in that one scheme plus multiple
horizontally related predicate act violations. See: Kornfeld -v-
First Jersey National Bank 638 F. Supp 454, "Each individual use of
the mails or wires in a fraudulent scheme constitutes a separate
offense even if part of one fraudulent scheme, for purpose of RICO
requirement of multiple predicate offenses".
Both Defendant
Luskin and Defendant Vere O. Haynes (signatory to the Operational
Agreement with the United States) facilitated over 700 counts of
mail fraud and the other substantive violations of RICO in scheme
#4. The facilitating in violation of 18 USC 2 was for the purpose to
maintain and control Arthur A. Coia's captive labor organization [Coia/Lopreato Group] in violation of 18 USC 1962(b,c) and in doing
so violated 18 USC 1962(d) creating the Luskin/Coia/Lopreato Group.
Also See: U. S. -v- Indelicato 865 Fed. Rep. 1370 Court of Appeals
(2d Cir) en banc: Finding #5, "Multiple acts of racketeering
activity are not excluded from reach of RICO simply because they
achieve their objective quickly or because they further but a single
scheme 18 USCA 1961 (1,5)".
Addressing defendants memorandum
at 4 stating: "In addition to listing the Hobbs Act and the mail
fraud statues - violations that this Court has already ruled were
insufficiently plead-plaintiffs add a variety of labor offenses,
only one of which is even a RICO predicate offense 29 USC 411, 401,
530 and 1959. Compare 18 U.S.C. 1961 (1)(B) (listing only two labor
offenses as racketeering activity, including 29 USC 501
(c)".
Plaintiffs did not just "add a variety of labor
offenses"--- the cited offenses including the Hobbs Act are the
offenses based on the racketeering activity" conducted in the
affairs of an enterprise of this nature - a labor organization. The
defendants purposely do not even mention the word enterprise let
alone the nature of the enterprise. Defendants defense is clearly
insufficient as a matter of law and as a matter of fact and a clear
violation of Rule 8(b) F.R.C.P. See United States -v- I.B.T. 708
Fed. Supp. 1388 Finding #4 ID 1389 (2d Cir). "Federal Labor Law does
not preempt RICO actions in context of labor union; RICO was enacted
precisely for purpose of facilitating eradication of organized crime
elements in legitimate business and labor unions, and legislature
intended that RICO be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial
purposes 18 USC 1961 et. Seq.
Also in response citing case
authority see United States -v- Boffa 688 F. 2d 919, "this Court
held that the RICO predicate act of mail fraud 18 USC 1341 may
encompass a scheme to deprive union members of the right to honest
and faithful service of union officials as provided by Section 501
of the LMRDA".
Also See United States v Local 560 581 Fed.
Supp. 279 Id. 287 relying on Boffa, "following a review of the
legislative history of both the Hobbs Act 18 USC 1951 and the LMRDA,
and relying on United States -v- Boffa 688 F. 2d 919, I conclude
that the rights guaranteed to union membership by the LMRDA Bill of
Rights 29 USC 411 are intangible rights which fall within the ambit
of the Hobbs Act, I further conclude that the Hobbs Act as construed
in this manner, was not impliedly repealed by the enactment of the
LMRDA and conduct which is regulated or prescribed by the LMRDA may
also violate RICO. RICO like the LMRDA is I determined legislation
intended to supplement the panoply of remedies designed to reach
racketeering".
Also at 4 of defendant memorandum regarding
the 18 USC 1512 violation. The official proceeding which they
intended to affect was this RICO action. Mr. Manos was a witness not
a plaintiff at that time see Docket #29 and Docket #99 Scheme #4 in
(re-pleading of 2d AC) dated August 30, 1999 at 16,17,18, and the
Court will see clearly - that said scheme involving the 1512
violation is way beyond the two predicate act requirement and was
part of the scheme to maintain and control an enterprise 18 USC 1962
(d) (b,c), 18 USC 1961 (1,5). Addressing Attorney Reed statement at
5 of his memorandum: "This complaint should suffer the same fate as
its four predecessors-dismissal for failure to state a RICO
offense"
As the Court knows, this is the second Amended
Complaint. Addressing in two parts defendants Footnote #4 at 5 of
Defendants Memorandum which states: Part I 4. Further, plaintiffs
have failed to allege that defendant Robert Luskin proximately
caused any of their alleged injuries see e.g. Laborers Local 17
Health and Benefit Fund -v- Philip Morris 172 F. 3d 223, 228, 29 (2d
Cir. 1999). Here plaintiffs have not alleged that defendants Luskin
caused them to lose any "wages, benefits, and membership rights" as
this Court has previously ruled, any such losses by plaintiffs were
sustained before the limitation period.
In response Local 17
-v- Philip Morris is inapposite and has no bearing on the
allegations lodged against Mr. Luskin in this case. Mr. Luskins
primary violation is of 18 USC 2 in doing so violating 18 USC
1962(d)(b,c) and the plaintiffs have been harmed directly,
individually, and collectively by the enterprise through Mr.
Luskin's facilitating. Facilitating/Conspiracy 18 USC 2, 18 USC
1962(d) See United States -v- Local 560 581 Fed. Sup. 279 Id. 280
"And "Enterprise" conspiracy under racketeering influence and
Corrupt Organization Act may be established without personal conduct
amounting to two (2) personal predicate offenses, instead, it is
sufficient if government demonstrates agreement through defendants
aiding and abetting in at least two (2) such offenses or through
assent to commission by someone else or several others of at least
two (2) such offenses."
See Also United States -v- I.B.T. 708
Fed. Supp. 1388 (2d Cir.) Finding #14 Id 1390
"Government
allegations were sufficient to support RICO claim, based on theory
of collective liability and conscious avoidance of knowledge,
against union officers who were fiduciaries with respect to union
members; complaint alleged that officers in question aided and
abetted others by failing to act when they had such duly, and lack
of knowledge of particular officers could only have resulted from
conscious avoidance of facts 28 USC 1961 et. Seq."
At a
minimum Defendant Luskin is the primary fiduciarie of Local 230 and
LIUNA and it is very clear that his facilitating 18 USC 2 and other
predicate act violations in the re-pleading of 2d AC are within the
limitation period. 18 USC 2 is applicable to the entire United
States Criminal Code see United States -v- Local 560 780 Fed. Supp.
267: "Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids,
abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission is
punishable as a principal. The criminal standard for aiding and
abetting (18 USC 2) applies in civil cases under 18 USCS 1964 where
extortion of union members rights are involved."
Part II
Footnote #4 Defendants Memorandum at 5:
"Further, plaintiffs'
request for dissolution is not available to private parties under 18
USC 1964(c) See, e.g. Religious Tech. Ctr. -v- Wallersham, 796 F. 2d
1076 1088-89 (9th Cir. 1986) No private equitable relief under
RICO."
In response: dissolution is available under 18 USC
1964(a) to the Court. In this case at Bar it will be a moot issue if
the named defendants, including Mr. Luskin are found guilty of the
violations cited. They will be automatically barred for 13 years
pursuant to 29 USC 504 (a) and will have no access to the union or
its funds. In addition to that argument See Now -v- Scheidler 897 F.
Supp. 1047. In said RICO action plaintiffs sought equitable relief
from 1962 (d) violations by associate-in-fact conspiracies with
multiple Hobbs Act violations [apposite to this instant case]. The
Court concluded Id. 1083 "the Court concludes that the plaintiffs
may seek equitable remedies they ask for"-----
THE NONE
MENTIONING OF THE WORDS ENTERPRISE AND FACILITATING. Defendant
Luskin in his instant 12(b)(6) motion ignores and eliminates two
primary words, enterprise and facilitating. The primary violation
[facilitating an enterprise] that is lodged against him in this
action. In addition to ignoring and eliminating the words enterprise
and facilitating, Defendant Luskin does not answer-The 18 USC
1962(b,c,& d) violations asserted-in the complaint form and the
re-pleading of the 2d AC. Defendant Luskin also ignores and does not
answer any of the H. J. Inc. multi scheme tests; which includes
Scheme #1) "the Operational Agreement scheme in the meaning of 18
USC 1962 (d)(b,c) violating 18 USC 1961 (1,5)." In Re-plead of 2d AC
DKr. #99 at 10 & 11, "the Operational Agreement as a concept,
pursuant to scantier Rule 9b" in re-plead of 2d AC Dkt.. #99 at 11,
12. Scheme #2: "Scheme to classify Plaintiff Wall and Cooksey as
barred pursuant to 29 USC 504(a) prior to February 13, 1995, and as
barred individuals per the Operational Agreement after February 13,
1995" in re-plead 2d AC Dkt.#99 at 13, 14, & 15. Scheme #4: "the
Manos threats by LeConche 18 USC 1951 assault by Freeman 29 USC 530
for the purposes of 18 USC 1962(d)(b,c) in the furtherance of the
enterprise facilitated by Vere O. Haynes an International
representative and signatory to the Operational Agreement". In
re-plead 2d AC Dkt. #99 at 16, 17 & 18. In all three of those
schemes a conspiracy violation has been alleged against Defendant
Luskin pursuant to subsection (d) of 1962. There is also a clear
showing of associates-in-fact conspiracies plus multiple Hobbs Act
violations see: Now -v- Scheidler 897 F. Supp. 1047 Id. 1050, The
Court Holding: "allegations that Hobbs Act plaintiffs sustained
economic losses resulting from defendants actions is sufficient to
withstand motion to dismiss for failure to state claim 18 USCA 1951
(a)(b)(2)".
There is no answer from the defendant a violation
of the requirement of Rule 8(b) F.R.C.P. DEFENDANT LUSKINS 12(b)(6)
MOTION IS DEFICIENT EVEN AGAINST THE COMPLAINT FORM ITSELF.
Notwithstanding the fact that Defendant Luskin does not answer the
re-plead or address the motions attached-Defendant Luskin's Rule 12
motion is deficient against the complaint form itself. See: Second
Amended Complaint Form Dkt. #99 at 4 see: C. NATURE OF THE CASE
"This action is against an enterprise 18 USC 1961 (4) and the
entities that are part of the enterprise 18 USC 1961 (3) and the
defendant person's 18 USC 1961 (3) that are associates of said
enterprise. For substantive violations of 18 USC 1962 (b)(c)(d), 18
USC 1961 (1)(5) from October 15, 1970 "effective date RICO
enterprise" Racketeering injury's in the meaning of 18 USC 1961 (5)
starting 1985 and continuing on by and through the "Operational
Agreement" February 13, 1995 to present day, with no determinable
completion date".
See also at 4 of 2d AC, the primary
defendant in Equity, defendant #12 the ENTERPRISE is the nature of
the case. See also at 4 Second Amended Complaint Form Dkt. #99
Defendant #12 "the enterprise 'Luskin/Coia/Lopreato Group' 18 USC
1961 (4) is an active effective date enterprise in the District and
Commonwealth of Connecticut since February 13, 1995 the L.C.L. has
maintained and controlled the existence of this effective date
enterprise. Its primary address not its exclusive address is 475
Ledyard Street, Hartford, Connecticut"
See also at 5 Second
Amended Complaint Form Dkt. #99 "Supporting Facts of D. Cause of
Action":
"Defendant Robert Luskin GEB Attorney/In-House
Prosecutor per agreement with the Department of Justice, Mr. Luskin
from February 13, 1995 has facilitated, consciously avoided facts,
and conspired with criminal acts of the Coia/Lopreato Group, [now
the "Luskin/Coia/Lopreato Group"] for violations of Federal Statutes
committed by international representatives, a signatory to the
Operational Agreement with the Department of Justice [Vere O.
Haynes], Local 230 Officers, Executive Board Members and associates
in the District and Commonwealth of Connecticut".
See Also at
9 Second Amended Complaint Form Dkt. #99 titled: The enterprise
October 15, 1970 Coia/Lopreato/February 13, 1995 "L.C.L."
Luskin/Coia/Lopreato Group". See Regarding Defendant Luskin at 9-10
-----From February 13, 1995 Defendant Luskin participated in the
maintenance and control, both directly and indirectly of Local 230
enterprise and LIUNA enterprise, through facilitating and the
conscious avoidance of facts and in some cases conspiracy to hide
the racketeering facts, all for the purpose of hiding the
enterprise. All of these defendants understood the scope of this
agreement and had knowledge that others were performing tasks
related to the accomplishment of their purpose, the collective
impact of which has directly and substantially contributed to the
existence of the climate of fear and intimidation in Local 230 with
no definable termination date".
The aforementioned averments
go uncontested by Defendant Luskin. Deficient in meeting the
requirement of Rule 8(b) F.R.C.P. Addressing at 5 of Defendant
Luskin's Rule 12 Motion
"B. PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO ALLEGE
ANY CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT LUSKIN". In asserting
said defense, the defendants cite United States -v- Inter. Broth. of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America 156 F.
3d 354 (2d Cir. 1998). The core of their argument is that said case
applies to this instant action-which it does not. In said case,
Teamster President Ron Carey challenged the decision of an Election
Officer who disqualified Carey from running for re-election. In said
opinion Id. 156 F. 3d 359 the Second Circuit observed that it had
repeatedly held that persons appointed pursuant to the IBT Consent
Decree are not state actors because they derive their authority from
the Teamster's constitution which incorporated the terms of the
Consent Decree citing U.S. -v- IBT 981 F. 2d 1362, U. S. -v- IBT 954
F. 2d 801, U. S. -v- IBT 941 F. 2d 1292 all from the 2d Circuit. All
of the cited IBT cases including 156 F. 3d 354 are inapposite to
this instant action-the reason being i.e. the Teamster's Consent
Decree was one of thirteen consent decrees filed in a U. S. District
Court and all have either a Court appointed monitor, Court Liaison
Officer, Court appointed Independent Supervisor with disciplinary
powers or Court appointed Trustee. See the Honorable Judge Cabranes
Holding #3 Id 156 F. 3d 355 "District Court had sufficient
evidentiary record on which to assess EO's factual
determination"
That is not the case in this case at bar as a
matter of fact, it is just the opposite. The Court's ruling dated
July 29, 1999 stopped a motion to compel pursuant to the crime fraud
exemption, against Defendant Luskin-which this plaintiff sees as
fraudulent concealment. In addressing due process the Honorable
Judge Cabranes was careful to make a distinction in his 2d Holding
Id. 156 F. 3d 355. "(2) EO's decision did not implicate
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA)". LMRDA
violations are multiple and clearly documented in this instant case!
Also in addition to the "Operational Agreement" violating the
principles of Federal Prosecution, see: United States Attorney's
Manual Chapter 110-9-110 401 Page 5: "Inclusion of RICO count in an
indictment solely or even primarily to create a bargaining tool for
later plea negotiations on lesser counts would not be appropriate
and would violate the principles of Federal Prosecution".
In
addition to that fact-the Operational Agreement has eliminated the
JUDICARY BRANCH of Government. In this case in the Federal Court
system in the District and Commonwealth of Connecticut [The D.O.J.]
has designated through the Attorney General [in the meaning of 18
USC 1961 (7)] Defendant Luskin as a "racketeering investigator" to
define and apply the law, and order its enforcement or
non-enforcement of Judicial Code. And in doing so eliminating the
Judiciary Branch of Government and in doing so compromising its
associated agencies the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the
United States Attorney's Office See[ Dkt.#100, Affidavit Judith
Dobrich and Dkt.#101 Affidavit Stephen Manos], depriving the three
named plaintiffs of our constitutional right to due process
violating the fourteen (14th) amendment of the constitution, by
abridging Article III Section 1 of the constitution which states:
"The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in a
Supreme Court and such inferior courts as the Congress may from time
to time ordain and establish"
In order for the Court to
recognize the clear difference between the (EO) Officer in U. S. -v-
I.B.T. as a "state actor" and Defendant Luskin as a "state actor"
see Exhibit F of Standing Order Dkt. #37 (LIUNA Innovation at Work)
page #34 Appendix A, the Court will see upon review the predicate
acts of 18 USC 1961 (1). The Court will also see on page 55, 56
& 57 (the Agreement) signed by JoAnn Harris, Assistant Attorney
General and James B. Burns, United States Attorney , Paul E. Coffey,
Chief Organized Crime and Racketeering Section Criminal Division, U.
S. Department of Justice on page #57, entrusting Mr. Luskin with
carrying into effect violations of 18 USC 1961 (1), as part of his
job of internal reform in eliminating racketeering. Now see: 18 USC
1961 (7) defining "racketeering investigator" means any attorney or
investigator so designated by the Attorney General and charged with
the duty of enforcing or carrying into effect this Chapter [18 USC
1961 et. Seq.] The Court can see a clear distinction between the
responsibilities and authority, of the E. O. Officer in said
Teamster Case and Defendant Luskin actions and none actions in this
instant case as state actor, and the Court can see that our
constitutional rights were abridged by the illegal Operational
Agreement and State Actor Defendant Luskin. The only similarity
between the two cases is that the consent decree and the Operational
Agreement are both part of the constitutions of both trade unions.
The great difference is that the Teamsters Consent Decree was and
still is subject to Judicial Review and the Operational Agreement
never has been subject to judicial review. The only judicial review
of the Operational Agreement is in this instant action-where it is
being shown for what it is, an 18 USC 1962(d) conspiracy violating
18 USC 1962 (b,c), 18 USC 1961 (5). CONCLUSION: Defendant Luskin is
being sued in four different capacities. In his personal capacity as
G.E.B. Attorney, in his capacity as Fiduciary Officer per agreement
with the Department of Justice and LIUNA and as the Luskin of the
enterprise shown as the Luskin/Coia/Lopreato Group under Claim I.
Under Claim II Defendant Luskin is being sued for his actions and
non actions as a state actor. Defendant Luskin has failed to defend
against material facts and legal issues in all capacities. A hearing
at this stage of the litigation would be fair to the plaintiff and
appropriate. The plaintiffs have shown clearly that they have
standing under 18 USC 1964(c) and were directly harmed by
substantive violations of 18 USC 1962(d)(b)(c) by direct predicate
acts of 18 USC 1961(1,5) within tolling some predicate act
violations that occurred within the four (4) year period were part
of long term schemes that Defendant Luskin
furthered.
SUBMITTED BY:
GARY R. WALL, PRO SE 60
Carriage Hill Drive Wethersfield, Connecticut 06109 860-529-2651
860-563-5915
CERTIFICATION
This is to certify that copy of plaintiffs Memorandum of Law in
Support of the Motion for a Preliminary Hearing has been sent Next
Day Air to Terrence G. Reed, Reed & Hostage, 1025 Thomas
Jefferson Street, N. W., Suite 455, West, Washington, D. C.
20007-3763 and First Class postage prepaid to John T. Fussell,
Cheverie & Associates, Commerce Center One, 333 East River
Drive, Suite 101, East Hartford, Connecticut
06108-4203.
Terrence G. Reed, Esq. Reed & Hostage 1025
Thomas Jefferson Street, N.W. Suite 455, West Washington, D. C.
20007-3763
John T. Fussell Cheverie & Associates 333 East
River Drive Suite 101 East Hartford, Connecticut
06108-4203
SUBMITTED BY:
GARY R. WALL, PRO SE 60
Carriage Hill Drive Wethersfield, Connecticut 06109 860-529-2651
860-563-5915
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